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Introduction
This thesis studies aspects related to the role of schools characteristics and their governance
on students’ learning outcomes. The thesis contains three chapters. The first chapter ex-
plores the effect of exposing students to more science in high school on their enrolment and
persistence in STEM majors at university. It exploits the different timing in the implemen-
tation of a reform that induced high schools in the UK to offer more science to high ability
14 year-old children. The findings show that a stronger science curriculum at high school
increases the probability of enrolling and of graduating in a STEM major at university. More-
over, the effect masks substantial gender heterogeneity. It is indeed mostly concentrated on
boys. Girls tend to choose more scientific subjects, but still the most female-dominated ones:
they choose medicine, not engineering.
The second chapter of this thesis analyses the effects of providing strong research incentives to
university professors on the way they allocate effort between teaching and research and on the
way they select into different types of universities. I find evidence that teaching and research
efforts are substitute in the professors’ cost function: the impact of research incentives is
positive on research activity and negative on teaching performance. Effects are stronger for
young faculty members, who are exposed not only to monetary incentives but also to career
concerns. Moreover, I find that less skilled researchers tend to leave the university under
stronger research incentives. Since I estimate that teaching and research skills are positively
correlated, this implies that also bad teachers tend to leave the university. The overall impact
of stronger research incentives on the university teaching quality is therefore ambiguous: the
negative effect on teaching performance for incumbent professors is compensated by the
positive sorting effect, given by changes in the composition of teachers.
The third chapter explores where do the large cross-country differences in students’ perfor-
mances in international standardized tests come from. This chapter argues that, while most
of the debate concentrates on country differences in the school systems, differences in cultural
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environments and parental inputs are instead of great importance. I show indeed that the
school performance of second generation immigrants is closely related to the average one of
native students who still study in their parents’ countries of origin. This holds true even af-
ter accounting for different family background characteristics, different schools attended and
different patterns of selection into immigration. This pattern questions whether PISA scores
should be interpreted only as a quality measure for a country’s educational system. They
actually contain an important intergenerational and cultural component. Parental inputs
are found indeed to explain a large part of the cross country variation in school performance,
for instance they account for more than one third of the gap between East Asia and other
regions.
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Chapter 1
STEM Graduates and High School
Curriculum: Does Early Exposure to
Science Matter?
1.1 Introduction
In the new heavily globalized and innovation driven economy, increasing the number of
Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM)1 graduates at university is found to
generate high social returns in terms of long-term productivity, growth and competitiveness
(Winters, 2014; Peri et al., 2013; Moretti, 2012; Atkinson and Mayo, 2010; Jones, 2002).
Moreover, graduating in a STEM major also represents a very profitable private investment
for college graduates themselves. First, lifetime earnings of graduates in STEM majors are
extremely high (Kirkeboen et al., 2016; Hastings et al., 2013; Pavan and Kinsler, 2015; Ren-
dall and Rendall, 2014; Koedel and Tyhurst, 2010): Altonji et al. (2012) show that nowadays
intra-educational income differences are comparable to inter-educational differences. In the
US in 2009 the wage gap between the average electrical engineer and someone majored in
general education was almost identical to the wage gap between the average college graduate
and the average high school graduate. Second, the differences in earnings among university
majors have increased substantially over time: some scholars (Rendall and Rendall, 2014)
claim that a large part of the increased income inequality in the US is driven by increasing
1Throughout the paper I define as ”STEM” the following majors: Physical science, Mathematical and
Computer science and Engineering.
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returns of scientific and mathematical university majors. Third, graduates in STEM fields
earn more independently of the quality of the institution they attend (Kirkeboen et al., 2016;
Arcidiacono et al., forthcoming): engineering is considered a better investment than Har-
vard (James et al., 1989). Finally, also non-monetary returns are high in STEM occupations:
Goldin (2014) classifies occupations based on their degree of temporal flexibility, i.e. how
important it is to stay long or particular hours in the office, and STEM occupations are
ranked among the first.
However, despite the high social and private benefits obtained from graduating in STEM
majors, the general consensus among policy-makers is that the current supply of STEM
skills is insufficient and, when combined with forecast growth in demand for STEM skills,
it presents a potentially significant constraint on future economic growth (UK HM Trea-
sury and BIS, 2010; The President’s Council of Advisor on Science and Technology, 2012;
European Commission, 2010).2 The governments of many countries invested a very large
amount of funds to induce more graduates in STEM (Atkinson and Mayo, 2010). The US
federal government for instance is considering actions with the objective of increasing STEM
graduates by 34% annually (The President’s Council of Advisor on Science and Technology,
2012). Still, the graduation rate or even the degree of interest for students in graduating in
these majors has remained pretty stable since the ’80s (Altonji et al., 2012) and, while the
literature on choices of educational levels is very wide and consolidated (starting from the
seminal work by Mincer (1974)), there is relatively little work on choices of fields of study.
This paper evaluates how much of the lack in STEM graduates can be attributed to high
schools, and in particular to the curriculum they offer. Ellison and Swanson (2012) show
indeed that there is a large heterogeneity in high schools effectiveness in developing talents in
math and science, which is not explained by differences in schools composition. This paper
investigates the role of high school curriculum and it addresses three questions in particular.
First, does being exposed to more science courses in high school increase by itself the supply
of STEM graduates? Second, who is induced to take more science classes, when exposed to
the option of taking them at age 14? Third, this paper evaluates whether more exposure
to science at age 14 works for everybody, or whether the effect is concentrated on some
segments of the population. This is a relevant question to distinguish whether is it more
efficient to force all students to take more science courses in high school or to target the offer
2Overall, STEM employment grew three times more than non-STEM employment over the last twelve
years, and it is expected to grow twice as fast by 2018. According to a report by the Information Technology
and Innovation Foundation (2010), the number of STEM graduates in the US will have to increase by 20-30%
by 2016 to meet the projected growth of the economy.
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to some subgroups of the population only, those most likely to benefit from it. Some papers
(Dougherty et al., 2015) find that universal coverage of stronger mathematics courses may
not be overall beneficial. Moreover, by evaluating the heterogeneity of the effect with respect
to gender, this chapter investigates whether increasing students’ preparation in science has
an effect on shrinking the gender gap in enrollment in STEM majors.
The identification of the effect of studying more science in high school is difficult because
of what I call a ‘nested selection’ problem: of students into different schools -based on the
curriculum they offer- and of students into different courses within the school they chose. To
my knowledge I am the first to fully address and test both sources of endogeneity to answer
this type of question. I eliminate the selection in different courses within the same school by
collapsing the analysis at the school level (in the spirit of Altonji (1995)). I address the other
layer of selection, i.e. the selection of students into different schools, by exploiting exogenous
variation in the timing of the introduction of an advanced science course in English high
schools. The UK government introduced in 20043 an entitlement to study advanced science
for high ability students at age 14, with the explicit aim of fostering enrollment in post-
secondary science education. This resulted in a strong increase in the number of schools
offering advanced science: from 20% in 2002 to 80% in 2011. As a consequence, the share of
students taking advanced science increased from 4% in 2002 to 20% in 2011 and the increase
was almost entirely concentrated on high ability students4 (see Figure 1). Thanks to a novel
dataset, obtained combining different administrative sources from the UK, I propose two
alternative identification strategies that approach this type of selection problem from two
complement perspectives and use two different sources of variation. The first uses within
school over time variation in the type of courses offered. It exploits the three year time lag
between the moment when students choose their high school (age 11) and the moment when
they choose their field courses (age 14). It evaluates the effect on students unexpectedly
exposed to the offer of the advanced science course, because their schools started to offer the
advanced science course only once they chose the school.5
The second identification strategy tests the robustness of my results by using variation
in whether the schools are offering advanced science that were in place even before the
students started to attend their schools. I exploit the fact that schools in the UK, when
3After the publication on a ten-year investment framework for science and innovation (UK Government,
2004)
4I define high ability students as those who were in the top 30 percentile of the primary school grades
distribution. The increase for these students was of 35 percentage points, from 15% to about 50%.
5A similar idea, with only one year lag, has been used by Joensen and Nielsen (2009, 2015), to evaluate
a different treatment. However in their context schools self-selected in the program and, due to the lack of
data, it was impossible to check that selection was not driven by cohort-specific demand-driven shocks or by
the fact that families anticipated the change in curriculum (since there is 1 year lag only).
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oversubscribed, select students based to home-to-school distance and schools catchment areas
vary (unpredictably) over time. My second instrument therefore compares students living
in the same neighbourhood, who are more or less likely to enrol in schools offering advanced
science, because of exogenous changes in schools’ catchment areas over time.
My empirical findings may be summarized by three broad conclusions. First, I find that
taking advanced science at age 14 increases the probability of choosing science at age 16
by 5 percentage points and of enrolling in STEM majors by about 2 percentage points.
Moreover, offering more science courses at high school not only induces more students to
enrol in STEM majors but also increases the likelihood that they graduate in these majors.
This is extremely important, given the large problem with persistence in this kind of ma-
jors (Arcidiacono et al., forthcoming; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2014). Second, I find
that previous test scores in science are the main determinant behind the choice of taking
advanced science, when students are exposed to this option. Boys and girls at this stage
behave similarly and select into advanced science in the same proportion. Still, third, I find
that the final effects are very heterogeneous and are mainly concentrated on boys and on
middle-high ability students. The gender gap in STEM major enrolment therefore increases
as a consequence of this policy; not because less girls take advanced science at age 14, but
because girls, when exposed to more science in high school, are induced to take, yes, more
challenging subjects6, but still the most female-dominated ones: they choose medicine, not
engineering.
Taken together, my findings can inform ongoing debates over government intervention to ad-
dress apparent mismatches and market frictions in the supply and demand for post-secondary
fields of study. My results suggest that to reinvigorate STEM education, and high skilled
STEM education in particular, governments should consider a policy aimed at offering more
science courses to high ability students during high schools. I estimate that the policy con-
tributed to one third of the increase the share of STEM graduates in the UK between 2005
and 2010.
This paper speaks to the literature aimed at explaining choices of university majors. Most
of what we know so far comes from surveys or informational experiments. The evidence is
mixed. The most common explanations look at the role of expected earnings; of competencies
and preparation; of self-confidence; of preferences and of innate ability (Arcidiacono et al.,
2012; Arcidiacono, 2004; Beffy et al., 2012; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2014; M and
Zafar, 2014). However preferences and ability are usually considered to be fixed over time,
6I define challenging the subjects usually taken by high ability students
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and it is therefore difficult for policy-makers to shape them; returns to STEM majors are
already very high, as stated before, and the elasticity of major choice to expected earnings
is found to be very low (Beffy et al., 2012). Moreover, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner
(2014) show that students start university being over-confident not under-confident about
their scientific ability. There is, instead, large scope for policies intervening on students’
preparation and on primary and secondary schools quality. Many scholars (Cameron and
Heckma, 2001; Moretti, 2012), indeed, attribute the lack of STEM graduates to the low
quality of the US school system. While some studies look at the effects of school inputs
(usually at the university level), like peers (De Giorgi et al., 2010; Anelli and Peri, 2015),
teachers (Scott E. Carrell and West, 2010) and university coursework (Fricke et al., 2015),
there is surprisingly little quantitative work on the effects of high school curriculum (Altonji
et al., 2012). Still, not only every single government has to make at some point the decision
about how to design its country high school curriculum and how to implement it optimally in
order to reduce possible mismatches between demand and supply of skills, but also, differently
from other policies like changes in peers, this is not a zero sum choice: everybody may
potentially benefit from an optimally designed curriculum.
My paper improves on the existing literature in several ways.7
First, I address both layers of selection of students into courses mentioned before. Most
studies (Altonji, 1995; Levine and Zimmerman, 1995; Betts and Rose, 2004; Joensen and
Nielsen, 2009, 2015) use across school variation in the type of curriculum offered and do
not fully address possible selection of students into schools, based on the curriculum they
offer. Since family background and individual motivation are important determinants of both
choice of majors and of high schools, the bias in estimates that do not take into account
selection into schools could be important and could lead to overestimate the effects. I show
that, even in my context when the variation in curriculum is induced by a policy, adding
school-level controls is not enough to eliminate selection bias: when checking the identifying
assumptions, the inclusion of school fixed effects and the presence of an instrument turn out
to be crucial to correctly identify the effect of interest.
Second, I am able to identify the effect of offering more (natural) science courses only.
Usually (Altonji, 1995; Joensen and Nielsen, 2009, 2015; Gorlitz and Gravert, 2015; Jia,
2014), changes in high school curricula imply a restructuring of many different courses and
it is difficult to isolate the effect of one single subject. The policy I consider strengthens
instead the natural science curriculum only, without intervening on other subjects. Still,
my treatment has multiple components: taking advanced science also implies a change in
7I mention here both papers that look at the effect on earnings and on majors, even if most of the
literature looks at earnings without focussing on the effect on choices of majors.
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classroom heterogeneity and composition.8 I disentangle the curriculum effect from the peer
channel, using an instrument for peers that exploits within-school over-time variation in the
ability of predicted peers, depending on whether the school offers advanced science or not. I
find that the effect of the additional science course persists even after controlling for changes
in peers’ characteristics. This is key to identify the exact origin of the effect and therefore
to allow policy-makers to reproduce the policy in other contexts.
Third, I am able to look at the effect for extremely high ability students with potentially very
high probability of succeeding in STEM majors. These are the students of highest interest
for policy-makers because they are more likely to actually enrol in STEM majors and to make
important contributions to scientific and technological fields. Most of the existing empirical
works (Goodman, 2012; Cortes et al., 2015) analyze policies that affect almost entirely low
ability students, not likely to enroll to university at all, or students for whom taking science
is rather costly (Joensen and Nielsen, 2009, 2015).9
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I describe the data,
the English school system and the reform of the advanced science program in UK high
schools. Section 1.3 provides an overview of the main identification strategies. Section 1.4
presents the estimated impact of advanced science on post-16 educational outcomes and it
checks the identifying assumptions and the robustness of the results. Section 1.5 inspects
the mechanisms behind the estimates and, finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data and institutional setting
1.2.1 The English school system
Compulsory education in England is organized in four Key Stages (KS). At the end of each
stage students are evaluated in standardized national exams. Figure 2 shows a timeline of
the UK educational system. Pupils enter school at age 4, the Foundation Stage, then they
move to Key Stage 1 (KS1), spanning ages 5 and 6, and Key Stage 2 (KS2, from age 7 to age
8because the advanced science course provides the possibility of taking a course exclusively attended only
by other very high ability students.
9These studies exploit for instance changes in minimum math requirements across US states over time
or compare students just below or just above the threshold for attending remedial classes in math and find
modest effects on earnings, concentrated on low-SES students. In my setting, instead, compliers include also
extremely high ability students, within the same school.
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11).10 At the end of KS2 children leave primary school and go to secondary school, where
they progress to Key Stage 3 (KS3, age 12-14) and Key Stage 4 (KS4, age 15-16). At KS4
students start choosing some subjects.11 In particular, out of usually between 10 and 12
qualifications, students typically choose between 4 and 6 subjects.12 At age 16 compulsory
education ends and students may continue their secondary studies for a further two years.
This phase is called Key Stage 5 (age 17-18) and may take place in the same secondary
school (about 60% of the schools also offer KS5 courses) or in a different school. Again,
students have many different options: they can choose more vocational or more academic-
oriented type of qualifications (the so-called A levels). Students usually take three A level
or equivalent qualifications13, and are free to choose any subject.14 Finally, higher education
usually begins at age 19 with a three-year bachelor’s degree. Admission to university is
usually based on which subjects were chosen at KS5 and on the grades achieved.
1.2.2 Science in high school
While science is a core component of the National Curriculum at KS4, there are several
different ways to fulfill the requirement. All students are required to study the basics elements
of all three natural sciences (physics, chemistry and biology) and should at least take the so-
called ‘single science’ or core science course (which is worth 1 KS4 qualification). They can,
moreover, choose to take the ‘double science’ course (worth 2 qualifications) which leads
to more knowledge in all the three subjects or the ‘triple science’ course (which is called
advanced science and is equivalent to take one full qualification in each of the three natural
science subjects). Finally students can also choose more vocational science qualifications.
Taking triple science implies both longer instruction time and the study of more complex
science topics.15 Double science and, more recently, triple science provide the standard routes
into the fulfillment of KS4 requirements.
10KS1 corresponds to grade 1 and 2 in the US school system, KS2 to grades 3,4 and 5.
11A number of different qualification types are available to young people at KS4, varying in their level
of difficulty. These include: GCSE (the most common qualification in the UK and the most academic
oriented), and other more vocational qualifications. I will only consider GCSE qualifications or GCSE
equivalent qualifications.
12The six compulsory subjects are: English, math, (single) science, information and communication, phys-
ical education and citizenship. Students in general take overall between 10 and 12 qualifications.
1350% of students takes between 3 and 3.5 A level equivalent qualifications.
14Many university, when selecting students, look not only at grades in A level but also at the subjects
chosen, however none of them takes into consideration the type of KS4 subjects chose (see Section 1.4.4).
15In this case students study more difficult topics such as electric current, transformers, some medical
application, more quantitative topics in chemistry etc.
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In 2004 the UK Government published a ten-year investment framework for science and
innovation (UK Government, 2004). The framework set out the Governments ambition for
UK science and innovation over the next decade and emphasized in particular the need
for more graduates in science. Taking triple science was considered extremely important,
because “it gives students the necessary preparation and confidence to go on and study
science” (Confederation of British Industry). An entitlement to study triple science for
students achieving at least level 6 or above at KS3 science (the students on the top 40%
of the grade distribution) was established.16 The result was a very large increase in the
number of schools offering triple science. While in 2002 less than 20% of schools offered
triple science, by 2011 the share became more than 80% (see Figure 1). Between 2002 and
2011 the share of students choosing triple science increased from 4% to 20% and the increase
was mostly concentrated among high ability students17 (for whom the share increased from
15% to 50%).
Since I will exploit within school over time variation in courses offered, it is important to
explore what drives this variation.There are several, mainly supply driven, reasons why the
exact timing of the introduction of the triple science option differs by schools. First, the lack
of specialized teachers. 50% of science and math students in English high schools are not
taught by teachers specialized in the subject. For teachers teaching outside their expertise,
triple science is particularly demanding and they need more time to get familiar with the
material. Second, the school size: for small schools it is difficult to offer a large amount of
subject options. With the ten-year investment framework, the government encouraged new
collaborative arrangements with other schools (to jointly provide triple science). However,
setting these agreements up takes time and many schools need the support of their Local
Education Authority (LEA) and the exact timing of the conclusion of these agreements is
uncertain. Finally, support and pressure on schools to fulfill the entitlement to triple science
was provided at the LEA level.18 Some LEAs are not as positive and supportive as others
regarding the introduction of triple science. Figure 3 shows that the increase in the share of
schools offering triple science was very heterogeneous across different LEAs.
16In particular the government stated that “all pupils achieving at least level 6 [Level 6 or above is
equivalent to the top 30% of students] at KS3 should be entitled to study triple science at KS4, for example
through collaborative arrangements with other schools.
17Based on their primary school grade in math, science and English.
18LEAs organize courses both on how to organize the time schedule to fit the new curriculum and on the
new material covered and encourage school-to-school learning. There is large heterogeneity on how actively
different LEAs promoted and pushed the introduction of the Triple Science option in schools. In total there
are 152 local authorities in England.
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1.2.3 Data
I use administrative data on all students in maintained schools in the UK, from primary
school till the end of secondary school. Moreover, I link these data to the universe of all UK
university students. In this way, my final dataset follows students from primary school till
the end of their university career.
I obtain information on students demographic characteristics from The Pupil Level Annual
School Census (PLASC) that collects information on students’ gender, ethnicity, Free School
Meal Eligibility (FSM), Special Education Needs (SEN), language group as well as their
postcodes.
I obtain information on students’ attainments in all their Key Stages exams (from KS1 till
KS5) from the National Pupil Database (NPD). The NPD contains moreover information
on every single subject chosen (and the corresponding grade) in KS4 and KS5. Finally,
NPD provides a very rich set of data on school characteristics (peer groups, types of school,
teachers’ hirings, schools location etc.).
From the NPD dataset I also obtain the information on which courses are offered by each
school. In particular, I follow the official methodology used by the English Department of
Education and I infer that a school offers a course if at least one pupil at the school took
an assessment in that specific course and year. My results are robust to different definitions
(at least 5 pupils, at least 5% of the students, for at least two consecutive years etc.) and
all different definitions are extremely highly correlated.
I then link the NPD to the universe of UK university students, the Higher Education Statis-
tical Agency (HESA) dataset. The HESA dataset provides information on whether pupils
progress to university, on their major, on the institution they attend and on whether they
graduate and in which major. I combine these two data sources to create a dataset fol-
lowing the entire population of five cohorts of English school children. My sample includes
pupils who took KS4 examinations (at age 16) between the academic years 2004/2005 and
2009/2010. After 2010, there would be no information on university outcomes, because I only
have data on university results till 2013. Before 2005, there is no information on whether
the school was offering triple science when the student applied to the school, because the
data collection starts in 2002 and there are three years of lag. Using information on the high
school attended by each individual, I match the individual record with school level data on
whether the school was offering triple science when the student applied and three years later,
when she had to choose her KS4 subjects.
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Finally, I impose a set of standard restrictions on the data. First, I exclude special schools,
hospital schools, schools where there is a three tier system instead of a two tier system.
Second, I only use students who can be tracked from KS2 to KS4.19 This leaves me with
approximately 530,000 students per cohort.
The data I use are a major improvement over previous studies. While the very detailed nature
of the information needed on subject choices gives particularly large scope for measurement
error problems in survey data, the students’ administrative dataset usually available in other
countries do not usually contain all the elements necessary for this analysis. For instance,
most datasets do not have information on university outcomes and the few administrative
datasets that include post high school outcomes as well, refer to small countries such as Scan-
dinavian countries, relatively homogeneous in terms of students’ background and sometimes
do not include information on previous test scores (Joensen and Nielsen, 2009, 2015). The
large amount of observations and the heterogeneity in the students’ background available in
the UK dataset, provide me with enough power to accurately run my analysis and to study
the heterogeneity of the effect on subgroups of the population.
1.3 Empirical strategy
1.3.1 A ‘nested’ selection problem
The main identification challenge when studying the effects of high school courses on post
high school outcomes, is to correct for selection bias.
To fix ideas, consider the case in which students choose between taking more science in high
school (D = 1) or not (D = 0). The observed choice of university major (Y ) can be linked
to potential majors (Yj where j = 1, 0) and the type of science in high school (D) as:
Y = Y0 +D(Y1 − Y0) (1)
The OLS estimates of the effect of choosing more science in high school, can be written as
follows:
E(Y |D = 1)− E(Y |D = 0) = E(Y1|D = 1)− E(Y0|D = 0) (2)
19I checked whether this selection generates any bias (i.e. is correlated with the instrument) and this is
not the case. The results are available upon request.
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The main challenge is that students selecting into certain high school courses would have
different potential outcomes in any case, meaning that a simple OLS does not provide the
right counterfactual (E(Y0|D = 0) 6= E(Y0|D = 1)). In practice the bias is generated by
what I call a ‘nested selection’ problem, because there are two layers of selection: selection
of students into schools offering triple science and selection of students into triple science,
for a given school.
Let’s call S a dummy equal to 1 if the school attended by student i offers triple science and
0 otherwise. Then, the OLS estimates can be written as follows:
E(Y |D = 1)−E(Y |D = 0) = E(Y1 − Y0|D = 1, S = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ATT
+
P (S = 1|D = 0) [E(Y0|D = 1, S = 1)− E(Y0|D = 0, S = 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection into courses
]+
P (S = 0|D = 0) [E(Y0|D = 1, S = 1)− E(Y0|D = 0, S = 0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection into schools+courses
(3)
In particular, if I parametrize potential outcomes and I introduce covariates Xist such that
Y jist = β1Dist + β2Xist + δs + δt + u
j
ist (4)
where Dist is the usual dummy equal to 1 if student i in high school s, in cohort t takes
triple science and 0 otherwise; j = 1, 0 refers to the scenarios where Dist is equal to 1 or 0
respectively; Xist are school and student controls; δs are school fixed effects and δt are year
fixed effects. Finally, ujist is the error term when j = 1 or j = 0. Combining equation 1 and
equation 4, I get:
Yist = β1Dist + β2Xist + δs + δt + u
0
ist +Dist(u
1
ist − u0ist)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ist
(5)
where β1 is the effect of more science in high school on subsequent subject choices.
Estimating equation 5 by OLS is likely to lead to inconsistent and probably upward biased
estimates of β1, because of selection bias. Adding controls to equation 5 may not be enough:
students may select into schools or into subjects according to unobservable characteristics,
like family expectations and individual motivation that are important determinants of both
choices of majors and choices of high schools and high school courses.
I address the nested selection problem by tackling the first and the second layer of selection
in two different ways. Selection of students into courses within the same schools (second
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layer) is addressed by collapsing the analysis at the school level, since I use an instrument
that varies only at the school-cohort level. The error term becomes st = u
0
st +D(u
1
st − u0st)
and varies only at the school-year level. Most papers (in the spirit of Altonji (1995)) use
school average curriculum as instrument and basically adopt this approach and therefore
address this type of selection only.
This leaves space, however, to endogeneity due to selection of students into schools offering
different curricula (first layer). Differently from most of the existing literature, I also address
this layer of selection and I do it in two different ways, that exploit two different types of
variation.
1.3.2 First instrument
My first identification strategy uses as instrument for Dist a dummy equal to one if student i
in school s and cohort t was unexpectedly exposed to the triple science option. I rely on the
time span between the time when students choose high schools (age 11) and the time when
they choose their optional subjects (age 14). When students choose a school, they choose
the school that maximizes their expected utility, conditional on their information set at age
11. However, by the time they have to choose subjects, at age 14, some schools may have
started to offer triple science as induced by the policy. I will therefore compare two types
of students, a priori identical because they all selected schools not offering triple science at
age 11. My treated group is composed by students whose schools unexpectedly start to offer
triple science by the time they turn 14 (three years after they enrol). My control group are
students whose schools does not offer triple science when they have to choose subjects at age
14.
My first stage equation is:
Dist = γ1zst + γ2Xist + ζs + ζt + vistj (6)
where zst is a dummy equal to 1 if school s was not offering triple science when students
from cohort t applied to secondary schools and has started to offer triple science by the time
they choose their KS4 subjects at age 14; Xist are school and individual controls and ζs and
ζt are school and cohort fixed effects. I only include schools not offering triple science when
students applied.20
20The results are robust if I also include schools already offering triple science when students applied and
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This strategy mainly relies on two assumptions.
First, the assumption that the information set of both students in the treatment and in the
control group at age 11, when they choose their school, does not include the information on
whether the school is going to offer triple science in the next three years. This is very likely,
given the large time lapse and uncertainty on when exactly teachers/classrooms and time
schedules would be ready. Moreover, students are not totally free to choose the school they
want: there are exogenous geographical constraints in choosing schools in the UK, especially
if schools are oversubscribed. Finally, in Section 1.4.4, I show that students enrolling in
schools offering triple science are observationally identical to students enrolled in schools not
offering triple science: there is no sign of strategic selection of schools based on whether they
offer the advanced science course, even if the information is available to parents and students
at age 11.
Second, the assumption that schools’ decisions on when exactly to start offering triple science
are related to supply-driven rather than demand-driven factors: schools must decide when
to start offering triple science not based on the quality of the current cohort attending the
school. In Section 1.2.2 I described some supply driven reasons why schools may delay the
introduction of triple science. In Section 1.4.4 I show that the timing of the introduction of
the triple science option is not correlated with (observable) characteristics of current students
in the school. Finally, I check that school s, before starting to offer triple science, was on
the same trend of all other schools.
1.3.3 Second instrument
Still, even if there is no evidence that schools decide when to offer triple science depending
on observable characteristics of their current cohort, it may still be that the unobservable
characteristics matter. This is impossible to test. My second strategy however is not subject
to this last concern because it exploits variation in available courses that existed even before
the current students started to attend their high schools. This excludes the possibility that
the choice of offering triple science depends on specific shocks to the particular cohort in the
school.
This instrument compares students living in the same neighbourhood but who are more or
less likely to enrol in schools offering triple science, because of exogenous changes in schools’
catchment areas.
I exploit the fact that schools in the UK, when oversubscribed, have to prioritize based on
I control for the year they started to offer it.
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geographical distance.21 Therefore, in each year there will be a maximum distance between
the school and the students’ addresses above which students will not be accepted. I build my
instrument in two steps: first, I compute the school catchment areas for each year, the area
delimited by the circle whose centre is the school and ray is the maximum observed home-
to-school distance,22 and I define the set of ‘reachable’ schools for each student. Second, I
compute the share of ‘reachable’ schools that offered triple science when student i applied.
Figure 4 shows how the instrument is constructed. Address 1 refers to the lower level output
area (LLOA)23 where student i used to live at age 10. Around i’s house there are three
schools with different catchment areas, whose ray is indicated by the black dashed line. The
instrument used in this section of the analysis counts how many schools, out of the two
schools reachable by students i in year t, offered triple science when i applied to high school
(in this case the instrument in year t would be 0.5). The instrument varies both because of
(unpredictable) variations in schools catchment areas and because of the overall increase in
the number of schools offering triple science. My first stage equation is:
Dipt = θ1z
2
pt + θ3Xipt + θt + θp + vipt (7)
where z2pt is my instrument: the share of schools reachable in year t by student i, residing in
block p, that were offering triple science in year t, when i applied to secondary school. Xipt
are neighbourhood and individual controls24 and θt and θp are cohort and neighbourhood
fixed effects respectively; vipt is the error term.
This instrument compares students attending schools that offer triple science with students
attending schools not offering it, i.e. it uses across school within neighbourhood variation.
However, offering triple science is likely to be related with other school characteristics, like
school quality, that may directly affect the choices of majors at university. This issue may
be more relevant when we use across school rather than within school variation because
differences in quality across schools are likely to be more sizeable than differences within
schools over time. Section 1.4.5 addresses this concern by including as control the average
quality level of ‘reachable’ schools in each year catchment areas.
21With some exceptions for students with siblings attending the same school or for students with special
education needs. Since I do not have the full set of information necessary to simulate the exact admission
formula for each school, I can’t adopt an RDD strategy.
22In order to exclude exceptions I eliminated outliers (the distances higher than the 0.01 percentile for
every school.
23In total there are more than 30,000 LLOAs in England and Wales and each LLOA contains on average
1500 households.
24The average primary school grade in math, English, science of students in the neighbourhood, the share
of girls and of FSME students in the neighbourhood, beside the usual individual controls.
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1.4 Results
This section begins by showing results obtained with the first instrument. It first shows the
overall effect of taking more science in high school in term of post-16 outcomes (Subsection
1.4.1). Second, it describes who decides to take triple science, when exposed to the option
of taking it, by characterizing compliers (Subsection 1.4.2). Third it analyses how the effect
is heterogeneous, depending on gender, ability and socio-economic status (Subsection 1.4.3).
Finally it checks the identifying assumptions and whether the main findings are robust to
the second identification strategy (Subsections 1.4.4 and 1.4.5).
1.4.1 Main Results
Table 2 presents the main estimates of the effect of taking triple science at age 14 on the
probability of choosing at least one natural science subject at age 16 (KS5) and a STEM
major at university.25 The Table proceeds by estimating the effect of interest under different
specifications. Column 1 displays results from a simple OLS regression, in column 2 I add
school fixed effects, column 3 follows Altonji (1995) and uses as instrument for triple science
the share of students taking triple science in school s and year t. Column 4 uses my first
instrument (zst), but instead of including school fixed effects only adds some school level
controls.26 Column 5 shows results from my preferred specification: it estimates equation 5,
using the identification strategy whose first stage is described by equation 6, that includes
school fixed effects. Finally column 6 includes a school-specific trend. Reassuringly, the
coefficients of columns 5 and 6 are very similar, suggesting that schools offering triple science
are on a similar trend. Column 7 estimates the specification of equation 5, but it eliminates
controls (Xist), to check whether the instrument zst is correlated with observable cohort-
specific characteristics. Again, the coefficients of columns 5 and 7 are very similar, suggesting
that -conditional on my fixed effects- the instrument is quasi randomly assigned. As expected
the bias in the OLS estimates is upward: the coefficient indeed gets smaller as we correct
for all different layers of selection. The Table shows that, if a student strengthen her science
preparation at age 14, she is 5 percentage points more likely to take science at age 16 and
25I adopt throughout the paper a narrow definition of STEM majors, that includes engineering, math and
the three natural science subjects. The dependent variables in all cases are dummies equal to one if students
attend each different course and equal to 0 if they do not attend those courses or do not continue studying
at all.
26In particular, the share of girls attending school s in year t and the share of FSME (Free School Meal
Eligible).
22
1.5 percentage point more likely to choose a STEM major at university.
Table 3 shows the coefficients obtained from estimating equation 6 on some other age 14
(KS4), age 16 (KS5) and university outcomes. The top panel shows results on KS4 grades
and on the number of exams taken in KS4 and KS5. Since triple science is more difficult,
taking it reduces the average science grade at KS4. Columns 2 and 3 show instead that there
are not spillovers on other subjects’ grades. Columns 4 and 5 investigate whether the total
number of qualifications taken at age 14 and 16 changes, as a consequence of the new course
offered. The results show that the number of exams taken at age 14 slightly increases.
The second panel refers to outcomes at age 18, the results of KS5 exams. Column 1 shows
that the policy does not have any effect on the probability of continuing to study at age
16. This is probably because the instrument mainly affects high ability students, who would
continue to study in any case. This is a very important result, because a change in the
probability of enrolling in science subjects at age 16 may be driven by both a change in
the likelihood of continuing to study after age 16 and a change in the likelihood of choosing
science subjects, conditional on continuing. Column 1 tells that the coefficient estimated on
KS5 subjects comes entirely from an increase in the second component, because the first is
not affected by the policy. The result displayed in column 2 shows that the effect of studying
triple science is not only limited to the pure natural science subjects but it also has spillovers
on math, for instance. The third panel refers to outcomes at university. Column 1 shows
again that the policy does not have any effect on the probability of continuing to study at
university.27 The other columns show the effect on choices of majors and on the quality of
the institution attended. Students taking triple science are more likely to attend institution
belonging to the Russell group.28 Moreover studying more science in high school increases
not only the probability of enrolling in STEM majors but also, even more importantly, the
probability of graduating on time in these majors.29 This is extremely relevant given the
large debate that is taking place in many countries, and the US in particular, about the low
persistence of students in scientific fields (Arcidiacono et al., forthcoming; Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner, 2014).
One important aspect, which due to lack of available data is largely under-explored in the
literature, is the extent and the presence of subjects complementarity and substitutability.
If one takes more science at age 14, is she more likely to take other (complement) subjects
27Note that even if the magnitude of the coefficient is similar to the other coefficients, the baseline in this
case in much larger: the average is 36% in this case.
28The Russell group represents 24 leading UK universities in terms of research and teaching.
29The results on university outcomes are estimated on students taking the final KS4 exam in the years
2005-2007 only, otherwise there is no information on whether the students graduated from university.
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in the meantime and, more importantly, from which (substitute) subjects does she opt out?
Moreover, does more science in high school lead just to more science later on or does it also
trigger a virtuous cycle where students start studying more challenging and difficult sub-
jects, even if not explicitly related to the three natural sciences (such as math, engineering,
medicine...)? Table 16 in the Appendix shows the coefficients and standard errors obtained
from estimating equation 5 using each time a different KS4 subject as dependent variable.30
Tables 17 and 18 report the same type of estimates but with respect to KS5 subjects and
university majors, respectively. Columns 1 and 2 refer to the entire sample, columns 3 and 4
to girls and columns 5 and 6 to boys. Students who take triple science at KS4 tend to drop
more vocational subjects, some foreign languages like German and some other core subjects
like history. In terms of KS5 courses, taking triple science induces students to take more
natural science subjects and more math later on, and to drop more vocational subjects, like
media and accounting. Finally, triple science increases the probability of choosing scientific
subjects at university, like physics, engineering and medicine, but also non scientific but
difficult subjects, like classical languages. It decreases, instead, the probability of enrolling
in law and architecture. The effect masks substantial gender heterogeneity: the findings on
STEM majors are entirely driven by boys. Subsection 1.4.3 further explores this aspect.
It is, however, difficult to draw conclusions from the coefficients of Tables 16, 17 and 18.
Anecdotic evidence may suggest that a vocational course in music is very different from an
advanced course in science at age 14, but to evaluate each subject along some objective
dimensions, Table 4 uses a more formal procedure. I define courses along two dimensions:
(i) ‘high achievers’ courses, characterized by a high average primary school grade of students
choosing them in out-of-sample academic years; (ii) ‘female dominated’ courses, characterized
by a high share of girls attending the courses in out-of-sample academic years (2002-2005).
Figure 5 describes each subject, along these dimensions. In particular it shows three scatter-
plots where for each course is displayed on the x-axis the share of girls usually enrolled in it
and on the y-axis the average primary school grade of student attending it. Triple science is,
by far, the course at KS4 that is attended by the best students, followed by foreign languages,
history and geography. For what concern KS5 options, math is the most challenging course,
followed by physics, chemistry and foreign languages. For university majors, medicine, lan-
guages and STEM subjects are attended by very good students while education, subjects
allied to medicine and art are attended by the worst students on average. The correlation
between the ability of students usually attending each course and the share of girls enrolled
in those courses is negative. This is surprising, given that on average girls have higher grades
30I exclude math and English because compulsory in KS4.
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than boys in primary school.
Table 4 shows whether students start choosing more ‘high achievers’ courses at age 18 (KS5)
and at university as a consequence of taking more science at KS4.31 Taking advanced science
at age 14 induces students to choose more difficult subjects later on. Students taking triple
science are induced to choose courses at age 16 whose average grade in primary school of
students usually attending is about 0.2 standard deviations higher. Moreover, for KS5, I
disentangle how much of the reported increase is automatically due to the higher probability
of choosing natural science subjects and how much to the fact that students choose other
(complement) more ‘high achievers’ subjects, different from the three natural sciences. I find
that the increase is partly driven by an higher probability of choosing science courses (63%)
and partly due to a higher willingness to enroll in other difficult subjects not strictly in the
natural science field (37%).32 The same is true for university majors, but the magnitude of
the effect is smaller.
1.4.2 Compliers’ characterization
This Section analyses who decides to take triple science, when the school offers it. This
is useful to understand, on one side, how students make decisions about which subject to
take at age 14 and, on the other side, whether the heterogeneity in the coefficient β1 is
actually driven by differences in the actual treatment effect or, since I estimate local effects,
by differences in compliers’ type. Even if teachers in the UK usually make recommendations
to students about which field courses to choose, the choice of whether to actually take triple
science or not is a free decision made by students.33
Students will choose to take triple science if their expected utility when D = 1 is higher than
their expected utility when D = 0. This may be because triple science reduces their costs (or
their perception of the cost) of graduating in certain majors or of graduating at all or because
triple science directly increases their productivity, and therefore wage, in more scientific jobs.
The contribution in terms of utility of taking triple science with respect to the second best
31To obtain these results I multiply the coefficients displayed in Tables 16, 17 and 18 by the numbers
displayed in Figure 5 and I sum the series. Standard errors are computed through the Delta method.
32These results are available upon request.
33One caveat should be considered when interpreting the results: sometimes supply of triple science
is constrained since classes in the UK cannot be larger than 30. Since schools mainly prioritize based on
previous science and math scores, any differences in the probability of taking triple science based on previous
test scores may be taken with caution. It may not be driven by students’ willingness to take triple science,
but by schools admission rules.
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option, will not be the same for all students: there are some students who may not find as
beneficial to take triple science, like students already very good in science or students with
very strong preferences towards other subjects.34 This means that the likelihood of taking
triple science will not be the same for everybody: it will depend on students preferences, on
their innate ability and on their perceptions towards their abilities.
The first row of Table 5 shows the first stage regression for the entire sample. Being unex-
pectedly exposed to the triple science course increases students’ probability of being enrolled
in triple science by 15 percentage points. The F statistics is around 2800.
Table 5 then characterizes compliers for the entire population and separately for boys and
girls (columns 2 and 3, respectively). I obtain information on compliers’ characteristics
looking at the first stage for several covariate groups. For instance the ratio between the
instrument’s coefficient of the first stage estimated on the sample of females only (0.149) and
the coefficient of the first stage estimated on the entire sample (0.163) represents the relative
likelihood that a complier is female.35 Table 5 displays coefficients from estimating equation
6, the first stage, on different subgroups of the population. The first column refers to the
entire sample and splits it in different covariates groups. It shows that compliers are more
likely to be very good students in primary school: the relative likelihood a complier is in the
top 20th percentile of test scores in primary school is more than two. Moreover compliers
tend to be high income students and, interestingly, there does not seem to be any particular
gender difference in compliance. The second and the third columns compare compliers for
the subgroups of girls and boys respectively and show that compliers’ characteristics are very
similar between these two groups.
1.4.3 Heterogeneity
This section evaluates the heterogeneity of the effect of strengthening the science curricu-
lum in high school for different subgroups of the population. In particular, I analyse the
heterogeneity of the effect by gender, socio-economic status and previous grades in science.
The first panel of Table 6 looks at whether attending more science classes at high school has
a different effect depending on students science grades in primary school. In particular the
34Unless triple science has a positive effect also in reducing the cost of taking exams in other subjects, for
instance through changes in self confidence.
35First stages in this case do not include any control a part from year and school fixed effects. This does
not affect the effect of interest because controls are not correlated with the instrument.
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Table looks at the probability of enrolling in STEM majors and of persisting in these studies.
The group mostly affected by the policy are the middle-high ability students. The very high
ability students would probably be very well prepared in any case and are less likely to be
at the margin, the low ability students are instead less likely to be affected by the policy at
all.
The second panel analyses heterogeneity by socio-economic status (SES).36 The effect on
science at age 16 is slightly stronger for low SES students, the effect on university outcomes
is instead more difficult to estimate with enough precision for low SES students because of
the small share (20%) of low SES students attending university.
The third panel analyses gender heterogeneity. The effect is positive for both boys and girls,
but the effect on STEM majors is entirely driven by boys. Still, girls are affected by the
policy: they are induced to enrol in more scientific majors, but tend to choose more female-
dominated science majors like medicine instead of engineering.
Table 7 summarizes the results on gender, following the same method adopted in Table 4 but
it looks at the sample of boys and girls separately. While the first row shows that girls tend
to choose more challenging subjects (i.e. more ‘high achievers’ subjects) in about the same
proportion as boys, the second row shows that they still opt for female-dominated subjects
(like medicine for instance).
1.4.4 Checks to the identification strategy
As stated in Section 1.3, the instrument used in the analysis relies on some assumptions.
First, the assumption that the information set of both the treatment and the control groups
of students at age 11 does not include the information on whether the schools that do not
offer triple science when students apply are going to offer triple science in three years. To
check this I include all schools in the sample (both offering and not offering triple science
when student i applies) and I estimate the following equation:
Wist = α1z
11
st + α2zst + α3Xist + ξs + ξt + ηist (8)
36Two separate proxies of socio economic status are available in the NPD: Free School Meal eligibility
(FSM), a dichotomous variable indicating whether the student is eligible for or in receipt of FSM (approx-
imately 14% of students) and Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI), that indicates the
proportion of children under age 16 in the local area where the student lives who are living in low income
households (the median is 16% of low income households in the area). Table 6 uses only FSM, but results
are consistent using the other proxy.
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where Wist are several outcomes (like the dummy for whether student i chooses a STEM
major or whether he graduates in it) or pre-determined characteristics (like the average
science grade in high school, his gender etc); z11st is a dummy equal to 1 if school s attended
by student i in cohort t offered triple science when the student was 11 and chose her high
school and zst is my usual instrumental variable. Table 8 shows the results with (panel 1)
and without (panel 2) school specific trends. The coefficient α1 is not significant for most
variables and in any case is usually extremely small, suggesting that, even if parents and
students know, when they choose their school, whether S = 1 or 0, they do not select schools
correspondingly- at least in terms of observable characteristics. This is consistent with the
notion that students cannot freely choose their schools because schools, when oversubscribed,
have to select students based on geographical distance.
Second, the assumption that schools decide when to start offering triple science not based on
the quality of the current cohort attending the school. Table 9 provides evidence that, when
using my identification strategy, the timing of the introduction of the triple science option is
not correlated with (observable) characteristics of current students in the school. The Table
runs a set of placebo tests, where I estimate equation 6 (without controlling for Xist) and
where the dependent variable is a pre-determined outcome, the grade in the science course
in primary school, and should not be correlated with the instrument. Therefore the triple
science dummy (TS) should not be significant, unless the instrument is not taking full care
of selection. The Table has the same structure of Table 2 and it shows how different iden-
tification strategies may fail to address endogeneity. Column 1 shows results from a simple
OLS regression, column 2 adds schools fixed effect, column 3 replicates the specification used
by Altonji (1995) and uses as instrument for triple science the share of students taking triple
science in school s and year t, Column 4 uses my instrument but instead of including schools
fixed effects adds some school level controls.37 column 5 refers to my preferred specification
and it includes also school fixed effects. Reassuringly, the effect in this case is 0. Finally
column 6 includes school specific time trends, and the coefficient is again 0. Table 15 in the
Appendix shows results from a set of balancing tests obtained estimating the same specifi-
cations as in columns 5 and 6 for a bunch of other predetermined observable characteristics.
All balancing tests show that the treatment is not correlated with observable characteristics
of the current students in the school.
Moreover, I check for the presence of parallel trends. In particular, I check whether, before
school s started to offer triple science, the trend was parallel to that of all other schools still
37This column partly replicates, even if in a very different context, Joensen and Nielsen (2015)
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not offering triple science, i.e. the school did not start offering triple science because it was
already on a different trend. To do this, I augment my reduced form regression with leads
and lags of the instrument (following Autor (2003)):
yist =
m∑
t=0
γτ−tzs(τ−t) +
q∑
t=0
γτ+tzs(τ+t) + ζt + ζs + uist (9)
where zst is my instrument, τ is the year school s starts offering triple science, ζs and ζt are
the usual school and year fixed effects and uist is the error term. I then check for the presence
of parallel pre-treatment trends by evaluating whether all coefficients γτ−t are close to 0, for
every τ . Figure 6 shows that the trends are parallel before the introduction of the advanced
science course and there is a jump in the outcomes and in the treatment correspondingly
exactly to the year of the introduction of the new course.38 This confirms the results obtained
in Table 8 and 9.
Another possible concern is that, once a school sets up all arrangements in terms of teaching
qualifications and staff in order to offer triple science, it may start to offer more science
courses at KS5 as well. In the UK about 60% of the schools offer both KS4 (age 14)
and KS5 (age 16) exams. This would imply that part of the effect I find may be purely
mechanical: students take more KS5 science courses because the set of options changes also
at KS5. I address this concern in Table 10. Columns 1 and 2 look at how the probability of
offering science at KS5 evolves over time and whether it corresponds exactly to the cohort
when the school starts offering triple science at KS4. The correlation is 0: the probability
of offering science at KS4 is not correlated with the probability of offering science at KS5.
Columns 3 and 4 look at whether the effect of studying triple science on the probability of
choosing science at KS5 is larger for schools offering both KS4 and KS5 courses than for
schools offering KS4 courses only. The effect is identical. If part of the effect I find in my
results was mechanical, it would be stronger for schools offering both KS4 and KS5 exams.
Moreover, one may worry that taking triple science could potentially directly affect the
possibility of being admitted to STEM majors at university and to science courses at KS5,
especially if there is a limited amount of available places. This would imply that my results
are not generated by a higher number of applications but just by a higher probability of
being admitted, given the same choices. Still, while universities often require some A level
subjects in order to admit students to certain majors, in no case they require specific KS4
38I also estimated the same graphs but using predetermined characteristics as dependent variables: in this
case there is no jump at year 0, nor at year -3, that correspond to the time when students know, when
applying, that the school offers triple science. These results are available upon request.
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subjects. For instance, in 2013, a KS5 exam in math was required in 13% of the cases (i.e. of
major-university combinations) and at least one KS5 exam in science was required in 12% of
the cases. In no case, in 2013, there was a specific requirement for age 14 (KS4) subjects.39
Finally, it may be that the simple fact of having the possibility of being enrolled in advanced
science but having been excluded, for example because the class was oversubscribed and
schools had to select students, may generate a direct effect on some students and may
therefore violate the exclusion restriction assumption. This is impossible to test. Table 11
however exploits some of the institutional features of the UK scholl system to evaluate how
problematic this may be. Figure 7 plots the distribution of the size of triple science courses
in each school. From the Figure it is clear that class size bunches at multiples of 30. There is
a discontinuity both corresponding to 30 students and corresponding to 60 students. Since
class size in the UK is required to be lower than 30, this Figure suggests that in some cases the
triple science course was oversubscribed, and schools had to select students. Unfortunately
the exact admission rule is different for each school and is not publicly available. Table
11 exploits this feature of the system and runs the main specification (using as first stage
equation 6) on the sample of schools where the triple science course was most likely not
oversubscribed, because the number of enrolled students was not close to the maximum.40
The results of this exercise are very similar to the main ones.
1.4.5 Second instrument
Table 12 shows the results obtained from the second identification strategy, described in
Section 1.3.3.41 The first column does not include neighbourhood fixed effects, but controls
for the lagged value of my instrument: it compares neighbourhoods which had the same
share of reachable schools offering the triple science course the previous year and it exploits
variation between t and t− 1. The second column includes neighbourhood fixed effects.
This instrument compares students attending different schools which offer or do not offer
triple science, i.e. it exploits across school within neighbourhood variation. However, the
39Data are taken from http://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/courses/search
40Those schools where the number of students enrolled in the triple science classes was not between 28
and 32 or between 58 and 62.
41Since there is no information on postcode in primary school for students who finished high school in
the years before 2007, this section only refers to the years 2007-2010. For these cohorts, however, I have
information on whether they graduated only for the students who took KS4 exams in the year 2007, so I
only analyze effects on enrollment and on KS5 outcomes.
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probability of offering triple science is likely to be related to other school characteristics,
like school quality, that may directly affect the choices of majors at university. I address
this point in Column 3, where I include the average quality of the set of reachable schools
in year t as a control. I proxy school quality using the school value added in the previous
years (2002-2005). The results confirm the robustness of the first identification strategy: the
estimated effects are very similar to those found in Table 3.
1.5 Mechanisms
This Section digs into the mechanisms that may generate the effect found in Section 1.4
and explores whether the effect obtained is actually generated by changes in curriculum or,
since the treatment has multiple components, it is actually driven by changes in the peer
composition of the courses attended or in the type of teachers in the school.
1.5.1 Peers
First, I analyse the peers channel. In particular, I use the following measure of peer quality
in science (Qist) for student i, attending school s in year t who takes science courses Dist:
42
Qist = X
D
(−i)st (10)
where X
D
(−i)st is the average science grade in primary school of students taking age 14 science
course D43, in school s in year t (excluding i).
The first panel of Figure 8 shows how peers’ composition in the science course taken at age
14 changes for schools offering triple science or not. The dashed line plots the density of Qist
in the age 14 science course for students attending schools not offering triple science. The
solid line refers instead to schools offering triple science. The figure shows that when schools
offer triple science there is a concentration of very high ability students able to attend the
science class with peers of much higher quality than before. Column 1 of Table 13 confirms
this finding: it shows how peers’ quality in science courses changes after the school starts
42Dist takes a different value if the student takes triple science, double or single science.
43Since there is no information about the exact class but only about the type of science course, I use the
average grade in primary school of students taking the same course.
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offering the advanced science course, depending on students’ primary school grade in science.
The quality of peers in the science class decreases for lower ability students and increases
quite extensively for higher ability students.
To control for this dimension and check whether the effect found in Table 3 comes mostly
from changes in the peer composition or from changes n the curriculum, I control for peer
quality in equation 5. Since students self-select into different types of science course at age
14, peers’ quality may be endogenous. I therefore instrument peer quality by using within-
school over-time changes in peers’ composition (following Hoxby (2000)). In particular, I
use the fact that classes in the UK cannot be larger than 30 (as shown in Figure 7).44 I
therefore predict, based on predetermined characteristics,45 the probability of getting into
triple science and I take the average science grade in primary school of the 30 or 60 students
(depending on the number of triple science classes offered) with the highest probability of
being enrolled into triple science. I then exploit within school over time variation in the
average quality of these students and of all other students in school s and year t, allowing
the effect to be different depending on whether the school offers (unexpectedly) triple science.
My first stage equation is:
Qist = θ1zst+θ2Q
t̂op30
st(−i)+θ3Q
ôthers
st(−i) +θ4Q
t̂op30
st(−i) ∗zst+θ5Qôthersst(−i) ∗zst+θ5Xist+θs+θt+ηist (11)
where zst is the first instrument - the dummy equal to 1 student i was unexpectedly exposed
to the option of choosing triple science- Qt̂op30st(−i) is the average science grade in primary school
of the 30 (or 60) students with the highest predicted probability of being enrolled in triple
science and Qôthersst(−i) is the average science grade in primary school of all other students; θs
and θt are school and year fixed effects and ηistj is the error term. Panel b of Figure 8 shows
how the instrument works. The solid line refers to the average science grade in primary
school for students predicted to attend the triple science class, the dashed line refers to all
other students.
Table 13 displays the results. Columns 2 to 6 show that the effect of triple science is very
similar to what found before, even after controlling for changes in peers’ quality. The joint
F statistic is 35.
44While for primary schools this requirement is compulsory, it is just recommended for secondary school.
45KS2 and KS3 science grades (both teacher assessed and from standardized exams) , gender, Free School
Meal Eligibility.
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1.5.2 Teachers
Unfortunately, there are no data on teachers in the UK. The only information available
refers to the yearly number of teachers and of qualified teachers in each school. Table
14 shows that neither the overall number of teachers nor the number of qualified teachers
changed significantly once the school introduced the triple science option. This suggests that
teachers’ quality and quantity did not increase in correspondence to the introduction of the
advanced science course.
1.6 Conclusions
This paper uses a reform that increased the supply of advanced science courses in high school
in the UK to ask whether high school curriculum affects post-16 outcomes, in particular the
probability of graduating and of graduating in a STEM major. Moreover it asks whether
the effect is heterogeneous with respect to gender and socio-economic status.
My estimates suggest that offering more science in high school improves educational out-
comes in many domains. Advanced science course in high school has no clear effect on high
school graduation and university enrolment on average, probably because they mostly affect
students who would continue studying in any case. Moreover it shifts very high ability stu-
dents towards high quality universities. More science at age 14 significantly increases the
probability of enrolling and, very importantly, of graduating into a STEM major and sci-
entific majors at university. This effect masks however a substantial and interesting gender
heterogeneity. When exposed to the option of studying more science in high school at age 14,
there is no gender difference in the likelihood of taking more science. However, the difference
arises later on, at university, when subject choices are likely to be correlated to occupation
and jobs: both boys and girls opt to more challenging and more scientific courses on average,
but girls choose more female-dominated subjects like medicine, instead of engineering and
math.
Since the advanced science courses attracts a very favourable selection of peers, I disentan-
gle how much of the effect is driven by peer composition and I show that different peers’
quality is not the main driver behind my results: what matters is the actual change in the
curriculum at high school.
My findings show that there is a certain degree of persistence between what is studied at
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high school and what is studied at university. A optimal design of the high school curricula
may be useful to improve the matching between supply and demand of specific skills.
34
Figures
Figure 1: Take up in triple science
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Source: NPD dataset.The bars represent the share of schools offering triple science; the red
dots represent the share of high ability (based on English, math and science primary school
grade, top 40 %) students taking triple science and the blue dots show the share of low ability
(based on primary school grades, bottom 60 %) students taking triple science, by year.
Figure 2: Timeline of the English educational system
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Figure 3: Spacial variation in the diffusion of triple science, over time
offering in 2005 (exam taken in 2007) offering in 2008
Source: NPD dataset. The two maps show the diffusion over time of the share of schools
offering triple science, by LLOAs (Lower Level Output Areas).
Figure 4: Second instrument
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Figure 5: Subject descriptives
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Source: NPD dataset. Subjects are described along two dimensions: the average primary
school grade (in English, math and science) of students taking the course in out of sample
years and the share of girls taking the course in out of sample years. The circles around each
observation represent the number of students attending these courses.
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Figure 6: Parallel Trends: Leads and Lags of the instrument
Dep var: 1=Triple Science
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Source: NPD dataset. The continuous line represent coefficients, the dashed lines the 5%
confidence intervals, obtained from estimating equation 9. Omitted category: one year before
the treatment.
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Figure 7: Class size and number of students in triple science
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Source: NPD dataset. The dots are the number of schools, by triple science class size .
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Figure 8: Peers
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Source: NPD dataset. The first panel plots the distribution of science peers’ quality, distin-
guishing whether the school offers triple science or not. The second panel plots the average
peers quality for students predicted to take the TS class and students not predicted to take the
TS class.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Key Stage 4
offer TS (unexpected) 0.196 0.397
1=Triple Sci 0.076 0.264
1=Double Sci 0.764 0.425
1=Single Sci 0.163 0.369
Key Stage 5
1=KS5 science (if KS5) 0.198 0.282
1=KS5 math (if KS5) 0.142 0.252
University
1=uni 0.348 0.470
1=STEMa 0.126 0.198
1=Russell 0.046 0.211
1=graduatea 0.481 0.361
Demographics
1=female 0.497 0.500
1=FSM eligibleb 0.144 0.356
The summary statistics reported in the Table
refer to the entire sample of students taking their
final KS4 exams (at age 16) between 2005 and
2010.
a Conditional on going to university.
b Free School Meal Eligible.
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Table 2: Results for science at age 17 and 19
OLS OLS-Fe Altonji IV IV-Fe IV-Fe tr IV-Fe
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Dep var: 1=KS5 Science
1=TS 0.334*** 0.257*** 0.147*** 0.072*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.054***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
1=female -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
I sch gr sci 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.022***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 1690451 1690451 1690451 1690451 1690451 1690451 1690451
Fstat 559372 2234 2065 1742 2066
Dep var: 1=STEM university
1=TS 0.104*** 0.072*** 0.039*** 0.024*** 0.014*** 0.012** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
1=female -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.034***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
I sch gr sci 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1690451 1690451 1690451 1690451 1690451 1690451 1690451
Fstat 559372 2234 2065 1742 2066
School Fe No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
School trends No No No No No Yes No
School contr No No Yes Yes No No No
Stud contr No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Additional controls: year and school fixed effects; student controls: gender, Free School Meal Eligible, Special
Education Needs, primary school grade in science, math and english; schools controls: school size. All
dependent variables are set equal to 0 if students do not continue studying or if they do not take the
considered subjects. Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%,
** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 3: Results for other outcomes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Panel 1: KS4 (age 14) outcomes
Grades N. Exams
Dep var: KS4 Eng gra KS4 Math gra Ks4 science gr n exams ks4 n exams ks5c
1=TS 0.001 -0.026 -0.065** 0.438** -0.021
(0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.210) (0.022)
N 1332413 1339792 1690325 1690451 860615
ymean 0.022 0.021 0.000 10.303 3.416
Panel 2: KS5 (age 16) outcomes
Dep var: 1=KS 5 1=KS5 math 1=KS5 Bio 1=KS5 Che 1=KS5 Phy
1=TS -0.009 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.025*** 0.024***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
N 1690451 1690451 1690451 1690451 1690451
ymean 0.509 0.056 0.040 0.026 0.065
Panel 3: University outcomesb
Dep var: 1=uni 1=grad 1=Russell 1=uni med 1=grad STEM
1=TS 0.044* 0.041 0.022* 0.013** 0.033***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011)
N 966777 966777 966777 966777 966777
ymean 0.318 0.207 0.046 0.019 0.034
Additional controls: year and school fixed effects; student controls: gender, Free School Meal Eligible,
Special Education Needs, primary school grade in science, math and english; schools controls: school
size. All dependent variables are set equal to 0 if students do not continue studying or if they do not
take the considered subjects. Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. * denotes
significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
a Grades go from 0 to 7, but are standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
b The results on university outcomes use only the 2005-2008 sample because otherwise there will be no
information on the graduation outcomes.
Table 4: Summarizing effects on other subjects
∆ ks5 courses ∆ uni major
High achievers 0.187*** 0.021***
(0.019) (0.007)
Female-dominated -0.050*** -0.008
(0.017) (0.008)
The coefficients are computed as
∑
j βjqj where j
indicates subjects, βj is the subject specific coefficient
estimated in Tables 17 and 18 and qj is either ‘high
achievers’(the average primary school grade of taking the
course j in out of sample academic years (2002-2005),
standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1)
or ‘female dominated’ (the share of girls attending course
j in out of sample academic years). Standard errors are
computed through the delta method.
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Table 5: Characterizing compliers
Sample Everybody Only Girls Only Boys
[1] [2] [3]
Panel 1: Entire Sample
Zst 0.175*** 0.161*** 0.188***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
N 1690451 849184 841267
Panel 2: Quintiles science grade in primary school
subgroup: 1st quintile av. primary school grade
Zst 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 339951 174093 165858
Ratio wrt tot FS 0.051 0.050 0.048
subgroup: 2nd quintile av. primary school grade
Zst 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.041***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
N 341063 171845 169218
Ratio wrt tot FS 0.217 0.217 0.218
subgroup: 3rd quintile av. primary school grade
Zst 0.099*** 0.092*** 0.105***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
N 336767 168450 168317
Ratio wrt tot FS 0.566 0.571 0.559
subgroup: 4th quintile av. primary school grade
Zst 0.222*** 0.208*** 0.234***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
N 344551 171725 172826
Ratio wrt tot FS 1.269 1.292 1.245
subgroup: 5th quintile av. primary school grade
Zst 0.449*** 0.417*** 0.479***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
N 328119 163071 165048
Ratio wrt tot FS 2.566 2.590 2.548
Panel 3: Socio-Economic Status
subgroup: Low SES students (yes FSMa)
Zst 0.084*** 0.077*** 0.092***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
N 223375 114446 108929
Ratio wrt tot FS 0.480 0.478 0.489
The Table reports results from the first stage for different subgroups of the
population. Dependent variable: a dummy equal to 1 if the student takes
triple science. Additional controls: year and school fixed effects. Robust
standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. * denotes significance at
10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
a Free School Meal Eligible.
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Table 6: Heterogeneity
Dep var: 1=KS5 sci 1=Russell 1=STEM 1=medicine 1=grad 1=grad STEM
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Panel 1: Quintiles science grade in primary school
3rd quintile
1=TS 0.019 -0.002 -0.002 0.015 0.036 0.032
(0.015) (0.035) (0.037) (0.028) (0.089) (0.036)
N 336723 203148 203148 203148 203148 203148
ymean 0.045 0.024 0.026 0.017 0.188 0.023
4th quintile
1=TS 0.032*** 0.041* 0.076*** 0.017 0.084* 0.086***
(0.010) (0.021) (0.021) (0.014) (0.046) (0.019)
N 344500 197276 197276 197276 197276 197276
ymean 0.104 0.053 0.045 0.024 0.277 0.042
5th quintile
1=TS 0.053*** 0.018 0.010 0.005 0.016 0.012
(0.007) (0.016) (0.015) (0.008) (0.023) (0.015)
N 328076 181689 181689 181689 181689 181689
ymean 0.254 0.146 0.097 0.040 0.414 0.090
Panel 2: Socio-Economics Status
High SES students (no FSM)
1=TS 0.048*** 0.024** 0.020 0.015* 0.037 0.033***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.026) (0.012)
N 1431595 818880 818880 818880 818880 818880
ymean 0.093 0.052 0.041 0.020 0.226 0.037
Low SES students (yes FSM)
1=TS 0.063*** -0.008 0.042 -0.003 0.100 0.024
(0.018) (0.044) (0.039) (0.035) (0.090) (0.036)
N 258804 147854 147854 147854 147854 147854
ymean 0.034 0.015 0.018 0.010 0.103 0.016
Panel 3: Gender
Girls
1=TS 0.047*** 0.027 0.003 0.023** 0.049 0.015
(0.008) (0.021) (0.015) (0.009) (0.040) (0.013)
N 849149 486068 486068 486068 486068 486068
ymean 0.080 0.053 0.020 0.030 0.239 0.019
Boys
1=TS 0.053*** 0.018 0.037** 0.005 0.033 0.045***
(0.007) (0.013) (0.017) (0.006) (0.029) (0.016)
N 841234 480646 480646 480646 480646 480646
ymean 0.088 0.040 0.054 0.008 0.174 0.049
Additional controls: year and school fixed effects; student controls: gender, Free School Meal
Eligible, Special Education Needs, primary school grade in science, math and English; schools
controls: school size. All dependent variables are set equal to 0 if students do not continue studying
or if they do not take the considered subjects. Robust standard errors clustered by school in
parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at
1%.
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Table 7: Summarizing effects on other subjects by gender
Dep var: ∆ ks5 courses ∆ uni major
Girls Boys Girls Boys
High achievers 0.157*** 0.211*** 0.021** 0.028***
(0.028) (0.022) (0.012) (0.008)
Female-dominated -0.025 -0.065*** 0.014 -0.023**
(0.026) (0.020) (0.011) (0.010)
The coefficients are computed as
∑
j βjqj where j indicates subjects, βj
is the subject specific coefficient estimated in Tables 17 and 18 and qj is
either ‘high achievers’(the average primary school grade of taking the
course j in out of sample academic years (2002-2005), standardized to
have mean 0 and standard deviation 1) or ‘female dominated’ (the
share of girls attending course j in out of sample academic years).
Standard errors are computed through the delta method.
Table 8: Selection
av KS2 gra sci KS2 grb 1=FSM 1=KS5 sci 1=uni 1=STEM 1=grad STEM
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Z11st -0.005 -0.008 0.002 0.005*** -0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
N 2882341 2882341 2882341 2882341 1468169 1468169 1468169
School fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School trend No No No No No No No
Z11st 0.002 0.002 0.007** 0.004** -0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
N 2285735 2285735 2285735 2285735 1309004 1309004 1309004
School fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls years dummies, school fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.
The dependent variables in column 4, 5 and 7 are set equal to 0 if students do not continue studying or if they do not
take that subject. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
a average grade in English, math and science.
b grade in science.
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Table 9: Balancing Test
OLS OLS-Fe Altonji IV IV-Fe IV-Fe tr
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Dep var: 1=Average Grade prim schoola
1=TS 0.927*** 0.788*** 0.802*** 0.363*** 0.042 0.045
(0.013) (0.015) (0.054) (0.052) (0.026) (0.034)
mfemale 0.232***
(0.053)
mfsm -1.545***
(0.051)
N 1337202 1337202 1337202 1337202 1337202 1337202
School Fe No Yes No No Yes Yes
School time trends No No No No No Yes
Additional controls: years dummies. Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.
* denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
a Average grade in the KS4 exams in English, math and science.
Table 10: Robustness: offer KS5 Science
Sch level regr (offer) Stud in schools wo sixth form
Dep var: 1=Offer KS5 1=offer KS5 All schools only offer KS4
Science Math Dep var: 1=KS5 Science
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Zst 0.002 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004)
1=TS 0.050*** 0.053***
(0.006) (0.009)
N 5294 5294 1690451 751721
ymean 0.477 0.467 0.084 0.060
Column 1 and 2 are run at the school-year level. Columns 3 and 4 are run at the
student level. Additional controls: year and school fixed effects; student controls:
gender, Free School Meal Eligible, Special Education Needs, primary school grade
in science, math and English; schools controls: school size. The dependent
variables in columns 3, and 4 are set equal to 0 if students do not continue
studying or if they do not take the considered subjects. Robust standard errors
clustered by school in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes
significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 11: Robustness: exclusion restriction
Dep var: 1=KS5 sci 1=Russell 1=STEM 1=medicine 1=grad 1=grad STEM
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
1=TS 0.057*** 0.024* 0.022 0.010 0.039 0.026**
(0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.028) (0.012)
N 1613226 948058 948058 948058 948058 948058
The sample includes only schools where the triple science class is not likely to be oversubscribed
(class size not around a multiple of 30). Additional controls: year and school fixed effects; student
controls: gender, Free School Meal Eligible, Special Education Needs, primary school grade in
science, math and English; schools controls: school size. The dependent variables in columns 3, 4, 5
and 6 are set equal to 0 if students do not continue studying or if they do not take the considered
subjects. Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%,
** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
48
Table 12: Identification based on the second instrument
IV IV Neighb FE IV Neighb FE
[1] [2] [3]
Dep. variable: 1=KS5 Physics
1=TS 0.062*** 0.065** 0.060**
(0.008) (0.026) (0.028)
% reach school off TSt−1 0.005***
(0.002)
av. qual reach school 0.007
(0.005)
Dep. variable: 1=KS5 Chemistry
1=TS 0.041*** 0.049 0.040
(0.010) (0.031) (0.033)
% reach school off TSt−1 0.001
(0.002)
av. qual reach school 0.015**
(0.006)
Dep. variable: 1=KS5 Biology
1=TS 0.047*** 0.045 0.032
(0.012) (0.037) (0.038)
% reach school off TSt−1 0.000
(0.002)
av. qual reach school 0.019***
(0.007)
Dep. variable: 1=Uni Engineering
1=TS 0.006 0.034** 0.032**
(0.005) (0.015) (0.016)
% reach school off TSt−1 0.001
(0.001)
av. qual reach school 0.003
(0.003)
Dep. variable: 1=Uni Medicine
1=TS -0.010* 0.045** 0.044**
(0.006) (0.020) (0.021)
% reach school off TSt−1 -0.000
(0.001)
av. qual reach school 0.002
(0.004)
N 2860812 2861393 2861393
Neigh fe No Yes Yes
Additional controls: year and school fixed effects; student controls: gender, Free
School Meal Eligible, Special Education Needs, primary school grade in science,
math and english; neighbourhood controls: av grade in primary school in
science, math, english, share of girls, share of low SES. All dependent variables
are set equal to 0 if students do not continue studying or if they do not take the
considered subjects. Robust standard errors clustered by neighbourhoodM in
parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, ***
denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 13: Peers
Dep var: Qist
a 1=KS5 sci 1=Russell 1=STEM 1=medic 1=grad 1=grad STEM
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Z*gr sci q1 -0.095***
(0.011)
Z*gr sci q2 -0.060***
(0.008)
Z*gr sci q3 -0.031***
(0.007)
Z*gr sci q4 0.024***
(0.007)
Z*gr sci q5 0.055***
(0.007)
Z*gr sci q6 0.099***
(0.008)
1=TS 0.053*** 0.022** 0.024** 0.013* 0.042* 0.034***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.025) (0.011)
Qist 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.003 -0.001 0.014 0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004)
N 1648926 1621765 935630 935630 935630 935630 935630
Additional controls: year and school fixed effects; student controls: gender, Free School Meal Eligible, Special
Education Needs, primary school grade in science, math and english; schools controls: school size. All dependent
variables are set equal to 0 if students do not continue studying or if they do not take the considered subjects.
Gr sci refers to sixtiles of the grade distribution in the science exam at the end of primary school (KS2). F
statistic: 35.
a quality (based on science grade in ks2 (age 11) of peers in the same science class. Robust standard errors
clustered by school in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes
significance at 1%.
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Table 14: Teachers
Dep. variable: N teachers N qualified
teachers
[1] [2]
1=TS 1.604 1.577
(1.267) (1.249)
N 1022489 1022489
ymean 70.567 66.654
Additional controls: year and school fixed
effects; student controls: gender, Free School
Meal Eligible, Special Education Needs,
primary school grade in science, math and
english; schools controls: school size. Robust
standard errors clustered by school in
parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, **
denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes
significance at 1%.
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1.7 Appendix
Table 15: Other balancing tests
RF RF IV IV
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Dep var: 1=Grade English prim school
Zst -0.000 0.005
(0.004) (0.005)
1=TS -0.001 -0.002
(0.023) (0.023)
N 1690451 1690451 1690451 1690451
ymean 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
Dep var: 1=female
Zst -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
1=TS -0.009 -0.009
(0.009) (0.009)
N 1690451 1690451 1690451 1690451
ymean 0.502 0.502 0.502 0.502
Dep var: 1=FSM
Zst -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
1=TS -0.001 -0.001
(0.008) (0.008)
N 1690451 1690451 1690451 1690451
ymean 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.153
School Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
School trend No Yes No Yes
Additional controls years dummies. All dependent variables
are set equal to 0 if students do not continue studying or if
they do not take that subject. Robust standard errors
clustered by school in parentheses. * denotes significance at
10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at
1%.
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Table 16: Effect on other KS4 subjects (age 14)
Dep. var All Girls Boys
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Coeff. Se Coeff. Se Coeff. Se
English lit 0.068** (0.030) 0.075** (0.030) 0.061* (0.032)
Statistics 0.011 (0.034) 0.010 (0.038) 0.011 (0.034)
DT food -0.027* (0.016) -0.047** (0.024) -0.009 (0.013)
DT graphics -0.015 (0.014) -0.002 (0.017) -0.027 (0.017)
DT material -0.014 (0.014) 0.000 (0.011) -0.024 (0.022)
Art design -0.008 (0.019) 0.001 (0.025) -0.015 (0.019)
History -0.032* (0.019) -0.045* (0.023) -0.022 (0.021)
Geogr 0.007 (0.020) 0.010 (0.024) 0.005 (0.022)
French -0.015 (0.028) -0.010 (0.033) -0.020 (0.027)
German -0.065*** (0.018) -0.072*** (0.022) -0.060*** (0.018)
Business -0.012 (0.019) -0.012 (0.020) -0.014 (0.021)
Drama 0.007 (0.014) -0.001 (0.020) 0.013 (0.014)
Inf tech -0.034 (0.031) -0.020 (0.032) -0.048 (0.035)
Music -0.001 (0.008) -0.012 (0.011) 0.009 (0.010)
Media -0.012 (0.022) -0.016 (0.025) -0.009 (0.023)
Fine art 0.005 (0.014) 0.007 (0.019) 0.004 (0.013)
Office technology 0.016 (0.028) 0.008 (0.032) 0.022 (0.028)
Applied buss -0.001 (0.014) -0.004 (0.015) 0.000 (0.015)
Health care 0.003 (0.011) 0.009 (0.022) -0.002 (0.004)
Applied IT -0.009 (0.021) -0.009 (0.021) -0.008 (0.024)
Each line represents a different regression. Columns 1, 3 and 5 display the coefficients on the
independent variable 1 = TS. All dependent variables are set equal to 0 if students do not
take that subject. Usual controls. Robust standard errors clustered at the school level. *
denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 17: Effect on other KS5 subjects (age 16)
Dep. var All Girls Boys
Coeff. Se Coeff. Se Coeff. Se
Biology 0.035*** (0.005) 0.037*** (0.008) 0.034*** (0.006)
Chemistry 0.037*** (0.004) 0.032*** (0.006) 0.040*** (0.005)
Physics 0.025*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.003) 0.036*** (0.005)
Math 0.024*** (0.005) 0.016** (0.007) 0.031*** (0.007)
AD textile -0.003* (0.002) -0.005 (0.003) -0.001* (0.000)
History 0.005 (0.005) 0.004 (0.008) 0.005 (0.006)
Economics 0.003 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.004 (0.005)
Law -0.007** (0.003) -0.007 (0.005) -0.008** (0.004)
Psychology -0.010* (0.006) -0.015 (0.011) -0.006 (0.005)
Media film tv -0.012*** (0.005) -0.013* (0.007) -0.011** (0.005)
German -0.003** (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) -0.003** (0.001)
Music tech -0.004*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.008*** (0.002)
Accounting -0.002* (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)
Each line represents a different regression. Columns 1, 3 and 5 display the coefficients on
the independent variable 1 = TS. All dependent variables are set equal to 0 if students
do not continue studying or if they do not take that subject. Usual controls. Robust
standard errors clustered at the school level. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes
significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 18: Effect on other university majors (age 18)
Dep. variables All Girls Boys
Coeff. Se Coeff. Se Coeff. Se
Physics 0.006*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.003) 0.009*** (0.003)
Math 0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.004)
Engineering 0.007*** (0.002) 0.003** (0.001) 0.011*** (0.003)
Biology -0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.005) -0.002 (0.004)
Veterinary agric -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001)
Computer sci -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.002)
Technology -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
General science -0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001)
Medicine 0.003* (0.001) 0.006** (0.002) 0.001 (0.001)
Allied medicine 0.004* (0.002) 0.008* (0.004) 0.000 (0.002)
Architecture -0.003*** (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) -0.004** (0.002)
Other languages 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
History 0.001 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002)
Art design -0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.005) -0.002 (0.003)
Education -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.001)
Soc studies 0.003 (0.003) 0.005 (0.005) 0.001 (0.003)
Law -0.004* (0.002) -0.006* (0.003) -0.002 (0.002)
Business 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.004) -0.000 (0.004)
Communication 0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002)
Ling classic 0.005** (0.002) 0.004 (0.004) 0.006*** (0.002)
Eu languages -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.002) -0.000 (0.001)
Each line represents a different regression. Columns 1, 3 and 5 display the coefficients on
the independent variable 1 = TS. All dependent variables are set equal to 0 if students
do not continue studying or if they do not take that subject. Usual controls. Robust
standard errors clustered at the school level. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes
significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Chapter 2
Multi-task Agents and Incentives: the
Case of Teaching and Research for
University Professors
2.1 Introduction
The study of principal-agents relationships and the design of the optimal incentive provision
systems have a long tradition in economics. A particularly complex and very common
situation arises when agents have to allocate their time and effort among different tasks.
In this case, the provision of incentives on one task only may distort multi-task agents’
behaviour: individuals may respond by increasing effort in the activities subject to incentives,
crowding out time and energy from other uses. This is especially the case if performance in
other tasks is not easy to measure, and if there are no other reasons, such as social pressure
or intrinsic motivation, to perform them in any case (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991, 1994;
Bru¨ggen and Moers, 2007; Fehr and Fischbacher; Bandiera et al., 2010; Benabou and Tirole,
2003; Prendergast, 2008).
While the theory related to multi-task agents is very well-developed, starting from the sem-
inal work by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), empirical tests to the size and the sign of the
behavioural responses predicted by this type of models are difficult to implement because of
very heavy data requirements, first of all the need of an individual measure of performance
for each task, which is often not easily observable. The empirical literature is therefore scarce
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and the actual economic cost of standard incentives for multitasks agents is still largely un-
known. In practice, it depends on how the different tasks interact in the agent’s production
and cost functions and it is therefore specific to the actual tasks taken into consideration.
This paper analyses one of the leading examples of multi-task agents: the case of university
professors. Faculty members allocate time among many activities, mostly teaching and
research. Incentives in most countries are however strongly skewed towards research: the
‘Publish or Perish’ paradigm is the most popular criterion for faculty hiring and promotion
decisions in universities. This paper analyses the overall consequences of strong research
incentives on teaching and research outcomes. It evaluates, first, the direct impact of research
incentives on research performance itself; second, it studies the indirect effect of research
incentives on teaching quality. Moreover, in order to understand the overall impact on
teaching and research performance at the university level, it analyses how the composition
of professors in terms of teaching and research skills changes under an incentive scheme
more skewed towards research. Finally, by analysing the correlation between teaching and
research skills for each professor, this paper discusses what may be the costs and benefits of
separating teaching and research careers for university faculty.
Using a standard model of incentives where agents allocate effort between two different tasks
and ability is multidimensional, I show that the effect of stronger research incentives on re-
search, teaching and sorting of professors depends on two main parameters: on whether
teaching and research are substitute or complement in the professors’ cost function and on
whether teaching and research skills are positively or negatively correlated (i.e. whether
good researchers are also good teachers). I then estimates the sign of these parameters. I
overcome many of the standard identification issues by studying the case of Bocconi Uni-
versity, an Italian private institution of tertiary education based in Milan. Its institutional
setting provides a unique opportunity to test the effect of research-oriented incentives on
teachers’ performance in multiple activities and the overall effect on the university teaching
and research outcomes.
Three features of Bocconi’s institutional setting are crucial for my analysis. First, I can
construct a measure of teaching performance using a value added approach, that is the
standard one used to evaluate teachers in primary or secondary schools (Rothstein, 2010;
Rockoff, 2004; Aaronson et al., 2007; Rivkin et al., 2005). It is usually impossible to apply
this method to universities because students self-select into courses, exams and teachers.
Therefore, the usual assumption that - conditional on previous test scores - allocation is ran-
dom, that may be credible in primary and secondary schools, does not hold in the university
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context.1 Bocconi students are instead randomly assigned to teachers in each academic
year: within a degree program, if the number of enrolled students requires it, students are
randomly split in different classes, each of which taught by a different lecturer, while the
exam, the syllabus and the type of classrooms are identical for all students. Therefore, once
I include an exam script fixed effect, I can use the average class grade of students taught
by different professors teaching the same course as a proxy for teaching quality.2 Second,
Bocconi sharply changed its faculty’s incentive regime in 2005, shifting the focus explicitly
towards research, by strengthening research requirements for promotion decisions and by
introducing monetary incentives based on quality and quantity of publications. Third, the
large heterogeneity of Bocconi teaching contracts provides a natural control group: many
teachers are not fully hired by Bocconi and act only as external teaching faculty. They
have the same teaching responsibilities but are not subject to Bocconi changes in promotion
strategy and research incentives.
This paper therefore estimates a difference in difference equation, evaluating teachers’ per-
formance before and after 2005 and using external teachers as control group. The robustness
of the results is confirmed by using two alternative control groups: faculty members who
became tenured just before 2005, and are therefore not exposed any more to career con-
cerns but only to the change in monetary incentives and faculty members of another Italian
university (Bologna), very similar to Bocconi in terms of quality and quantity of research.3
My main results are as follows. First, the new incentive regime improved both the quality and
the quantity of published papers. After the change in the incentive scheme Bocconi faculty
members started to publish, on average, more papers than before, by 9% of a standard
deviation. Moreover the effect is mostly driven by young faculty members, whose career
concerns are stronger since they are not tenured yet. This result is in line with the literature
on piece rate incentives (Lazear, 2000; Bandiera et al., 2007). Second, the introduction of
incentives towards research had a negative impact on teaching performance, as measured by
time-varying teacher fixed effect. In particular teaching quality decreased by 7% of a standard
1The only papers that can apply the value added method in the university context analyze the case of
Bocconi university (Braga et al., 2014, Forthcoming) or the case of the U.S. Air Force Academy Carrell and
West (2010) where the insituional setting implies student-teacher randomization.
2In particular I estimate time varying teachers fixed effects, controlling for yearly shocks at the course
level-such as shocks to the exam papers or to the syllabus. In principle, once I include the course fixed effects,
I do not need to control for students’ characteristics such as previous test scores, because of randomization
of students across classes within the same course.
3This second strategy can only be applied to Research outcomes, because there is no information on
teaching performance for the university of Bologna. I chose Bologna, because in terms on quality of research
as evaluated by the Italian Institute of University Research Evaluation (ANVUR) it is the most similar to
Bocconi University, in terms of dimension of the department and quality of the research outcome between
2004-2010. www.anvur.org/rapporto/files/Area13/VQR2004-2010 Area13 Tabelle.pdf
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deviation under the new incentive regime. The effect is, again, mostly driven by young faculty
members and more negative for students at the bottom of the ability distribution. Combining
the two estimates on teaching and research I find that, overall, one extra publication reduces
teaching quality by one third of a standard deviation. This suggests that teaching and
research are substitutes, not complement in the teachers’ cost functions, at least for the type
of courses I am considering. Third, there is evidence of some positive sorting effects: the new
incentive scheme induced low ability researcher to leave the university, thus increasing the
average quality of research at the university. Forth, I document that teaching and research
skills are positively correlated: if a university manages to attract/maintain good researchers,
it will also attract/maintain good teachers. The overall effect on teaching quality is therefore
ambiguous: on one side, since teaching and research effort are substitutes, teaching quality
of incumbents decreases, on the other side the policy pushes away the worst researchers and,
since research and teaching skills are positively correlated, also the worst teachers.
This paper fits into the literature that investigates behavioural responses to incentives, in
particular in the context of multi-task agents. As mentioned before, there is little empirical
evidence of the actual cost of not optimally designed incentive schemes for multi-task agents,
mostly because of limitations in the data and of the difficulty in measuring performance
in many tasks, for instance because it is not observable or it is difficult to disentangle
the individual contribution to the final outcome. Few exceptions, that usually analyse the
quantity-quality trade off for the same activity, are Dumont et al. (2008); Feng Lu (2012);
Hong et al. (2013); Johnson and Reiley (forthcoming). In the education literature Jacob
(2005); Fryer and Holden (2013) analyze the impact of accountability policies on test-specific
skills and students’ effort in high-stake versus low-stake exams.
My paper contributes to the incentive literature, first, by providing a well-identified estimate
of how multiple tasks interact in the agents’ cost function. While most of the existing papers
look at the quality-quantity trade off of performing the same activity, I analyse the effect on
the performance in two different activities, when it is not clear a priori whether the tasks are
substitute or complement in the agents’ cost function. Second, to my knowledge this is the
first paper that combines estimates of the effort substitution effect with an analysis of how
multi-task agents sort in different types of firms, depending on their incentive schemes. This
is key in order to evaluate the overall effect for the principal of different incentive schemes.
Sorting effects may be very relevant and may countervail the direct effort substitution effect
so to revert the sign of the impact of changes in the incentive scheme for all activities. Third,
I am able to disentangle the pure effect of monetary incentives from the effect generated also
by career concerns: this is extremely useful in order to understand the main drivers behind
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different responses and to be able to efficiently design incentives in other contexts or settings.
My paper is also related to the education literature on teachers’ contracts and incentives.
Some papers evaluate the effect of teaching contracts on teaching performances (Figlio et al.,
2015; Bettinger and Terry, 2010; Figlio and Kenny, 2007) and find that students learn more
from non-tenure line professors. Since non-tenure line faculty is less focussed on research, this
may suggest that these results are driven by differences in teachers’ incentive schemes. Still,
it is impossible from these analyses to disentangle whether the effect they find is actually
driven, instead, by selection into non-tenure line jobs. Some other papers look more directly
at the trade-off between teaching and research, by analyzing the effect of increased teaching
incentives on research and teaching outcomes. Brickley and Zimmerman (2001) use a single
difference strategy to study the consequences of the introduction of teaching performance
incentives at the University of Rochester Business School. The authors find a substantial
and almost immediate jump in teaching ratings, measured by students’ evaluations, and
a corresponding decline in research output. Payne and Roberts (2010) analyze this same
issue but using between, not within, university variation. They exploit US state variation in
the adoption of teaching performance measures and find that research activity decreased in
quantity but improved in quality in non-flagship universities.
This paper contributes to the education literature in two ways. First, it is the only one, to
my knowledge, to test the other side of the relationship between teaching and research: the
effect of strong research incentives. This type of analysis is crucial given the extremely wide
adoption of research incentives in universities. Moreover, it is likely that the extent of effort
reallocation generated by research incentives is larger than for teaching incentives because
teaching effort is more difficult to measure and monitor and peer pressure on excellence in
teaching is much weaker than in research. Second, this paper provides the first piece of
evidence about the sign of the correlation between teaching and research skill. The positive
correlation between teaching and research skills has important implications for the design of
professors’ incentives and hiring schemes. For example, policies aimed at increasing teachers’
specialization that propose to dedicate part of the faculty exclusively to teaching and part
of it exclusively to research, should take into consideration that there is substantial overlap
between good researchers and good teachers.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 provides a simple conceptual framework
that rationalize expected results; Section 2.3 describes the data; Section 2.4 outlines the
identification strategy; Section 2.5 presents my empirical results and Section 2.6 shows how
my results are robust to alternative control groups. Finally, Section 2.7 briefly characterizes
the policy implications of my results and concludes.
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2.2 Conceptual framework
This section presents a very simple framework with the aim of organizing and rationalizing
expected findings. The working of the model in the spirit of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)
and it is similar to the model presented by Fryer and Holden (2013).4
An agent, upon accepting the contract, takes two non-verifiable actions er and et, which I
call research and teaching effort respectively. Each action takes values in R+ and generates
a performance measure mi = αiei where i = r, t and αi is unknown to the principal. I refer
at αi as the type of the agent on task i (her ability level).
I assume that the principal offers a linear incentive scheme of the form x = s+ brmr + btmt.
If the agent accepts, she makes her effort choices, the performance measure is realized and
the principal pays the agent accordingly.
I also assume that the agent’s preferences can be represented by the following CARA utility
function:
u(x, e) = −exp[−η(x− 1
2
(e2r + e
2
t )− δeret)] (1)
where x is the monetary payment and δ is the degree of substitutability between the tasks r
and t in the cost function. Let U be the agent’s outside option if he does not work. Moreover,
I assume that there is a minimum teaching performance mt and research performance mr
required by the university.
The agent therefore maximizes utility with respect to er and et, subject to the participation
constraints (u(x, e) > U and mr > mr and mt > mt). Note that when m
∗
r < mr or m
∗
t < mt
each individual will choose whether to stay and exert effort level e (such that mr = erαr)or
to leave, depending on whether U(xm, em) is larger or smaller than U .
5 If it is smaller, she
will decide to leave (or be fired). Otherwise, she will be induced to exert more effort, even
if very costly, in order to stay in the university.
The new incentive scheme, that took place at Bocconi in 2005 as I will describe with more
details in Section 2.4, implied an increase in br, the monetary return to research activity, and
4I will not model why the university decided to increase research incentives, i.e. I do not make assumptions
on the university objective function, I only analyze what are the agents’ responses to an increase in research
incentive, in the spirit of Lazear (2000).
5em and U(xm, em) are respectively the effort an agent needs to exert in order to obtain m and the utility
level when mr and or mt are binding.
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in mr, the minimum research performance required, but only for professors not tenured yet.
Changes in br act mostly on the intensive margin (the amount of research effort to exert),
changes in mr instead mostly affect decisions also on the extensive margin (whether to stay
in the university or to leave).
2.2.1 Effects on teaching and research performances
This section shows what happens to m∗r and m
∗
t (and therefore e
∗
r and e
∗
t ) if the university
increases br and mr (to m
′
r) and professors remain in the university.
In the Appendix I solve the model (for internal solutions) and I show that the equilibrium
effort level is:
e∗r =
brαr − δbtαt
1− δ2 ; e
∗
t =
btαt − δbrαr
1− δ2 (2)
It is clear that e∗r increases if br increases, while the sign of the derivative of e
∗
t with respect
to br depends on the sign of δ.
Proposition 1. An increase of br, the marginal return on research performance, leads to an
increase in er.
The response of et depends on the value of δ:
 ∂et∂br < 0 ifδ > 0 (er and et substitute)∂et
∂br
> 0 ifδ > 0 (er and et complement)
The policy, moreover, increased mr.
Proposition 2. When m∗r > m
′
r: an increase in mr does not have any effect.
When m∗r < m
′
r and U(xm′r , em′r) > U , mr is binding and professors exert emr,r even if
above their optimal level.
Where m∗r = αre
∗
r; U(xm′r , em′r) is the utility level achieved when research outcome mr = m
′
r
and U is utility from leisure.
2.2.2 Sorting effects
Whether agents will decide to continue working under the new regime or to leave, depends
on U , the utility provided by leisure, U(xm′r , em′r), the utility provided by achieving the
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minimum level of research performance in order to stay at the university and U(x, e∗), the
utility provided by optimizing research and teaching efforts, without constraints.
Increases in br, do not have any effect on the decision to continue working or to leave the
university because, at most, the agents will not change their behaviour. Increases in mr,
instead, may have effects on the decision to leave the university.
Proposition 3. If U > max {U(xm′r , em′r);U(x, e∗)|m∗>m′r}, professors will leave the
university and enjoy utility U
Therefore, overall, for individuals whose m∗r > m
′
r, the effect of the policy comes entirely
from variations in br and therefore from evaluating the sign of the derivatives of e
∗
r and e
∗
t
with respect to br.
For individuals whose m∗r < m
′
r, the effect depends on whether U(xm, em) under the new
m′r is larger or smaller than U . If it is smaller, again, they will decide to leave and exert no
effort. Otherwise, they will be induced to exert more research effort, even if very costly, and
stay in the university.
I now evaluate how this effect varies by agent’s ability. It is important to keep in mind that
∂er
∂αr
|mr=m < 0: research effort is more costly for low αr individuals. An increase in research
incentives, therefore will be much more beneficial for high ability researchers. Instead, those
more likely to leave because of an increase in mr are low ability researchers.
Proposition 4. When m∗r > mr: an increase in br, leads to a larger increase in er for
individuals with high αr and to a larger response of et for individuals with low αr.
For low αr agents, it is more likely that m
′
r is binding, and that they are induced to leave.
The predicted response of stronger br along the distribution of αr is therefore that: (i) for
teaching, the effort substitution effect is stronger for low ability researchers (as long as δ > 0);
(ii) for research the effect is instead non-linear. Very low ability researchers will leave the
university; of those staying, the lowest ability ones (those whose m∗r < m
′
r) will increase
effort on research in order to reach m′r; the others (those whose m
∗
r > m
′
r), will increase er
proportionally with their ability αr.
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2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
2.3.1 Students
This paper uses the administrative records of individual students and teachers from Bocconi
University, an Italian private institution of tertiary education based in Milan. Bocconi
offers degree programs in Economics, Management and Law. I only consider compulsory
undergraduate courses between 2001 and 2011. My sample includes around 700 teachers
and 30,000 students, who take on average 20 compulsory exams over the 3 years of study.
My data cover in detail the entire academic history of students, including their basic demo-
graphics (gender, place of residence and place of birth), high school leaving grades as well
as high school type (whether the high school focusses on humanities, on sciences or tech-
nical/vocational subjects). Information is also provided on the grades in each single exam
together with the date when the exams were sat. Moreover, I have access to the random class
identifiers of students, which allow me to determine in which class each student attended
each course.6
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for students. Most of the students are Italian, one fourth
is from Milan. They are positively selected among the population of high school graduates:
the average high school final grade is very high (0.9 out of a maximum of 17). On average
there are 5 classes per course, of about 110 students each, and 20 compulsory undergraduate
courses per year. Each student sits on average 7 exams per year. The degree program in
Management is the one with the highest number of classes (7 on average).
2.3.2 Teachers
Together with data on students, I have access to administrative data on Bocconi faculty. In
particular, I have information on teachers’ demographics (date of birth, gender, full name),
6Students students who did not sit the exam in the academic year they were supposed to, are randomly
allocated to a new class and the records on the initial class allocation are overwritten in the administrative
database. I therefore include them in the new class, including a dummy equal to one if the student took the
exam in a different year from what expected. However, this is a very small group (about 3% of students).
7Given that I know the maximum final high school grade each foreign student can take, I standardize
high school final grades of foreign students to be between 0.6 and 1, so that they are comparable with grades
of Italian students.
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type of contract, department of affiliation and number of teaching hours in each course and
class. I am therefore able to match students with teachers.
I classify each teacher as internal or external. Table 2 lists all different teaching contracts
available at Bocconi over the years I consider and the way I group them into five categories:
assistant professors-junior researchers, associate professors, full professors, non academics
and professors from other universities. I define teachers in the first three categories as
internal, treated by incentives, and teachers in the last two categories as external, my control
group. I ecxlude lecturers, see Section 2.4.2
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for teachers. Column (1) reports descriptives for internal
teachers, column (2) for external teachers and columns (3) reports the difference of the two
groups. In total, in my sample, I observe 681 teachers for 5 years on average. Internal
teachers tend to be slightly older and to teach more hours at Bocconi. Most teachers are
hired by the Management or Economics department. Finally, based on the data from 2005,
one year before the change in incentives, internal professors represent about 70% of the
sample.
2.3.3 Students-teachers randomization
The randomization of students to teachers is performed every year via a simple random
algorithm that assigns a class identifier to each student, within each degree program.8 Table 4
provides evidence that teachers were actually randomized to students. Following Braga et al.
(2014, Forthcoming). I show results of a regression of class (student) average characteristics
on teachers’ characteristics and dummies for the full interaction of courses, academic years
and degree programs.9 The null hypothesis under consideration is the joint significance of
the coefficients on teacher characteristics. The F statistics are always very low, suggesting
there is no significant correlation between students’ and teachers’ characteristics.
8The university administration adopted the policy of repeating the randomization for each course with
the explicit purpose of encouraging wide interactions among the students.
9This is the level at which randomization takes place
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2.3.4 Publications
I collect publication data from the Web of Science website. In particular, I count professors’
yearly publications in the fields categorized by Web of Science as ‘business’, ‘maths’ and
‘economics’. Unfortunately, for less recent years, the Web of Science database only reports
the author’s first name initial and not the full name. As such, I run a search only using the
authors’ first name initial, together with their surname.
I also use Google Scholar as a source for the number of working papers. In particular, I
use a web scraping program which makes automatic searches (one for each year/professor
combination) from the Google Scholar website. I restrict my research on the Google Scholar
website to the following fields: ‘social sciences, arts, and humanities’ and ‘business, adminis-
tration, finance, and economics’. In this case, data on full names are available for all years.
I thus look for full names.10
2.4 Empirical strategy
This section develops my empirical strategy, aimed at estimating the causal effect of increas-
ing incentives towards publishing on teaching and research performance.
I use administrative data from Bocconi university archives to estimate two Difference-in-
Difference models, one for teaching and one for research, exploiting the sharp change in
Bocconi research incentives and using external faculty as control group.
I begin this Section by describing in more details the reform in Bocconi’s incentives regime
announced in July 2005 (Subsection 2.4.1). Subsections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 present my empirical
model for the evaluation of the effect on teaching performance and on research activity
respectively. Finally, Subsection 2.4.4 describes how I estimate sorting effects.
10This procedure does not eliminate the possibility that the same working paper is counted more than
once, if published in two different versions. However, this is still a measure of the effort one puts in that
specific research. Moreover, this measure also contains the published version of the working papers. Accessed
in December 2011.
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2.4.1 The new incentive policy
In 2005, Bocconi University unexpectedly announced the adoption of a new policy of hirings
and promotions. The Board of Directors called for the Rector to make Bocconi University
one of the top five universities in Europe. As a consequence, the old hiring and promotion
strategies, mainly based on national competitions and seniority, were replaced with new prac-
tices based on international standards. Since then11, an independent committee, composed
of faculty members from all disciplines, has been in charge of recruiting and promotions.
Decisions have been centralized at the university level, making exceptions impossible. More-
over, the importance of research outcomes in promotion decisions was clearly stated in all
internal faculty contracts.
The goals of the New Strategic Plan, as announced in July 2005, were the following: (i)
recruiting at least 50% of new faculty on the international job market; (ii) improving the
systems to evaluate research produced by each professor (through the creation of an indepen-
dent evaluation committee and the internationalization of evaluation criteria); (iii) adopting
clear incentives on research (both monetary12 and career-based); (iv) creating mechanisms
to “attract and keep the best researchers worldwide”.
The focus switched explicitly towards research, tenure decisions started to be based almost
entirely on scientific productivity and the requirements on quantity and quality of research
started to be much tighter.
2.4.2 Research performance
I first evaluate whether incentives on publishing have an impact on research quality or
quantity.
I use three different measures of research performance: (i) the number of publications as
11The actual implementation of the policy was in 2007, but throughout the analysis I will consider the
year of the announcement, 2005, as the treatment year. Be aware that the full effect will be in place starting
from 2007.
12Even if previously anticipated, Bocconi started to actually provide monetary incentives to its internal
faculty in the academic year 2008. In particular there are three types of incentives: (i) the possibility of
getting ”research profile”, with less teaching duties; (ii) research premia that depend on the number and the
quality of publications; (iii) research funds, given to everybody who has reached a minimum level of research
productivity in the previous two years. Publications were weighted depending on the quality of the journal)
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collected from Web of Science; (ii) a proxy of the index actually used by Bocconi to evaluate
teachers (which is computed as the sum of the number of articles published by each teacher,
weighted by the quality of the journals as classified by Bocconi13, divided by the number
of co-authors) and (iii) the number of working papers and published papers (from Google
Scholar).
I then implement a Difference-in-Difference model by estimating the following equation for
the years between 2001 and 2010:
pubpt = θt + θp + γres(internalp ∗ post2006t) + γ4Xpt + ηpt (3)
where pubpt are publications of professor p in year t; internalp is the internal status (in 2005);
θt are time fixed effects; θp are teacher fixed effects; Xpt are teacher characteristics (age, age
squared) and ηpt is the error term. I cluster standard errors by professor.
For sake of consistency, I include only teachers who were teaching classes I can use to estimate
the teaching equation (see below equation 5).14 Moreover, in order to exclude endogenous
status switches from internal to external or vice versa after the introduction of the policy,
I classify teachers as internal if they were internal in 2005, before the change in promotion
strategy. In my robustness checks (Section 2.5.3) I check my results are not driven by this
choice, by running the same analysis using contemporaneous status instead of status before
2006 as treatment, therefore including endogenous ‘switches’ in the effect. Moreover, I drop
internal lecturers. Lecturers are internal professors (fully hired by Bocconi) but with only
teaching duties.15 On one side, monetary research incentives are not provided to lecturers
but, on the other side, the way lectureship decisions are taken has probably changed after
2006. They therefore do not represent a good control group. In a robustness check (Section
2.5.3), I include lecturers and interact them with the treatment. Finally, in order to use the
same sample of teachers as in the analysis on teaching, I do not consider law professors and
law courses: law’s exams are usually oral exams so the set of questions is not the same for
all students. It is therefore difficult to use average grade as a measure of teaching quality.
13Bocconi divides journals into 3 categories: A+ journals (i.e. Econometrica), to which it assigns a weight
of 15; A journals (i.e. Economic Journal), weighted 7; B journals (i.e. Economic Letters), weighted 3. I
classified journals using the list valid for the year 2007, available upon request.
14The difference in the number of observations is given by those teachers who were teaching more than one
class per year or by the fact that some teachers do not teach compulsory undergraduate courses all years,
but I still include those year observations in my analysis, for consistency over time.
15The difference between the position of lecturers and assistant/full professors is clear from how their con-
tracts. The contract for assistant professors states ”responsibilities include teaching and, most importantly,
productivity in research”. The contract for lecturers, instead, states that only teaching duties are expected
from lecturers. Research activity is not even mentioned.
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2.4.3 Teaching performance
Second, I estimate my empirical model for the effect on teaching. I do it in two steps.
The Bocconi institutional setting allows me use average students grades, controlling for yearly
shocks at the exam paper, as a proxy for teaching quality. Students taking the same course
are all taught the same syllabus and are all examined on the same questions, independently
of the class to which they are (randomly) assigned. Some variations in the material and in
the exam across degree programs are allowed (this is why I correct for the full interaction
of courses, degree programs and years). Usually a senior member of the faculty acts as the
course coordinator: he establishes the material to teach, manages possible complications and
prepares the exam paper. Grading is instead generally delegated to the individual teachers,
who typically are supported in the marking by teaching assistants.
The first step of my teaching analysis uses micro data from the student academic curriculum
database and it is aimed at computing the average grade at the class level, conditional on
students’ high school final score and demographics.16 I estimate the following equation:
gradeipct = β0 + β1HSgradei + β2Xi + αptc + uipct (4)
where gradeipct is the grade obtained by student i, with teacher p
17, in year t, in course c
(standardized at the course-year level to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1); HSgradei
is student i high school final grade; Xi are the students’ individual characteristics (gender,
age, whether Italian, whether from Milan, type of high school attended); uipct is the error
term. αpct, the year specific teacher fixed effect, is my parameter of interest.
The second step evaluates how the time-varying teacher fixed effects αptc evolve over time,
in response to the change in incentive regime. I implement the same Difference-in-Difference
estimation as in Section 2.4.2, changing the dependent variable. In particular, I estimate the
following equation:
α̂ptc = δp + δtc + γteach(internalp ∗ post2006t) + γ2Xpt + ptc (5)
16To reduce computational burden, I exploit randomization of students to teachers and I do not include
students fixed effects.
17Since in around 40% of the cases more than 1 professor teaches the same class the actual meaning of p
in this first case is the ”professor mix” of the class.
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where internalp is a dummy equal to one if the professor was internal before the change in
incentives; post2006t is a post reform dummy; δp are teacher fixed effects
18; δtc are fixed effects
for the full interaction between academic years, courses and degree programs19; Xpt are time-
varying professor characteristics (age, age squared, experience in teaching undergraduate
courses in Bocconi) and ptc is the error term. I cluster standard errors by professor.
γteach quantifies the change in teaching performance of incumbent professors under the new
incentive scheme more focussed towards research.
The economics literature usually measures teacher quality by estimating a teacher fixed effect
in equation 4. Here I allow teacher effects to vary over time and I analyze how they change
in response to the positive shock in research activity.
I overcome many of the standard identification problems because: (i) I eliminate concerns
related to time constant factors by including teachers’ fixed effects in my regressions: I only
analyse how teaching performance evolves over time; (ii) I eliminate concerns related to time
varying endogenous matching thanks to the randomization of students to teachers. There has
been a debate (Rothstein (2010, 2009); Ishii and Rivkin (2009); Kane and Staiger (2008);
Chetty et al. (2014)) about whether value-added models perform weakly in the absence
of randomization. Teachers fixed effects may also identify endogenous matching between
teachers and students. Results are mixed. Most recently Kane and Staiger (2008); Chetty
et al. (2014) use primary school data to show that this problem can be eliminated controlling
for previous year test scores. However, endogenous matching is likely to be much stronger
in the university context, where students self-select into courses and therefore teachers.
Finally, I also estimate the same effect running the analysis directly at the student level, as
follows:
gradeiptc = ζp + ζtc + ζteach(internalp ∗ post2006t) + ζ2Xipt + viptc (6)
where all the variables are defined as before and viptc is the error term.
While my preferred specification is the estimation of equation 5, because it is more easily
interpretable in terms of changes in teaching quality at the professor level, this last specifica-
tion will allow me to evaluate how the main effect is heterogeneous with respect to students’
characteristics, in particular with respect to students’ previous test scores, measured by their
final high school grade.
18Notice that in this case p represents a single teacher. Therefore if a class was taught by multiple teachers
I impute the (unique) class fixed effect to both teachers.
19Courses may have the same code but programs and exams may be different for different degree programs.
Interacting also with degree programs allows me to exploit variation across teachers’ performance when
syllabus and exam papers are exactly the same (and over which the randomization of students to teachers
takes place).
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2.4.4 Sorting patterns
To have a complete picture of the overall effect of the change in incentives on research and
teaching quality, I analyse how the composition of workers changed after the new regime
was introduced. As shown in Section 2.2, the change in minimum research requirements
should push low ability researchers away. Whether this translates into maintaining also
better teachers, it will depend on how teaching and research skills are correlated.
I analyse selection effects in two ways: first, I compare estimates with and without professors’
fixed effects; second, I obtain direct estimates of the underlying teaching and research abilities
and I analyse how the ability composition of teachers varies over time, looking both at
teachers sorting in and sorting out.
In order to analyse sorting patterns, I need estimates of teaching and research skills. I obtain
these estimates using professors’ fixed effects obtained from the following equations.
For teaching:
α̂ptc = θ
t
p + δtc + γ2Qpt + ptc (7)
where αptc is the conditional average grade of professor p, teaching course c in year t; δtc are
fixed effects for every course-degree program-year combination; Qpt are professors’ charac-
teristics (age, age squared, years of experience at Bocconi); ptc is an error term. Finally, θ
t
p
are professor fixed effects, my estimate of underlying teaching ability.
Analogously, for research:
pubpt = θ
r
p + ζt + ζ2Qpt + ηpt (8)
where pubpt is the number of papers published by professor p in year t; ζt are year fixed
effects, that absorb any possible time trend in how difficult it is to publish papers over time;
Qpt are professor characteristics (age, age squared and their department of affiliation); ηpt
is an error term. Again, θrp are professor fixed effects, my estimate of underlying research
ability.
One first concern is that, since incentives are muted under the new scheme, it is not clear
whether fixed effects based on teaching or research productivity after 2006 are a good proxy
for ability. This would imply one should only use fixed effects evaluated before 2006. How-
ever, it would be impossible to test whether the new policy managed to attract high ability
professors, since I would not be able to estimate a teacher fixed effect for faculty members
who entered under the new incentive regime. In Figure 4, I follow Lazear (2000) and I show
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that, for professors who were teaching also before 2006, there is a strong positive correlation
between fixed effects evaluated in the period before 2006 and those estimated for the period
after 2006. Whenever it is possible (for sorting out effects), I will run my regressions also
using fixed effects estimated on the pre-2006 period only.
For this analysis I do not run a proper difference-in-difference strategy because I do not
know the entire employment history of external teachers. I only observe whether they were
teaching undergraduate compulsory courses between 2001 and 2011, but I do not observe
their exact year of entry/exit. For internal professors, instead, I know exactly their year of
entry, every change in their contracts and their year of exit, including the reason for leaving.
Moreover, it is very unlikely that external teachers represent a good control group for the
analysis on sorting: the way they are selected is very different from the selection process of
internal faculty and it varies substantially depending on specific departments and academic
years.
I evaluate how average teaching and research ability change, depending on the year teachers
entered/exited Bocconi.
For sorting out, I estimate the following equation:
θ̂jp = α
j
1exitpost2006p + α
j
2exitpre2006p + α
j
3Xp + δ
j
e + u
j
p (9)
where: j = r, t refers to research and teaching, respectively; δje are year of entry fixed effects;
exitpost2006p is a dummy equal to one if teacher p left Bocconi after 2005; exitpre2006p is a
dummy equal one if professor p left Bocconi before 200520; Xp are time-invariant professors’
characteristics (age of entry, gender) and ujp is an error term. I only include teachers leaving
Bocconi for reasons different from retirement.
Symmetrically, I obtain the effects on sorting in of teachers, by estimating the following
equation:
θ̂jp = ψ
j
1entrypost2006p + ψ
j
3Xp + ψ
j
4f(e) + ω
j
p (10)
where: j = r, t refers to research and teaching, respectively; f(e) is a linear and squared
trend for year of entry; entrypost2006p is a dummy equal to one if teacher p entered after
2005; Xp are time-invariant professors’ characteristics (age of entry, gender) and ω
j
p is an
error term. To make the two groups of teachers more comparable, I estimate equation 10
only for teachers who entered after 2000.
20the omitted category are those staying
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Results for research
The sign of the effect on research is expected, from Section 2.2, to be positive and stronger
for young professors not tenured yet, since they are affected both by the changes in monetary
incentives and by the changes in promotion strategies.
Table 5 shows some descriptive statistics for the number and the quality of publications
and working papers for internal and external teachers before and after 2006. The first
panel analyses the total number of publications (books or journal articles) of professor p
in year t, as collected from the Web of Science database. The second panel looks at the
number of publications, weighted by the importance they have in terms of Bocconi’s new
incentive regime. This allows me to evaluate quality as well as quantity of research. The first
column reports the mean and the standard deviation of publications for internal and external
teachers. The second and the third columns break down the number of publications for the
period before and after 2006. Finally, the number in the bottom-right corner represents
the simple difference in difference, without any control. Standard errors, clustered at the
teacher level, are reported in parenthesis. The Table shows that the number and the quality
of publications increased after 2006 and they increased much more for internal professors
than for external professors.
Table 6 shows results from equation 3, using the three dependent variables described above.
Columns (1) and (2) report estimates without teacher fixed effects. The effect is positive
and significant in all three panels. Once I include teacher fixed effects (columns (3) and (4))
the effect is still positive and significant. After the introduction of research incentives, the
number of publications increased by 0.14 (9% of a standard deviation) for internal faculty and
the index used by Bocconi to evaluate teachers increased by 0.13 (6% of a standard deviation).
The number of working papers of internal professors is also 0.15 (6% of a standard deviation)
higher than it would have been otherwise. Moreover, while columns (1) and (3) look at the
aggregate effect, columns (2) and (4) separately evaluate the effect for for assistant professors
and associate professors (which I call junior faculty) and full professors. The aggregate effect
is mostly driven by junior faculty, as their career concerns are stronger.
Finally columns (5) and (6) report results from estimating equation 3, using as dependent
variable the square root of the number of publication. This is to try tackle simultaneously
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the presence of possible outliers and of a lot of zeros.21
Figure 1 displays the evolution of the difference in average number of publications between
internal and external faculty.22 The dotted lines refer to the 10% confidence interval bound-
aries. While the difference is rather stable before 2005, it gets larger after the introduction
of research incentives. Moreover, given the long time needed to publish papers in most
disciplines, after 2006 there is a clear change in trends but there is not a sharp jump.
2.5.2 Results for teaching
As shown in Section 2.2, the sign of the effect of stronger research incentives on teaching
quality depends on whether teaching and research efforts are complements or substitutes in
the professors’ cost function (δ smaller or larger than 0 respectively). The effect moreover
is expected to be stronger for junior professors, exposed both to the change in monetary
incentives and to the change in the minimum number of publications required.
Table 7 presents the results obtained from estimating equation 4. Exam grades are stan-
dardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 within the same course-year.
Results show that being male, with a higher final high school grade, Italian and from Milan
is associated with higher university exam grades.23
Table 8 reports some summary statistics of the estimated αpct for internal and external
teachers, before and after 2006. While before 2006, the teaching performance of the two
groups was very similar, after 2006 it improved much more for external teachers than for
internal teachers. Again, the bottom-right corner reports the difference in difference, without
any control.24
Table 9 displays results from estimating equation 5. The first two columns show results
without teacher fixed effects. Column (3) and (4) add teachers fixed effects. Teaching quality
21Moreover I dropped the 5/1000 highest values for each dependent variable, since it is very likely that
most outliers are generated by homonymity.
22This graph plots the coefficient γs of the following equation (where θs = 1 if t = s):
pubpt = θt + θp + Σ
2011
s=2001γs(internalp ∗ θs) + γ4Qpt + ηpt
.
23Grades in Italy go from 18 (pass) to 31 (excellence).
24Notice that, because of some sampling error generated by the fact that ˆαpct are estimated, the reported
standard deviation may be larger than the standard deviation of the true αpct.
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of internal teachers is 0.04 (around 7% of a standard deviation) lower after the change in
incentives than it would have been otherwise. This suggests that teaching and research are
substitutes in the professors’ cost function. Again, the effect is stronger for young faculty
members, more exposed to the policy.
Panel a and b of Figure 2 show the evolution of the different performance of external and
internal teachers (panel a) and external and assistant professors (panel b) over time25. The
difference is rather stable before the academic year 2005/2006 (named 2006 in the graph).
Right after the adoption of the new incentive regime there is a drop in the quality of teaching
for internal professors. In the following years, the performance is still slightly worse than
before the reform, but better than in 2006. This may be because internal professors under-
stood the consequences of their effort reallocation and partially readjusted their behaviour.
Alternatively, they just started being more generous with their grading standards. Section
2.5.3 analyzes this aspect in more details.
Table 10 reports results from the student level regression (equation 6).26 As expected, re-
sults are very similar. What differentiates columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 from columns
(3) and (4) of Table 9 is the way observations are weighted and coefficients should be in-
terpreted. Table 10 implicitly weights observations by the number of students in each class:
the coefficients should be interpreted as effects on average students’ performance. Table
9 weights observations by teachers and the coefficients should be interpreted as effects of
average teachers’ performance.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 10 explore whether the main results of Table 9 mask some im-
portant heterogeneity at the student level. I estimate equation 10, interacting the main effect
with a proxy for students’ ability. In particular I use high school final grade as proxy.27 My
omitted category are high ability students. Results show that the negative effect is mostly
borne by low ability students.
This result suggests that there is room for policies aimed at matching professors to students
in order to reduce the overall negative effect of stronger research incentives on teaching per-
formance. This would mean in this case to match young researchers, more affected by the
25This is obtained by plotting the coefficients γs obtained from the following equation (where δs = 1 if
t = s):
αptc = δp + δtc + Σ
2011
s=2001γs(internalp ∗ δs) + γ2Qpt + γ3Zpct + ptc
Year 2001 (and the interaction between 2001 and internal) is omitted. The dotted lines refer to the 10%
confidence interval bands.
26In this case, whenever a class was taught by more than one teacher, the observations for each student
were doubled, such that each student was imputed to every teacher he was assigned to.
27I divide it into 3 categories: (i) high ability (omitted)= those students whose final high school grade was
between 1 and 0.9; middle ability = between 0.8 and 0.9 and low ability: below 0.8.
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change in incentives, to higher ability students, who are less damaged by their lower teaching
quality.
2.5.3 Robustness checks for the effect on teaching
Table 11 presents a set robustness checks for the estimation of the teaching equation. First,
I estimate equation 5 excluding the academic years 2008/2009, 2009/2010 and 2010/2011.
Starting from 2008/2009, internal faculty was exposed not only to research incentives, but
also to teaching performance monetary awards. In particular, Bocconi University created
a commission in charge of awarding a premium of 20,000 euros for the best 20 teachers
who voluntarily apply. Decisions are based on students’ evaluations. This new policy may
attenuate the effect of research incentives (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994)). Column
(1) of Table 11 shows that results are almost unchanged. Second, in Column (2) I include
lecturers in my sample and I estimate a different treatment effect for lecturers. The effect
on internal professors is similar. The effect on lecturers, even if not significant because of
the small number of observations, is negative. Column (3) includes endogenous switches
from internal to external status after the policy: it uses the contemporaneous status, not the
status before 2006 as in Table 9, to define internal status. The control group includes in this
case also, for instance, professors who switched from internal to external as a consequence
of the policy. The coefficient is still negative and significant, but the magnitude is smaller.
This means that Bocconi promotions from external to internal and viceversa where positively
correlated with teaching quality. In column (4) I weight my regression by the number of
hours taught by each professor in each class. The results are again very similar.
I now discuss three possible confounding factors, that may undermine my identification
strategy. The first is that students might not comply with the random class assignment and
they might endogenously decide to attend classes with different lecturers. For example, they
may match to the best professors, or attend classes with their closest friends. Unfortunately,
I do not have any direct information on these unofficial switches of classes.28 Braga et al.
(2014) analyze whether the direction of class switches at Bocconi University is correlated with
professors’ ability. They use data on students’ answer to an item in the student evaluation
28It would have been in principle possible to grasp the size of classes reallocation by using students’
evaluations, exploiting the information for whether the number of answers is larger or smaller than the
official class size. However, Bocconi decided to hand in evaluation forms to a sub sample of professors only
exactly in the year 2005 and 2006, making it impossible to look at students’ evaluations for the period when
the policy took place.
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forms asking them about the level of congestion in their classroom. They estimate the
degree of class switches as the difference in congestion level between the most congested
and the least congested classes for each course. They find that, overall, course switching
is not related to teacher effectiveness in any direction. Therefore, if the process of class
switching is unrelated to teachers or students quality, then it will just affect the precision of
my estimated class effects. Moreover, if the process is constant over time, the effect will go
away with professors’ fixed effects. Finally, even if course switching does affect my results,
it would probably bias them against finding a negative effect on teaching performance. It
is likely that students, if anything, will react by attending classes with the best teachers,
who after the change of incentives will more likely be external faculty members. This would
reduce the negative effect of the incentive policy on teaching.
Another concern is that teachers may change the way they grade students’ exams as an
effect of observing worse performances of their students. In this case the observed change
in teaching quality may actually be confused with a change in grading standards. There is
not a common rule on how exams are graded at Bocconi: in some cases exam papers are
randomly allocated to be graded to one of the course teachers independently of the class they
were assigned to, in some other cases each professor is in charge of grading his own group. I
do not have information on how exam papers are actually graded in each course. However,
in the fist place, if anything, I expect internal teachers to start being more lenient towards
their students, therefore I expect this type of bias to go against finding a negative effect
on teaching performance. Moreover Table 12 addresses this point by looking at subjects
were grades are more difficult to be manipulated. Columns (1) and (2) look at the effect
on teaching quality for exams that are more objectively-graded, such as math, statistics or
quantitative finance. Results show that, even if the effect is slightly smaller and less precise
for this types of courses, it remains negative.29
Another concern is that internal faculty may have managed to reduce its teaching loads and
to avoid some of its previous teaching responsibilities, under the new regime. In columns (3)
and (4) of Table 12, I check whether the new incentive scheme implied a change in internal
teachers’ teaching duties. I estimate equation 5 using as dependent variables a dummy equal
to one if professor p was the course coordinator in year t and the number of teaching hours
taught by professor p in year t, respectively. Results show that there is no significant change
in the type of teaching loads and duties before and after the change in the incentive regime.
This suggests that the change in teaching quality was not driven by other, simultaneously
29Notice that it may be that what generates these results is just the fact that teaching are research efforts
are more complement for math subjects than for other subjects.
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related, changes in how teaching was organized and distributed.
Finally, in Table 13, I check whether my results may be driven by a recommendation letter
sent by Bocconi University in 2006 to the entire teaching faculty, asking for higher homo-
geneity of grades across classes. This may affect my analysis, if internal and external teachers
responded to this request differently. Table 13 displays the standard deviation of average
class grades across classes belonging to the same course and degree program, by academic
year and by whether the teacher was internal or external. The variability of grades between
classes did not decrease right after 2006, as a consequence of such recommendation, and
there was no differential response between internal and external teachers.
2.5.4 Teaching and research skills
Understanding the sign of the correlation between αr and αt, as defined in Section 2.2, is
crucial both to have a full picture of potential sorting effects and to understand the plausible
cost of separating careers of teachers and researcher in university.
Figure 5 and Table 15 correlate the two sets of fixed effects as estimated from equations 7 and
8 and they show that teaching and research ability are strongly positively correlated: good
researchers are also good teachers. This is an important result that has not been estimated
before. Columns (1) and (3) include all teachers in my sample. Columns (2) and (4) try
to address the fact that teacher fixed effects represent noisy measures of the true teaching
and research abilities and sampling error may bias the coefficients of columns (1) and (3).
I exploit the fact that sampling error decreases substantially if the analysis is performed
on a subsample of teachers with a large number of observations. I therefore estimate the
correlation, including only teachers for which I can estimate the fixed effects with more that 5
observations.30 Results are very similar but, as expected, after the correction the coefficients
are larger, because not affected anymore by the attenuation bias.
The positive correlation between research and teaching skills and the large standard devia-
tion of the teachers fixed effects have important policy implications. First, comparing the
standard deviation of the fixed effects plotted in Figure 5, which quantify the variation in the
time-invariant part of teaching quality (in teaching ability), with the coefficients obtained in
30Notice that I always estimate the research fixed effect with 10 (yearly) observations. For the teaching
fixed effects, instead, the number of teacher-specific observations used depends on the number of time I
observe teacher p teaching undergraduate compulsory courses.
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Tables 6 and 9, it is clear that sorting effects may potentially have much larger and substan-
tial consequences on the overall research and teaching productivity than substitution effects.
Keeping the composition of teachers constant (i.e. looking at the intensive margin), the re-
form of the incentive structure improved research productivity by around 9% of a standard
deviation and decreased teaching quality by 7% of a standard deviation. Instead, when we
allow the composition of teachers to change (i.e. we look at the extensive margin) and we
incorporate the fact that universities will, as a consequence, attract (push away) the very
best (worst) researchers, the average productivity may potentially increase by much more.
Therefore, even if Section 2.5.2 showed that, at the margin, pushing university professors to
focus more on research may induce them to crowd out time from preparing teaching classes
and may worsen their teaching performance, Figure 5 shows that sorting effects may poten-
tially be much more effective.
Second, the fact that teaching and research ability are positively correlated entails that if
universities are able to attract/maintain good researchers, they will also, indirectly, improve
teaching quality. A very popular proposal to solve the trade-off between teaching and re-
search, is to increase specialization of faculty members. This would entail, for example,
the creation of two groups of professors, one more research-oriented and one more teaching-
oriented. Figure 5 and Table 15 show that these proposals should take into consideration
that good researchers are also good teachers and the potential benefit of separating careers
may be minimal, given that the trade-off on the intensive margin (generated by forcing good
researchers to teach some class instead of researching) is less sizable than the trade-off on
the extensive margin (generated by excluding good researchers from teaching, for instance).
2.5.5 Sorting
The first way I analyse sorting effects is by evaluating the difference between the OLS and
the fixed effect estimates in Tables 6 and 9. OLS estimates are always larger than fixed
effects estimates, suggesting that the policy induced some positive sorting effects.
I also analyse sorting in and out separately using direct estimates of teachers’ underlying
ability, obtained through equations 7 and 8.
Table 16 shows how teachers’ fixed effects change for (internal) professors fired before and
after the change in the incentive regime, for research ability and teaching ability respectively.
Columns (1) and (2) use fixed effects estimated for the entire period. The dependent variable
of columns (3) and (4) are, instead, fixed effects estimated for the pre 2006 period only.
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Results, in line with the predictions of Section 2.2, show that the change in incentives
induced worse researchers and therefore worse teachers to leave.
Table 17 reports instead results from equation 10 and it shows no effects on Bocconi’s ability
of attracting good teachers or good researchers. The reason why I don’t find any positive
sorting-in effect, partly in contrast with what is expected from the results of Section 2.2, may
be due to the fact that it takes time to publish papers and it may be too early to evaluate
the research and teaching productivity of very young scholars.
2.5.6 Heterogeneity by teachers’ ability
This Section analyses how the effect on teaching and research performances changes with
respect to teachers’ ability. Section 2.2 shows that the bulk of the effort reallocation should be
concentrated on low ability researchers, while the effect on research should be concentrated
on very low ability (because of fair of being fired) or very high ability (because they benefit
more from any unit of effort in research) researchers.
Column 1 of Table 14 shows that the negative effect on teaching activity is stronger for low
ability researchers than for higher ability ones. The Table displays the coefficients of the
internalp ∗ post2006t dummy of equation 5 interacted with research ability tertiles.31
For what concerns the heterogeneity of the effect on research performance, columns 2 and 3
of Table 14 show that the positive effect is driven by low and middle ability researchers. The
difference is more evident in column 3, that looks at the effect on the number of working
papers.
2.6 Alternative control groups
One possible concern of using external teachers as control group is that these teachers may
react to the policy as well if, for instance, their final objective is to be hired by Bocconi.
This would spoil my identification strategy because it implies that the effect of the policy
31Tertiles are calculated using θrp of equation 8, and are estimated only for the years before the change in
the incentive regime. This is to avoid that the way ability is measured is affected by the change in incentive
regime itself.
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would spill over my control group. Moreover, one may think that external teachers are a
natural control group for evaluating the effect on teaching performance but may not be as
good as a control group for research activity, because they may have very different research
productivity and may be on very different trends in any case. To tackle these issues I propose
two alternative control groups.
The first one refers to the analysis on research. In Table 19, I use all professors belonging
to Bologna University faculty in 2005 as alternative control group. Bologna University is
another Italian University, whose department of management and economics is quite sim-
ilar to Bocconi University in terms of quality of the economics/management department.
Bologna university economics and management department is indeed ranked as the best32
department among Italian public institutions. Table 18 shows the productivity of Bologna
University faculty members in terms of research, compared to Bocconi’s faculty members.
Again, I obtain data on their publications from the Web of Science website and data on the
faculty composition in 2005 from the website of the Italian Ministry of Education.33
The second alternative control group are professors who became tenured before the policy.
Given that the change in the incentive structure acts mainly in terms of promotions and
tenure decisions, full professors should only be marginally affected. Since they are already
fully hired by Bocconi, they should not react to changes in hiring/promotion strategies. If
we assume that the effect of monetary incentives is the same on full and junior professors,
than what I estimate using full professors as control group is the effect of the change in
career requirements only. However, for publications it is very likely that trends for junior
and senior professors are different, after they get tenured, since tenure decisions are based
research productivity or potential productivity. I will therefore use this alternative control
group only for the analysis on teaching.
Moreover, both for the analysis on teaching and on research, I estimate my difference-in-
difference models separately on two sub samples of professors with similar age. In particular
I split both the sample of internal and external teachers between those older than 43 (the
median age) and those younger than 41. This allows me to use as control group for young
researchers, young external researchers since, especially for research, junior and senior faculty
members may be on very different trends.
Table 19 reports results for research activity. In columns (1) and (2) I run equation 4 on the
32Or one of the top three departments, depending on the type of ranking.
33www.miur.it
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subsamples of teachers younger and older than 43, respectively. As for the main results, the
effect is larger for junior professors. Columns (3), (4) and (5) use, instead, Bologna faculty
members as control group. Column (3) looks at the aggregate effect, column (4) compare
junior professors at Bocconi with junior professors at Bologna and column (5) compares
full professors. The effect is remarkably similar to my baseline estimates. The introduction
of incentives led to an increase in the number of publication of 0.17 for Bocconi faculty
members, very similar to the effect found in Table 6. The increase is stronger for young
faculty members.
Table 20 reports, instead, results using alternative control groups for teaching quality.
Columns (1) and (2) split again the sample by age. The effect is similar to what found
in my baseline estimates and is more negative for junior professors. Columns (3) and (4)
use full professors as alternative control group. Columns (3) does not include teacher fixed
effects. Column (4) shows results including teachers fixed effects. Again, results are remark-
ably similar to what found in Table 9. The introduction of research incentives worsened
teaching performance by 0.04, about 7% of a standard deviation. I can’t use Bologna fac-
ulty members as control group for the analysis on teaching, because information on teaching
performance of Bologna faculty members is not publicly available.
Figure 3 checks the presence of parallel trends.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper exploits a natural experiment to test predictions of models of incentives in a
multi-task environment. I use administrative data from Bocconi University to analyse fac-
ulty reaction to a sharp increase in research incentives. The heterogeneity in the teaching
faculty type of contracts allows me to find a control group for my Difference-in-Difference
estimation. The randomization of teachers to students within the same course, in a con-
text where the syllabus and the exams are fixed, allows me to build a credible measure of
teaching performance. In particular, the specific Bocconi setting allows me to overcome two
of the reasons why analyses of teachers’ effectiveness are rarely done at the post secondary
level: the lack of standardized tests and the endogeneity in students selection of courses (and
professors).
I find evidence that the introduction of research incentives affects the allocation of effort
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across tasks. Results show that professors’ teaching performance gets worse while their
research performance significantly improves. In line with the predictions of Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1991, 1994), I find that the effect is stronger for young faculty members,
more exposed to career concerns. This provides evidence of the importance of implicit and
explicit incentives in an organization. The number of working papers and published papers
of internal Bocconi faculty increases after the introduction of incentives on research. The
magnitude is in line with the literature on provision of incentives (see Prendergast (1999);
Lazear (2000); Checchi et al. (2014), for example). I observe that the effect on quantity
of publications does not go against the quality of publications. This may be due to the
way research incentives are structured by Bocconi. On the other hand, teaching quality of
faculty members more exposed to research incentives is 7% of a standard deviation lower
after the change in the incentive regime. The effect is nonproportionally borne by lower
ability students. My estimates suggest that encouraging one more paper has an implicit cost
of 0.3 standard deviation on teaching quality. Moreover, I find evidence of positive sorting
effects. After the change in incentives, lower quality researchers left Bocconi faculty and,
since teaching and research ability are positively correlated, the policy attracted also good
teachers.
My results suggest that it is beneficial to evaluate new policies not in isolation but as part
of a coherent incentive system. I believe this paper delivers three important policy-relevant
messages. First, since the negative effect on teaching is not homogeneously borne by the
entire students population, there is room for systems of allocation of tasks and courses to
teachers that match successful scholars with those students who benefit more from their
knowledge and that minimize possible distortions. Second, I show that, while at the margin
there is a trade-off between teaching and research, the overall effect is ambiguous: univer-
sities are also able to keep the best researchers under the new incentive regime and, since
good researchers are also good teachers, teaching quality improves. Finally, I provide the
first evidence on the correlation between research and teaching ability. This has important
implications for the design of professors’ incentives and hiring schemes. Policies aimed at
increasing teachers’ specialization that propose to dedicate part of the faculty exclusively to
teaching and part of it exclusively to research, should take into consideration that there is a
large overlap between good researchers and good teachers.
83
Figure 1: Research difference in difference graphs
N pub (WoK)
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
anno_acc
coeff CI(10%)
CI(10%)
N pub weighted (WoK)
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
anno_acc
coeff CI(10%)
CI(10%)
Working papers (google)
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
anno_acc
coeff CI(10%)
CI(10%)
Source: Web of Science and Google Scholar. The solid line displays the coefficient of the inter-
action between the year dummies and the internal professor (in 2005) dummy (γs); the dashed
lines represent the 10% confidence interval where standard errors are clustered by teacher.
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Figure 2: Teaching difference in difference graphs
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Source: Bocconi student and teacher archives. The solid line displays the coefficient of the in-
teraction between the year dummies and the internal professor (in 2005) dummy (γs); the dashed
lines represent the 10% confidence interval where standard errors are clustered by teacher.
Figure 3: Alternative identification strategies graphs
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Source: Bocconi registers and Web of Science and Google Scholar. The solid line displays the
coefficient of the interaction between the year dummies and the internal professor (in 2005)
dummy (γs); the dashed lines represent the 10% confidence interval where standard errors are
clustered by teacher.
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Figure 4: Robustness of teachers fixed effects
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Source: Bocconi registers and Web of Science and Google Scholar. On the x axis=fixed effects
based on the post 2006 sample; on the y axis= fixed effects based on the pre 2006 sample.
Figure 5: Correlation between research and teaching skills
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estimated on the entire sample of teachers. Panel 2 uses only the θ̂tp estimated on at least 5
observations.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics - Students
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
[1] [2] [3] [4]
1=female 0.469 0.499 0 1
year birth 1985 3.249 1954 1993
1=italian 0.973 0.163 0 1
1=from Milan 0.246 0.431 0 1
HS grade 0.899 0.103 0.6 1
Exam grades 25.532 3.532 18 31
N 501189
Source: Bocconi students’ registers. The sample
consists of students taking compulsory undergraduate
courses between 2001-2011. High School (HS) grade
normalized to be between 0 and 1 (pass if >= 0.6) for
all counties. Exam grades refers to Bocconi exams.
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Table 2: Types of teacher contracts
Description category
Adjunct Professor assistant
Researcher Bocconi assistant
Assistant professor Bocconi assistant
Assistant Professor (Job Market) Bocconi assistant
Assistant Professor (Young Foreigners) Bocconi assistant
1 year scholar Bocconi assistant
2 year scholar Bocconi assistant
3 year contract researcher Bocconi assistant
Phd Student Bocconi assistant
Assistant professor Bocconi senior assistant
Researcher Bocconi assistant
Full contract researcher Bocconi assistant
Researcher Bocconi on leave assistant
Associate professor Bocconi associate
Full Professor Bocconi full
Extraordinary professor Bocconi full
Non academics (expert in the subject) non academics
Associate professor other university other univ
Associate professor Bocconi on leave other univ
Temporary contract collaborator SDAa other univ
Collaborator SDA other univ
permanent contract collaborator Research centers other univ
Full contract researcher SDA other univ
Lecturer SDA other univ
Lecturer SDA Senior other univ
Full Professor other university other univ
Full Professor Bocconi on leave other univ
Associate professor other university other univ
Full Professor other university other univ
Researcher other university other univ
Extraordinary professor other university other univ
Visiting Professor Long Term other univ
Visiting Professor Short Term other univ
The big amount of contracts is due to the fact that identical contracts were
having different names over the years.
a SDA is the Bocconi School of Managers. It offers MBAs and master course
only. Faculty is hired and promoted according to different and independent
standards.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics - Teachers
Internal External Diff
Teachers’ descriptives
N teaching hours per class 38.91 33.91 5.47***
(16.60) (17.44) (1.34)
Age 43.18 41.29 1.89**
(9.45) (7.80) (0.77)
% female 32.27 34.25 -0.20
(0.47) (0.47) (0.045)
Teachers’ Department
Accounting 14.8 % 20.8%
Math/Stat 13.3% 24.6%
Economics 20.2% 13.8%
Finance 16.7% 7.4%
Management 39.0% 33.5%
Teachers’ Contracts
% Assistant prof 50.04%
% Associate prof 10.45%
% Full prof 12.65%
% Non academic 9.61%
% Other univ prof 9.11%
% Lecturers 7.76%
Source: Bocconi teachers’ register. Standard deviation
(columns 1 and 2) and standard errors (column 3) in
parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes
significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
Table 4: Random allocation
Av. final hs gradea Av. female Av. from Mi Sd final hs grade
1=int teacher 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
Teacher’s Age 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1=female teacher 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
1= course coordin 0.000 -0.001 0.003 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
N 3889 3889 3889 3889
course*year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
F stat joint sign 0.75 0.95 0.39 1.58
The Table plots average classes characteristics (based on students’ composition) on teachers’
characteristics. Robust standard errors clustered by teacher in parentheses. * denotes significance at
10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
89
Table 5: Summary statistics-Research
Overall Post 2006 Pre 2006 Diff
N publications
Internala 0.539 0.680 0.302 0.381***
sd 1.561 (0.061)
External 0.416 0.481 0.264 0.239***
sd 1.318 (0.042)
Diff 0.199 0.199** 0.037*** 0.143**
(0.199) (0.100) (0.071) (0.074)
N publications (Bocconi indexb)
Internala 0.814 0.927 0.625 0.336***
sd 2.328 (0.084)
External 0.575 0.634 0.437 0.251***
sd 1.944 (0.080)
Diff 0.293 0.293** 0.187* 0.085
N working papers (Google Scholar)
Internala 1.506 1.692 1.193 0.526***
sd 2.583 (0.126)
External 1.052 1.159 0.809 0.343***
sd 2.278 (0.105)
Diff 0.533 0.533** 0.385*** 0.182*
(0.533) (0.172) (0.191) (0.164)
Source: panel 1 and 2 Web of Science; panel 3: Google Scholar.
Standard deviation (column 1) and standard errors (column 4,
last row) in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10%, **
denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
a This refers to the status in 2005.
b Publications are weighted in the same way Bocconi University
assigns monetary incentives. I give weight=15 if articles are in
journals considered by Bocconi as belonging to band “A+”,
weight=7 if journals are considered as belonging to band “A”,
weight=3 if belonging to band “B” and weight=1 if not
belonging to any band. The index is computed as
Σi(weighti ∗ pubi)/Nauthorsi where i is a publication published
by professor p in year t.
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Table 6: Effect on research performance
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Dependent variable: N Pub N pub(1/2)
Internala*post2006 0.206** 0.142** 0.081**
(0.100) (0.070) (0.034)
Junior pra * post2006 0.224* 0.157* 0.087**
(0.114) (0.091) (0.039)
Full pra* post2006 0.137 0.099 0.065
(0.186) (0.123) (0.050)
N 5230 5230 5230 5230 5230 5230
Dependent variable: N Pub (weighted by Bocconi)b N pub w(1/2)
Internala*post2006 0.315*** 0.130 0.082**
(0.103) (0.098) (0.041)
Junior pra * post2006 0.266** 0.154 0.094**
(0.110) (0.109) (0.047)
Full pra* post2006 0.496** 0.064 0.050
(0.231) (0.174) (0.060)
N 5209 5209 5209 5209 5209 5209
Dependent variable: N working papers (Google Scholar) N wp(1/2)
Internala*post2006 0.711*** 0.148 0.091*
(0.166) (0.139) (0.052)
Junior pra * post2006 0.492*** 0.212* 0.120**
(0.166) (0.136) (0.059)
Full pra* post2006 1.572*** -0.035 0.008
(0.404) (0.203) (0.073)
N 5113 5113 5113 5113 5113 5113
Teacher fe No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls: age, age squared, academic year fixed effects. Years between 2001 and 2011. Only professors
included in the analysis on teaching. Junior professors are assistant and associate professors. The type of contract
is defined according to the year 2005. Robust standard errors clustered by teacher in parentheses. * denotes
significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
a This is the internal status in 2005
b Publications are weighted in the same way Bocconi University assigns monetary incentives. I give weight=15 if
articles are in journals considered by Bocconi as belonging to band “A+”, weight=7 if journals are considered as
belonging to band “A”, weight=3 if belonging to band “B” and weight=1 if not belonging to any band. The index
is computed as Σi(wighti ∗ pubi)/Nauthorsi where i is a publication published by professor p in year t.
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Table 7: Step 1: regression on students micro
data.
Dependent variable: standardized exam grade
All
[1]
HS grade -3.704***
(0.225)
HS grade2 4.159***
(0.131)
1=female -0.051***
(0.003)
1=italian 0.142***
(0.013)
1=from Milan 0.074***
(0.003)
N 501132
Additional controls: dummies for type of high school,
dummies for the full interaction of classes and years
(αpct). Robust standard errors clustered by
course-year in parentheses. * denotes significance at
10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes
significance at 1%.
Table 8: Descriptives for teaching performance
αpct
Overall Post 2006 Pre 2006 Diff
Internala mean -0.020 0.146 -0.197 0.343***
sd (0.632) (0.024)
External mean 0.074 0.239 -0.192 0.431***
sd (0.645) (0.026)
Diff -0.093*** -0.005 -0.088***
(0.033) (0.015) (0.036)
αpct estimated from Table 7, normalized to have mean 0. Standard
deviation (column 1) or standard errors (column 4, last row) in
parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at
5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
a Based on their status in 2005.
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Table 9: Step 2: regression at teacher level - students’ grades
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Internala*post06 -0.011 -0.037**
(0.012) (0.018)
Junior pra*post06 -0.014 -0.042**
(0.013) (0.020)
Full pra*post06 -0.001 -0.023
(0.016) (0.022)
N 3889 3889 3889 3889
Teachers fe No No Yes Yes
Year*course*degree pr fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls: age and age squared of teachers, class size, class
average final high school grade. Junior professors are assistant and
associate professors. Robust standard errors clustered by teacher in
parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%,
*** denotes significance at 1%.
a Based on status in 2005.
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Table 10: Regression at the student level - heterogeneity by students’ high
school grades
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Dependent variable: stud grade (std)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
inta*post06 -0.037*** 0.002
(0.014) (0.016)
juna pr*post06 -0.045*** -0.005
(0.016) (0.017)
fulla pr*post06 -0.009 0.028
(0.020) (0.022)
inta*post06*mid ability stud -0.079***
(0.014)
inta*post06*low ability stud -0.097***
(0.020)
juna*post06*mid ability stud -0.077***
(0.015)
juna*post06*low ability stud -0.100***
(0.021)
fulla*post06*mid ability stud -0.086***
(0.022)
fulla*post06*low ability stud -0.086**
(0.036)
N 346628 346628 346628 346628
Teachers fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year*course*degree pr fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control set: teacher age, age squared, student gender, type of high school, whether
Italian, whether from Milan. Ability based on final high school grade of students
(normalized between 1 and 0, pass if >= 0.6): High ability (omitted)=between 1 and
0.9; middle ability = between 0.8 and 0.9; low ability0 below 0.8. Robust standard
errors clustered by teacher in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes
significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
a Status as it was before 2006
b The number of observations is lower because Bocconi collected students evaluations in
only a subsample of courses for the years 2004/2005 and 2005/2006.
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Table 11: Robustness checks for the teaching regression
no also include weight by
09-10-11 lecturers switches h. taught
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Internala*post06 -0.037* -0.034* -0.035*
(0.020) (0.018) (0.021)
Lecturera*post06 -0.047
(0.042)
Internalb*post06 -0.027*
(0.016)
N 2848 4201 3889 3889
Teachers fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls: age and age squared of teachers, teacher
experience in Bocconi class size. Column (1) excludes the years when
teaching incentives were also in place; column (2) includes lecturers
and specifies a different treatment effect for lecturers; column (3)
includes switchers and teachers fixed effects; column (4) weights
professors by number of teaching hours. Robust standard errors
clustered by teacher in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10%, **
denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
a Status as it was before 2006
b Contemporaneous status
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Table 12: Robustness checks for the teaching regression 2
Grading 1=course 1=Num of
Dep var: αptc coordin
a taught hb
[1] [2] [3] [4]
int*post 06 -0.045** -0.042** 0.025 0.671
(0.020) (0.020) (0.037) (1.084)
int*post 06*objc 0.024
(0.047)
int*post 06*math depd 0.017
(0.046)
N 3889 3889 3889 2989e
Teachers fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls: age and age squared of teachers, dummies for teacher
experience in Bocconi. Robust standard errors clustered by teacher in
parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, ***
denotes significance at 1%.
a 1=whether professor p in year t was the course coordinator
b Tot n of teaching hours in year t by professor p
c Objective if the name of the course includes the words ”math”, ”stat”,
”quantit”
d Math if the teacher belongs to the math and statistics departments
e N of observations at the teacher-year level (if a teacher teaches more than one
courses n of teaching hours are summed)
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Table 13: Robustness checks for the teaching regression 3:
average class grades
sd av. class gr internal sd av. class gr external
2001 0.390 0.434
2002 0.283 0.379
2003 0.390 0.453
2004 0.415 0.375
2005 0.423 0.431
2006 0.407 0.477
2007 0.375 0.400
2008 0.450 0.349
2009 0.406 0.442
2010 0.428 0.425
2011 0.468 0.404
a This is the standard deviation of average class grades within
courses (of classes that sit the same exam).
Table 14: Heterogeneity by teachers’ research skills
Teaching Research
Dep. var αpct n pub n pub weight n wp (google)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
int*post 06* ability q 1 -0.087** 0.146*** 0.185** 0.296***
(0.037) (0.042) (0.073) (0.113)
int*post 06* ability q 2 -0.036 0.200*** 0.351*** 0.166
(0.041) (0.070) (0.102) (0.172)
int*post 06* ability q 3 -0.035 0.184 0.197 0.095
(0.042) (0.140) (0.257) (0.254)
N 3770 6281 6264 6082
Additional controls: age, age squared, all double interactions, teacher fixed effects, year
fixed effects. Ability based on tertiles of the teachers fixed effects on research obtained
from estimating euqation 8. Robust standard errors clustered by teacher in parenthesis. *
denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 15: Teaching and research skills
Dep. var= Teaching Fe (θtp)
everybody N>5a everybody N>5a
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Research FE (θrp) 0.715*** 0.795*** 0.542*** 0.640***
(0.067) (0.102) (0.062) (0.094)
N 313 109 313 109
Controls No No Yes Yes
Additional controls: age at entry (linear and squared), gender.
a N>5 is referred to the n of observations over which is estimated the
teacher fixed effect in the teaching quality regression (for the research
quality regression N=10 for every teacher). Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%,
*** denotes significance at 1%.
Table 16: Sorting out
Fixed Effects all pre 06 Fixed Effects
Dep Variable: Research Fe Fe Teaching Fe Research Fe Teaching
(θrp) (θ
t
p) (θ
r
p) (θ
t
p)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
1=exit after 2006 -0.133** -0.113** -0.099* -0.100
(0.063) (0.054) (0.055) (0.074)
1=exit pre 2006 -0.044 0.023 -0.008 -0.040
(0.054) (0.034) (0.046) (0.036)
N 345 352 232 232
Columns 1 and 2 use fixed effects estimated over the entire time period. Columns 3
and 4 use fixed effects estimated only before the change in incentives. Excluding those
exiting because retiring, omitted category=those staying. Additional controls:
dummies for year of entry, gender, age at entry, age at entry squared. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, ***
denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 17: Sorting in
Dep. Variable: Research Fe Fe Teaching
(θrp) (θtp)
[1] [2]
1=entry after 2006 -0.051 0.049
(0.091) (0.056)
tr y entry 0.009 0.099***
(0.011) (0.013)
tr y entry sq 0.001* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
N 350 352
Excluding those exiting because retiring, omitted
category=those staying. additional controls: dummies
for year of entry, gender, age at entry, age at entry
squared. Columns 3 and 4: omitted category= entry
before 2006, additional controls=time trend of year of
entry (linear and squared), age at entry (linear and
squared and triple), gender. Only for teachers entered
after 2000. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *
denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at
5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 18: Summary statistics on publications Boc-
coni and Bologna professors
Bologna Bocconi Difference
Junior prof
N publications 0.201 0.417 -0.217***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.033)
Senior prof
N publications 0.280 0.481 -0.201***
(0.030) (0.043) (0.051)
Based on faculty composition in 2005, refers to yearly
publications between 2001 and 2011. Source: Web of
Science. The junior professors category includes
assistant and associate professors. Standard deviation
(column 1 and 2) or standard errors (column 3) in
parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes
significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 19: Alternative identification strategies - Research
Dep. var Number of publications
Contr gr External professors Bologna professors
age groups
< m age (43) > m age (43) All Jun Full
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Internala*post 06 0.170* 0.119
(0.096) (0.124)
Bocconia*post 06 0.162**
(0.064)
Jun bocca*post 06 0.221***
(0.080)
Ord bocca*post 06 0.051
(0.107)
N 3119 2111 4497 3063 1434
Additional controls: age and age squared of teachers, year fixed effects. column (1) and (2)
use as control group external teachers in the same age group (< or > median age of 43),
columns (3), (4) and (5) use as control group professors from Bologna University. Robust
standard errors clustered by teacher in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, **
denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
a Status based on the year 2005.
Table 20: Alternative identification strategy - Teaching
Dep Var: αpct
Contr gr: External prof Prof just
age groups became tenured
< m age (43) > m age (43)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Internala*post06 -0.061* -0.034
(0.032) (0.029)
No fulla*post06 -0.221*** -0.042*
(0.052) (0.025)
N 1958 1931 2068 2068
Teachers fe Yes Yes No Yes
Year*course*deg fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls: age and age squared of teachers, dummies for year of arrival
in Bocconi. Only internal teachers (in 2005). Robust standard errors clustered by
teacher in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at
5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
a Status based on the year 2005.
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2.8 Appendix
Given the exponential utility function and normality of i, the agent receives certainty equiv-
alent
CE = brαrer + btαtet + s− 1
2
(e2r + e
2
t )− δeret −
η
2
(b2tσt + b
2
rσr) (11)
The first order conditions obtained from maximizing the expected utility of the agent with
respect to er and et are:
αrbr = er + δet; αtbt = et + δer (12)
and the optimal (internal) solutions are:
e∗r =
brαr − δbtαt
1− δ2 ; e
∗
t =
btαt − δbrαr
1− δ2 (13)
Therefore, taking the partial derivatives with respect to br, I get:
∂e∗r
∂br
=
αr
1− δ2 > 0;
∂e∗t
∂br
= − δαr
1− δ2 =
> 0 ifδ < 0< 0 ifδ > 0 (14)
To show the results stated in Proposition 2, I take the derivatives also with respect to ability:
∂2e∗r
∂br∂αr
=
1
1− δ2 > 0;
∂e∗t
∂br∂αr
= − δ
1− δ2 =
> 0 ifδ < 0< 0 ifδ > 0 (15)
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Chapter 3
Parents, Schools and Human Capital
Differences across Countries
3.1 Introduction
According to international standardized tests, there are large and persistent cross country
differences in the performances of students of similar age. East Asian countries like Korea,
Japan, China and Singapore consistently position themselves at the top of international
rankings, while the relatively disappointing performance of several Southern European and
Latin American countries has become a hot topic in the public debate. This is true, though to
a slightly different extent, across all subjects commonly tested in these international studies
and across all years for which these comparisons are available.
While these facts have been well known at least since the release of the first results of the PISA
test, they have recently received renewed attention in light of an emerging literature that puts
them at the centre of the discussion on cross country differences in economic performance.
Kimko and Hanushek (2000), Hanushek and Woessmann (2012a) and Schoellman (2012),
among others, argue that average years of schooling, the standard proxy in the growth
literature for the quantity of human capital, does a rather poor job of measuring differences
across countries in terms of the knowledge embodied in their workers, while standardized
tests allow to capture differences in terms of human capital quality which turn out to have
much greater explanatory power for differences in GDP.
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Given the increasing role these cross-country gaps in standardized tests play in the growth
literature, it becomes important to understand where they come from. Most of the public
and academic debate on this issue tend to use (and argue in favour of) an interpretation of
PISA scores as measures of school quality. The popular press is rich of anecdotes on the
severity and depth of school curricula in some Asian countries, which introduce students to
challenges often quite demanding for their age. On the other hand, there is some evidence
(once again, mostly anecdotal) of important differences in terms of “parental inputs”, a
broad category which includes parenting styles and parents’ attitudes and beliefs towards
education. The international best-seller by Chua, Amy (2011) coined the expression “Tiger
Mother” to describe the rather strict way in which some Asian parents raise up children,
pushing on academic excellence and very long studying hours.
In this paper we aim at shedding some light on the importance of parental inputs in PISA
test scores. We show that a substantial share of cross-country gaps are reproduced across
second generation immigrants educated in the same school as children from other countries.
Discriminating between parental inputs and the “school” component has rather important
implications, since it determines whether Western countries aiming at improving their stu-
dents’ performance should consider imitating some of the characteristics of the East Asian
school system, or whether the explanation for achievement gaps lies in deeper cultural fac-
tors, perhaps harder to affect for policy makers. With this in mind, our objective is to
investigate how much of the cross country variation in test scores can be attributed to dif-
ferences in parental inputs, and what is the nature of these differences in parental inputs in
the first place.
It is important to clarify that our focus in this paper is on the cross-country variation in
average test scores only, as opposed to the variation across students within a given coun-
try. We are therefore after a country-specific parental component, which captures a set of
practices, inputs, attitudes and beliefs that on average belong to parents of a given nation-
ality. Of course parents differ on a wide array of dimensions even within countries, and it is
likely that some of these differences will be important determinants of individual students’
performances in standardized tests. However, for the study of cross country gaps in average
scores, and cross country differences in GDP growth, all that matters are gaps in terms of
average parental inputs across countries.
Such analysis is obviously complicated by the fact that parental inputs are typically difficult
to measure, and, even when proxies are available, it is unclear how to separately identify
their effect from the quality of the school system. In this paper we wish to overcome these
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difficulties by studying test scores for second generation immigrants. We identify the im-
portance of country-specific parental inputs by comparing the performance of students born
and educated in a given country and in the same school, but with parents of different nation-
alities. Since factors such as the school curriculum, teaching style and school infrastructure
(as well as other individual level characteristics) are being kept fixed in this comparison, we
can attribute any residual difference to inputs received by their parents. We then show that
the results from this simple empirical exercise can be used to decompose the cross-country
variation in test scores between different sources, shedding light on the nature of these gaps.
Our paper, therefore, shares the spirit and the approach of several studies that look at first
and second generation immigrants to identify the importance of “portable” cultural and fa-
miliar componentsfor various different outcomes (the so-called “epidemiological approach”
(Alesina et al., 2013; Fernandez, 2011; Alesina and Giuliano, 2010; Fernandez and Fogli,
2009; Giuliano, 2007)). As we discuss at length, our approach is unlikely to be biased by
a pattern of differential selection of emigrating parents from different countries. Indeed we
check that our relation of interest is not spuriously generated by the fact that emigrants
from high PISA score countries are more positively selected into migration than emigrants
from low PISA score countries. If anything, we find a pattern of selection which seems to go
against our findings.
Our results point towards a substantial role of the parental component. We find the perfor-
mance in the PISA test of second generation immigrant students, living in the same country
and studying in the same school, is very closely related to the one of natives1 from the
country of origin of their parents. In particular, second generation immigrants from high
PISA countries score better than their peers from low PISA countries, even when they are
observed in the same school and even if their parents have the same level of education and
type of occupation. This pattern is present also when we focus on a different schooling out-
come from a different sample, such as the probability of grade repetition in the US Census;
once again, the best performing second generation immigrants are those whose parents come
from countries where natives are particularly successful in standardized tests. Taking our
estimates at face value, we find that at least 12% of the total cross-country variation in test
scores can be accounted for by differences in parental inputs. Their contribution is substan-
tially higher when we look at the gaps between specific countries: for example, at least 33%
of the out-performance of East Asian and Souther European countries is persistent across
second generation immigrants, suggesting that parental practices play a predominant part
1Throughout the paper, we call natives those students born in the country where they are taking the test
and whose parents are born in the same country as well. Students born in a country different from the one
where they are taking the test are excluded from all the analyses that follow.
105
in explaining this gap.
We then move to explore more in detail the nature of these differences in terms of parental
inputs, making use of both the PISA and US Census data as well as of several other sources.
We first show that the relationship between the performance of a second generation immi-
grant and the average score in the parents’ country of origin is weaker for parents that are
more educated. This suggests that what drives our results is not related to the quantity or
quality of education received by parents in their home country. Moreover the relationship
weakens if parents have spent more years in the host country, suggesting the importance
for school performance of country-specific “cultural” traits, that are progressively lost by
immigrants as they integrate in their new host country. Then we look at detailed time use
surveys on immigrants in the US, to investigate whether differences in parents and students’
observable practices can help to explain gaps in performance between children of different
nationalities. Our results suggest that this is a promising avenue for further exploration,
since parents from high PISA countries systematically spend more time on various forms of
childcare, while their children spend more time studying and in related activities.
Beside contributing directly to the previously mentioned growth literature on cross country
differences in human capital quality, our results speak to the literature that studies the role
for the performance of immigrant children of various attributes of the destination countries
or of the home countries (for instance Dronkers and de Heus (2012),Dustmann et al. (2012)
and Jerrim (2015)). We contribute to this literature first by extending the analysis to about
40 host countries and 60 countries of origin instead of focussing on specific communities
(Dustmann et al. (2012) study Turkish immigrants and Jerrim (2015) East Asian immi-
grants); second by quantitatively decomposing how much of the cross country differences
in test scores is actually attributable to the country of origin of the children’s parents and
how much to the destination country; third by providing some suggestive evidence of the
mechanism behind the relationship. Moreover, our findings are connected to the literature
examining schooling and labor market outcomes as a function of ethnicity. In his seminal
work, Borjas (1992) uses data from the General Social Survey (GSS) and the National Longi-
tudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to show that the quantity (not the quality) of education in
the ethnic environment of parents, what he calls “ethnic capital”, plays a role in the human
capital accumulation process of the following generations in the US. Dustmann et al. (2010)
study the evolution of the attainment gap between white British born and ethnic minority
pupils throughout compulsory schooling. Finally, the finding that parental inputs are impor-
tant determinants of school performance speaks to the literature highlighting the role, for
children educational attainment, of transmittable cultural values such as attitudes towards
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school, aspirations and non cognitive skills (Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001; Brunello and
Schlotter, 2011; Behncke, 2012; Borghans et al., 2008; Carneiro et al., 2007).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data. Section 3.3 shows empirical
evidence on the performance of second generation immigrants as a function of their parents’
country of origin. Section 3.4 addresses the possibility that our findings are driven by different
forms of selection. Section 3.5 makes use of these results to quantify the overall importance of
the parental component for cross-country differences in test scores, while Section 3.6 explores
more in detail the possible mechanisms behind our results. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Data
Our main data come from the 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012 waves of the PISA test. PISA is
a triennial survey of the knowledge and skills of 15-year-old children, explicitly designed to
allow comparisons across countries. Since 2003, 73 countries have administered at least one
wave of the test, covering all OECD members as well as some partner countries. Typically,
each country selects between 4,500 and 10,000 students through a two-stage stratified sam-
pling technique, where a random sample of at least 150 schools enrolling 15-year-old students
is drawn first, and then 35 students within each school are randomly selected to take part
to the test. Throughout the analysis, we make use of the sample weights provided by the
OECD.
The PISA tests cover three different subjects: reading comprehension, science and mathe-
matics. Neither students nor teachers know the result of the test at the end, so these are
rather low stake tests for students. Since each student is tested on a random subset of
questions, test results are not presented as point estimates, because they will not be eas-
ily comparable, but rather as “plausible values”. The OECD estimates for each student
a probability distribution of test scores based on their answers, and randomly draws from
it five values (defined “plausible values”), see OECD (2011) for details.2 PISA scores are
internationally standardized to have mean 500 and standard deviation 100 across OECD
countries. We further standardize them to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for each
subject, across all available waves.
2Throughout the analysis, when using the PISA data, we compute the standard errors of our estimates
by using the unbiased shortcut procedure described in OECD (2009) and followed by the literature (i.e.
Dustmann et al. (2012)), to take into account that we use plausible values for the test scores, as the OECD
only provides plausible values.
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As it is well known, results for all subjects vary greatly across countries. In an attempt to
summarize this variation, Table 1 shows the average score within a number of broadly defined
geographical regions. The superior performance of East Asian countries is particularly strong
in mathematics, but the ranking across regions is quite stable across different subjects. The
magnitude of the gaps is quite striking. According to OECD (2012a), a gap of 0.4 in this scale
corresponds roughly to what is learned in an average year of schooling. It follows that East
Asian students have a more advanced knowledge of mathematics which corresponds to two
additional years of schooling compared to Southern Europe, and to almost four additional
years of schooling compared to Latin America and Middle East/North Africa.
The PISA data include a Student Questionnaire in every wave, which provides basic de-
mographic information on students and parents. The exact country of origin of parents is,
however, not available in all participating countries questionnaires and for the wave 2000.3
On top of this, for some countries and waves further information is available from the School
Questionnaire and the Parent Questionnaire. In particular, we use the School Questionnaire
to construct some measures of school quality, and the Parent Questionnaire to get additional
information on parents’ age and education.
The final sample includes 43486 second generation immigrants on the mother side and 43728
on the father side, from 49 and 48 different countries of origin and distributed across 39 host
countries. Descriptive statistics for second generation immigrants on the mother side are
provided in Table 2. Table 3 displays the number of available observations for each country
of origin that can be included in our decomposition exercise and the main receiving country
for each country of origin. Sample sizes vary greatly, and for some countries of origin we have
only a few second generation immigrants. To account for this, we weight countries of origin
by the number of second generation immigrants in the sample when constructing averages
for broad geographical regions.4 Table 4 shows the same set of information but referred to
host countries. Our final sample includes only host countries for which we have information
on the parents’ country of origin. Each destination country receives immigrants from, on
average, 6 different countries of origin.
The second source of data is the Integrated Public Use Micro data Series (IPUMS) created
3Individual countries have some flexibility on how to classify parents’ country of origin. While most
have indicators for each country, some group small countries in broader categories. We construct a set of
countries/regions consistently defined over time, and drop observations for second generation immigrants
whose parents do not come from any of these countries. See the data Appendix for the details.
4Moreover, in all graphs plotting estimates relative to individual countries of origin we weight observations
by the inverse of the corresponding standard error.
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by the US Census Bureau. The IPUMS consists of individual and household level data
from the decennial census in the US and includes nearly all the details originally recorded
by the census enumerations. We use the 1% samples from the 1970 and 5% sample from
the 1980 censuses. Even if IPUMS has little information on children’s outcomes, it does,
however, contain information on each individual’s exact grade attending at school.5 We
follow Oreopoulos and Page (2006) in combining this information with children’s age to
construct an indicator of whether or not each student has repeated any grade. As pointed out
by Oreopoulos and Page (2006), grade repetition is a widespread phenomenon in the United
States and is correlated with many commonly used measures of educational achievement and
socioeconomic success. We classify a child as a repeater if her educational attainment is below
the mode for her state, age, quarter of birth, and census year cell. Following Oreopoulos and
Page (2006), we focus on children between the ages of 8 and 15, since children younger than
8 have not had many opportunities to repeat a grade, and children older than age 15 might
have left home already or dropped out of school. To adjust for the fact that older sample
members have had more opportunities to repeat a grade, and to adjust for possible gender
differences in grade repetition, all regressions include controls for age dummies and gender.
Moreover, we experimented with several alternative definitions of grade repetition and our
results are robust throughout.6
The final sample includes 53361 second generation immigrants on the mother side and 46685
on the father side, from 61 different countries of origin. Descriptive statistics for second
generation immigrants on the mother side are provided in Table 6.
For Section 3.6.2, we use the ATUS-US Time Use Survey to analyze how immigrant parents
and their children spend their time. We pool together all waves between 2002 and 2013. The
ATUS survey was administered only to one person per household, chosen randomly among all
individuals at least 15 years old. We use both data on parents and children, where children
are those individuals between 15 and 18 years old. For parents, we construct a variable
measuring the total time (in minutes) spent on child care on the previous day, and three
subcategories that split total child care in educational, recreational and basic activities.7
Descriptive statistics on parents’ and students’ time are displayed in Tables 15 and 17.
Finally, we rely on several other sources to construct our controls at the level of parents’
country of origin. We take GDP per capita in 2006 from the PWT, average years of schooling
5This information is only available until 1980, which prevents us from using more recent years.
6Results are available upon request.
7We follow Aguiar and Hurst (2007) for the construction of these variables. See Appendix 3.8 for the
details.
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for different demographic groups from Barro and Lee (2013), measures of school quality from
Bartik’s “School Quality” dataset, various answers from the World Value Survey to proxy for
cultural differences and data on the religion composition in 1970 from Barro and McCleary.
3.3 Reduced Form Evidence
In this section we examine whether the school performance of second generation immigrants
is related to the one of natives8 in the parents’ country of origin. Throughout the section,
we focus our analysis on second generation immigrants on the mother side only. This is done
only to simplify the exposition, and alternative specifications, available upon request, show
that our results hold without exception when we look at second generation immigrants on
the father side or at the whole sample of second generation immigrants and natives.9 We
present results for the PISA and the US Census samples in turn.
3.3.1 PISA
Let Tmicst denote the PISA math
10 score in year t of child i, studying (and born) in country
c and in school s (or country c), whose mother was born in country m.11 We start from the
following specification:
Tmist = θ0 + θ1T
m + θ2X
m
ist + θ3Z
m + θst + ε
m
ict (1)
8Throughout the paper we use the term natives to refer to the group of children born and educated in a
certain country, whose mother/parents were born in the same country.
9This more complete specification will be used for our decomposition in Section 3.5
10The results are similar for the Reading and Science tests (results available upon request). The Math
test is often preferred for international comparisons for the relative easiness of defining and quantifying a
common set of expected skills (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012a).
11Throughout the paper, subscripts refer to the location and characteristics of students, while superscripts
refer to the country of origin of parents.
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where Tm is the average score of native students in the mother’s country of origin1213, Xmist is
a vector of individual characteristics of student and parents, Zm are controls at the mother
country of birth level, θst is a country or school (depending on the specification) fixed effect,
specific for each PISA wave and εmict is an error term. The main coefficient of interest is θ1,
which captures the relationship between a given second generation immigrant’s performance
and the average score of native students in country m.
Here, Tm is used as a proxy for the bundle of characteristics of parents born in country
m which affect the school performance of their children. The average test score in a given
country reflects a combination of school quality, economic, cultural and institutional fac-
tors. However, by analyzing children educated in the same country/school (through the use
of θst), who differ just because their parents come from different countries, we disentangle
the part of their tests scores related to institutions/school system from the part related to
parental inputs. The main worry is of course that omitted inputs for students’ performance
might be correlated with Tm, i.e. that, for example, second generation immigrants whose
parents come from high PISA countries might receive higher investments in their educational
development for reasons unrelated to their parents’ nationality. The school fixed effect takes
care of the possibility that they might attend schools of higher quality, given that we are
comparing students within the same school. On top of this, we also control for parental
characteristics which might be correlated with human capital investments on children and
with PISA scores, such as parental education and socioeconomic status.14 In this way we
are able to understand how much of the effect comes from differences in parents’ observ-
able characteristics (education level, type of schools) and how much from differences in an
unobservable, country-specific, component. The possibility that our results are driven by
differential selection on unobservables of second generation immigrants will be discussed in
great detail in Section 3.4.
Table 5 shows our main results. The sample is limited to second generation immigrants on the
mother side, and a dummy is included in all specifications to control for whether the father
12The average score is computed across all available waves, applying the provided sample weights
13In this setting the dominant information is found in cross-country variation. A panel data approach
would be of difficult implementation because the main regressor is indeed persistent over time (see Kimko
and Hanushek (2000)), and short run shocks and variations in PISA scores are likely to be caused by cohort
effects rather than significant changes in the cultural and educational environment. Moreover, PISA tests
are available for few points in time and for recent years only. This prevents us from including country of
origin fixed effects in this specification.
14Results with socioeconomic status as controls are not show here, and are available upon request. In-
formation on parental age is available only for country and waves for which the Parent Questionnaire was
administered. Our results are robust to the inclusion of these controls in this subsample.
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is also foreign born.15 We proceed by progressively adding controls. Column (1) of Table 5
displays the raw correlation between PISA scores of second generation immigrant students
whose mother comes from country m and the average PISA score of natives in country m.
It is strong and highly significant: if we compare two second generation immigrant students,
with the mother of the first coming from a country where students score a standard deviation
higher than the mother of the second, we see the former doing better than the latter by 66%
of a standard deviation. The coefficient shrinks when we restrict the comparison to students
that are observed in the same country (Column 2) and, especially, in the same school (Column
3), but is still positive and significant. The difference in the size of the coefficient between
the first two specifications and Column 3 is quite illuminating, since it suggests that mothers
from high PISA countries tend to send their children to better schools. We will show further
evidence of this and discuss some implications for our empirical exercise in Section 3.4.
The specification in Column 4 adds controls for parental education, with the coefficient of
interest being hardly affected. This finding is useful for the interpretation of the mechanisms
behind our results: it suggests that the estimate of θ1 is not driven by some parents’ unob-
servable skills (like IQ for instance), otherwise we would expect these unobservables to be
correlated to parental education, and therefore we expect the inclusion of this last variable to
matter a lot for our coefficient of interest. What drives our result seems to be something not
correlated with parents’ education level. A possible concern, though, is that θ1 is not much
affected because parental education for immigrant parents is measured with error. Indeed,
the estimated coefficients for these variables are quite small and, with the exception of the
tertiary education dummy for fathers, not statistically significant. Moreover, the presence
of some measurement error is quite realistic, given that PISA questionnaire are filled in by
students, who may have difficulties reporting their parents’ educational level, especially if
parents were educated in a different country. We exploit the fact that for countries and
waves where the Parents Questionnaire was administered, parents were asked to report their
education as well. We therefore instrument the mother’s and father’s educational levels, as
reported by children, with those reported by the parents themselves. Since the sample that
allows this exercise is considerably smaller, we focus on the specification that includes both
natives and second generation immigrants on either parent’s side.16 The results (available
upon request) show that, while there is some degree of measurement error, the coefficient of
15This specification therefore ignores the variation in parental inputs associated with the country of origin
of the father. As mentioned earlier, specifications that focus on fathers or that include the whole sample of
second generation immigrants and natives give very similar results.
16As discussed later in the paper, in all specifications on the whole sample we include an interaction term
between a given parent’s native status and the average score in his or her country of origin, such that the
coefficients of Tm and T f are identified only out of second generation immigrants.
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interest θ1 does not vary much in magnitude between the OLS and the IV specifications.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 5 show that results are not driven by the particu-
larly good performances of Asian students, since the coefficient is robust to the inclusion of
continent fixed effects and to the exclusion of Asian mothers.
Figure 1 summarizes the results presented in this section. The left panel plots the average
score of second generation immigrants, studying abroad but whose mother is from a given
country against the average score of natives in that country, displaying graphically the strong
and positive relationship described in Column 1 of Table 5. The right panel shows the
correlation weakens but is still positive and significant when we clean the scores of second
generation immigrants from the effect of differences in observable characteristics.17
3.3.2 US Census
In this section we apply a similar specification as in equation (1) on the US Census data, using
a dummy equal to one if a child has never repeated any grade as our dependent variable. We
notice that this outcome, while still related to school performance, captures quite a different
dimension compared to the PISA score, given that the variation in this case comes only from
the bottom part of the distribution (more than 80% of the students in the sample has never
repeated a grade, as shown in Table 6). On the other hand, while the PISA dataset contains
only 15 year old children, the US data allows us to look at students between 8 and 15 years
old. We therefore find quite noteworthy that our results generalize to this sample as well.
The US Census does not contain any information on the particular school children are
attending, making it impossible to compare second generation immigrants in the same school,
as we did for Table 5. In an attempt to capture some of the differences across educational
systems within the US, we control for State and Commuting Zone18 fixed effect. However,
the US Census provides us with precious information on parents’ immigration history, so
that we can control for the number of years passed since the mother has first migrated to
the US. This is important to inspect the mechanisms behind our results. On top of this we
17This graph is plotting the estimated θm’s from the regression
Tmist = θ0 + θm + θ2X
m
ist + θst + ε
m
ist
where θm are mother’s country of birth fixed effects.
18Commuting Zones are constructed following Autor and Dorn (2013).
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can also control for parents’ age and family size.
Table 7 shows our main results. Once again the coefficient on Tmm is positive and significant,
and does not change much in magnitude when controls for parental education and years since
migration are included. According to column 3, the most complete specification, an increase
of a standard deviation in the PISA score of students in the mother’s country of origin
is associated with a higher probability of not having repeated any grade by 3 percentage
points (4% over the average). This effect is not trivial, given that, as mentioned earlier,
most students do not repeat any grade. As for the PISA specification, the result is robust
to the inclusion of continent fixed effects and the exclusion of Asian parents.
3.4 Selection
As our analysis relies on emigrant parents to make inference on all parents of a given nation-
ality, an obvious concern is represented by the fact emigrants are not a random sample of
the population, and might be selected on unobservable characteristics that also matter for
children’s school performance.
What type of selection should we worry about? Figure 2 displays various possibilities. In
these plots the solid line represents the actual relationship between the score of second
generation immigrants and the one of natives from the parents’ country of origin, i.e. the
relationship that we would be able to observe in a world where emigrant parents were ran-
domly selected from the population. The dashed line represents instead what we would
observe in our data, assuming different pattern of selection into emigration. The first panel
depicts the case where the type of selection into emigration (as measured by the gap between
the two lines) is the same across countries of origin with different PISA scores: if this is the
case, only the estimate of the intercept of our regression will be biased. In the second panel
we have the case where parents emigrated from countries with high PISA scores are more
positively selected than parents emigrated from countries with low PISA scores, while in the
third panel we have the opposite case. These patterns of differential selection would lead
to a biased estimate of our coefficient of interest, and in particular the case depicted in the
second panel could rationalize the findings of the previous sections.
While the main threat to our approach is represented by differential selection on unobserv-
ables, it is useful to verify whether emigrant parents are differentially selected on observable
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characteristics. The idea here is that unobservables that positively affect children’s school
performance are likely to be positively correlated with some observable characteristics, like
parents’ education and socioeconomic status. We can therefore somehow alleviate the con-
cerns on differential selection by showing that the relative “quality” of emigrants compared
to stayers is not higher for high PISA countries.
For each emigrant parent we construct a measure of selection given by the ratio between his
or her years of schooling and the average years of schooling of non emigrant parents’ from
the same country.19 Figure 5 plots the average of this measure of selection across mothers’
countries of origin against the average score of native students in those countries. If anything,
the relationship seems to be negative, suggesting that emigrants from high PISA countries
might be more adversely selected than emigrants from low PISA countries (panel 3 of Figure
2).
Moreover, Table 8 shows results of a regression of our measure of selection of emigrant parents
on the average PISA score in their country of origin, controlling for country (columns 1 and
3) and school (columns 2 and 4) fixed effects. The pattern is rather similar for mothers and
fathers: we see rather weak evidence of negative selection within host countries, and stronger
evidence within schools.
We interpret this pattern of negative differential selection within schools as consistent with
the view that there is assortative matching between the quality of parental inputs and the
quality of the school attended by children. The logic is as follows: when we observe two
students in the same school, with one of them having received higher quality parental inputs
(which in our setting means having parents born in high PISA country), then it must be
that the other student (or parents) are “better” on some other (unobservable) characteristics,
otherwise the two students would not be in the same school to start with.
Another issue, which is not related to selection into immigration but to selection into
schools/host countries, is connected to the inclusion of θs fixed effects in our regressions
and with the interpretation of the coefficient θ1. If, for instance, parents from high PISA
countries select better schools/host countries than parents from low PISA countries and we
think that the ability/willingness to select good schools should be considered as part of the
parent component, then the inclusion of a school fixed effects will absorb it. In what follows
we try to quantify how much does the inclusion of θs change the estimates of θ1 by exploring
19We construct a mapping between the ISCED classification of educational levels and equivalent years of
schooling by using the country specific conversion table in OECD (2012b).
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how school selection is related to the type of parents’ country of origin.
In order to provide evidence for whether, everything else equal, second generation immigrants
with parents from high PISA countries attend better school, we use the proxies for school
quality we constructed from the information available in the School Questionnaire. Table 9
shows that, after controlling for country fixed effects and the usual observable characteristics,
a higher PISA score in the country of origin of the mother is associated with schools where
natives score better in the PISA test, no matter whether we take the raw average (column 1)
or we clean it from observable characteristics (column 2), where admissions are more likely
to be based on academic records, the proportion of teachers with at least some tertiary
education is higher and the proportion of students dropping out is lower.20
To summarize, second generation immigrants from high PISA countries seem to be attending
better school, and this is likely to generate a pattern of differential selection that biases our
result downwards when we use within school variation. What if we limit ourselves to within
country comparisons? In that case, the effect of these differences in the quality of the school
attended would be erroneously attributed to the country of origin of the parents, conflating
our coefficient of interest. For this reason, we view the specification with school fixed effects
as a lower bound for the importance of parental inputs, we will show also results from the
specification with host country fixed effects only which we can interpret, loosely speaking,
as an upper bound.21
A final concern about selection is that immigrant parents from high PISA countries may be
better at selecting host countries (or schools) where they children may better integrate and
perform at school. We check whether immigrant from high PISA countries are systematically
located in countries which are culturally and linguistically closer to their country of origin.
To explore this possibility, Table 10 explicitly looks at the linguistic dimension. In column 2
we add to the baseline regression of column 1 a dummy variable that takes value of 1 for all
students that declare to speak a foreign language at home (This observation is available only
for part of the sample). While the coefficient on this newly added control is, as expected,
negative and significant, our main coefficient of interest is virtually unaffected. In column 3
we add controls for whether the mother tongues of mother and fathers (inferred from their
20The same results hold when we look at fathers or at the whole sample.
21This discussion is rather informal given that, even if Tmm and θs are assumed to be positively correlated,
the sign of the bias when the school fixed effect is left out depends in general on the pattern of variances
and covariances with all the other controls. Moreover, another reason why we would expect a larger role
of parental inputs from the specification with host country fixed effects is a milder attenuation bias from
measurement error.
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countries of origin) are the same of the mother tongue spoken in the host country, while in
column 4 we add a measure of linguistic distance from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015). In
both cases the coefficient on Tm remains positive and significant, and does not change much
in size.
3.5 Decomposition
For our decomposition we introduce a slightly more general model, which allows parental
inputs supplied by both mothers and fathers to differ across countries. Suppose that the test
score in year t of child i, studying (and born) in school s (and in country c), whose mother
was born in country m and father in country f is given by
Tmfist = Parents
mf
ist + αst + ρ
′Xmfist + ε
mf
ist (2)
where Parentsmfist is the combined effect of all parental inputs and is given by
Parentsmfist = γ
m + δf + β′ParentsEdumfist + η
mf
ist (3)
with γm and δf being country specific components capturing a set of average (unobservable)
characteristics of mothers and fathers from countries m and f respectively. The parental
component of student i includes also the effect of her parents’ education, which potentially
might influence her performance in school.
Combining (2) and (3) we get our regression of interest:
Tmfist = β
′ParentsEdumfist + γ
m + δf + αst + ρ
′Xmfist + u
mf
ist
This model can be estimated on the sample of students for which both parents are born in a
different country from the one where the PISA test is taking place. However, in order to use
all the available information in the data and to obtain more precise estimates for the other
controls (including the country and school fixed effects), all second generation immigrants
and native students can be included in the following specification
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Tmfist = β
′ParentsEdumfist + γ
m + δf + θmNatMothmfist + θ
fNatFathmfist + ρ
′Xmfist + αst + u
mf
ist
(4)
where NatMothmfist and NatFath
mf
ist are dummies identifying native parents (mothers and
fathers, respectively). Notice that we allow the “native advantage” to be country specific for
both mothers and fathers: this is done as otherwise this kind of variation would be absorbed
by the country of origin fixed effects, which, in that case, would not be identified only out
of second generation immigrants.
The object whose variation we are ultimately interested in decomposing is the average score
of native students in country c, which is given by
T cc = α + Parents
c + αc + ρ
′Xc (5)
where Parentsc = γc + δc + β′ParentsEdu
c
, αc is a weighted average of the school fixed
effects in country c and Xc and ParentsEdu
c
are within country c averages.22 Equation (5)
makes our decomposition explicit: our objective is to evaluate the importance of Parentsc
to account for the variation of T cc across countries.
In order to do that, we estimate our country c specific parental component from
̂Parentsc = γ̂c + δ̂c + β̂′ParentsEduc
where γ̂c, δ̂c and β̂ are our estimated parameters from (4). Figure 6 plots the parental com-
ponent obtained from both the school fixed effect and the country fixed effect specifications
against the average score of natives (with ParentsCHINA being normalized to 1 in both cases).
Not surprisingly, the estimated Parentsc is larger (in absolute terms) for countries that per-
form better in the PISA test, which means that our parental component does account for
some of the cross-country variation (as opposed to masking an even larger dispersion) of av-
erage test scores. Consistently with our discussion in Section 8, the dispersion in Parentsc is
larger under the country fixed effect specification, which ignores the within country variation
in school quality and is not subject to the selection bias arising from assortative matching
between parents and schools. Table 12 displays Parentsc for all countries for which we have
at least 100 second generation immigrants in our sample and therefore a reasonably precise
22The constant now absorbs the “native advantage” terms and an average of the waves fixed effects.
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estimate of the corresponding fixed effect.
With our estimate at hand, we can compute the share of the total cross-country variance of
T cc accounted by Parents
c, simply as
VParents =
V ar( ̂Parentsc)
V ar(T cc )
Moreover, for every country (or group of countries) c we can calculate the share of the gap in
average test score accounted by the parental component with respect to a given benchmark
b as
SParents(c, b) =
̂Parentsb − ̂Parentsc
T bb − T cc
Finally, to gauge the relative contribution of parental education and country specific inter-
cepts, we also compute equivalent statistics for the country specific intercepts only23,
VFE =
V ar(γ̂c + δ̂c)
V ar(T cc )
SFE(c, b) =
(γ̂b + δ̂b)− (γ̂c + δ̂c)
T bb − T cc
Tables 11 and 12 show the results of these calculations, both under the country fixed effect
and the school fixed effect specifications. For the pairwise comparisons, we focus on the gap
between East Asia and the other group of countries as defined in Section 3.2 for Table 11,
and on the gap between China and the other countries for Table 12.
The first panel of Table 11 shows that Parentsc accounts for between 12% and 26% of the
total variation across countries. However, the role of the parental component is substantially
larger when considering the gaps between East Asia and some of the other groups. Partic-
ularly striking are the results for Southern Europe and Middle East/North Africa, which as
shown in Table 1 display large gaps with respect to the best performing countries, more than
a third of which is potentially explained by differences in terms of parental inputs. On the
other hand, it is interesting to notice the relatively smaller role that parental inputs play
for Latin American countries, whose poor performance in standardized test has been object
of recent study (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012b). For both the variance and pairwise
decompositions, the country of origin fixed effects account for the bulk of the contribution
23That is, excluding country differences in average parental education. This is to understand how much of
the variation is related to parents’ observable characteristics nd how much to unobservable characteristics.
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of the parental component, suggesting that cross-country differences in parents’ education
do not play an important role.24
Table 12 shows the corresponding results for individual countries. On average, between 17%
and 52% of China’s out-performance can be accounted by parental inputs. Once again,
differences in the estimated country-specific intercepts drive most of the parental component
contribution.
3.6 Mechanism
In this section we attempt to open the black box of the parental inputs whose importance
was quantified above. What makes parents from high PISA countries more “effective” in
terms of the school performance of their children? While answering this question precisely
is difficult, we attempt to shed some light on this by proceeding in three steps. First, we
distinguish between two alternative interpretations on the source of differences in parental
inputs, one based on an intergenerational effect of parental education and another based
on a cultural transmission mechanism. Then we turn to the Time Use data to see whether
immigrant parents from high PISA countries and their children differ in some observable
practices that might help us to explain their better performance at school. Finally, we test
whether measures relative to countries’ of origin economic development, culture and religion
can explain our correlation of interest.
3.6.1 Interactions
The results shown in the previous sections can be rationalized by two conceptually distinct
interpretations. One possibility is that the outstanding performance of second generation
immigrants from high PISA countries is a by-product of the fact that their parents received
an education of higher quality in their country of origin. While conceptually this would still
imply that these students have an advantage in terms of parental inputs, the source of this
advantage would be the school system itself, creating a powerful intergenerational multiplier
effect of educational quality. In other words, while our decomposition would still be valid in
24For several geographic regions, and notably for the US, SFE(c, EA) is considerably larger than
SParents(c, EA), since in those regions parents are on average more educated than their East Asian counter-
parts.
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an accounting sense, different parental inputs would only be a proximate cause of differences
in test scores, with the underlying fundamental force being the school system instead.
An alternative explanation is that there is some fixed cultural trait which parents transmit
to their children, which is unrelated to the quality of parental education and might have its
roots in factors deeply entrenched with a country’s history and culture. This would mean
that this component is likely to be quite persistent over time, and improving a country’s
educational system might not do much in raising the average test scores if this cultural
aspect does not change as well.
An useful way to discriminate between these two views is to explore the heterogeneity of the
importance of the country specific parental component with respect to parental education
and years since migration. If the intergenerational transmission of educational quality is
important, we would expect the correlation with the PISA score in the parents’ country of
origin to be particularly strong for immigrant parents with higher education in their home
country25, which have been more exposed to the educational system.26 At the extreme,
parents with no education could not transmit the quality of their home country’s educational
system at all. On the other hand, if the underlying mechanism is a fixed cultural trait we
would expect that parents that have been abroad for a longer time might be culturally
more integrated in their host country and would have at least in part converged to its
cultural norms.27 In that case, the correlation with the average test score in the country of
origin would be weaker for parents that have emigrated many years ago. Moreover, there is
some evidence that highly educated immigrants have an easier time integrating in their host
country28: if this is the case, under the “cultural” interpretation, parents’ years of schooling
(acquired either in the home or in the host country), would also alleviate the correlation
between their children performance and the average score in their country of origin.
To summarize, we have some testable implications to discriminate between the two mecha-
25It is actually unclear whether only years of schooling in the home country should matter, giver that
there could be dynamic complementarities in the human capital accumulation process that make the impact
of an additional year of schooling in the host country stronger for parents that have spent the initial part
of their educational career in higher quality schools. Moreover, it is possible that parents emigrating from
high PISA countries would go to better schools once in the host country. Since we actually find a negative
interaction term, this issue is mostly inconsequential for our purposes.
26This line of reasoning is similar to the one in Schoellman (2012), even though here it is applied to returns
to parental education for school outcomes of their children.
27See Giavazzi et al. (2014) for evidence on the speed of convergence of different cultural traits.
28For example, there is widespread evidence that more educated migrants have a higher propensity to
intermarry with natives (see Schoen and Wooldredge (1989); Sandefur and McKinnell (1986); Lichter and
Qian (2001); Meng and Gregory (2005); Chiswick and Houseworth (2011)), which is an important indicator
of integration in the host country.
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nisms. The intergenerational transmission of educational quality mechanism would imply a
positive interaction term between parents’ years of schooling acquired in the home country
and the average score of natives in the same country. The fixed cultural trait mechanism
would instead predict a negative interaction between the average test score and parents’
years since migration, as well as with parents’ years of schooling.
We now turn to the US Census data to put these predictions to empirical scrutiny. We once
again restrict attention to the results relative to second generation immigrants on the mother
side in the main text.29 We construct a measure of mothers’ years of schooling both in their
home and in their host countries from information on year of immigration and age at the
end of education (imputed from the educational level). Year of immigration is available only
as a categorical variable, identifying intervals of approximately 5 years. We therefore impute
the exact year of arrival in the US according to two alternative criteria: either we assign to
everybody the middle year of their interval (for our first specification below), or we impute
the last year in that interval in order to identify immigrants that most likely had their whole
education in their home country (for our second specification).
Table 13 shows our main results. We start by adding to the baseline specification in column
1 an interaction term between Tm and mother’s years of schooling, finding a negative and
significant coefficient. When we break down years of schooling between those acquired in the
US and those acquired in country m (columns 3 and 4), we find that the interaction term is
negative in both cases, with coefficients of similar magnitudes. These results are inconsistent
with the presence of a strong intergenerational effect of educational quality.
A similar message emerges from the study of heterogeneity with respect to years since mi-
gration. According to the results in column 5, the correlation between Tm and the school
performance of children is weaker for mothers that have emigrated many years ago. Column
6 shows that this result (as well as the results on education previously discussed) is unaffected
by the inclusion of controls for age at migration, which has also been shown to be important
for the assimilation of immigrants (Bleakley and Chin, 2010; Nielsen and Schindler Rangvid,
2012).
A possible concern is that our imperfect mapping from the information available from the
Census and years of schooling accumulated in country m and in the US might confound
our results, since the predictions of the “educational quality” mechanism would hold unam-
bigously only for education acquired in the mother’s home country (see the discussion in
29The results for the rest of the sample are similar and available upon request.
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footnote 25). To alleviate this concern, Table 14 shows results for a subsample of mothers
that we are more confident completed their whole education in their country of origin, since
we imputed their year of immigration using the most restrictive criterion discussed above.
We can see that the interaction between Tm and mother’s years of schooling is still negative
and significant, as well as the one between Tm and years since migration.
Overall, our results seem supportive of the fixed cultural trait interpretation, given that our
correlation of interest is attenuated by both parental education30 and integration in the host
country. To offer further visual evidence for the first fact, Figure 3 and 4 plot, for the PISA
and US Census data respectively, the country-specific intercept and coefficient on mother’s
years of schooling from a regression of our outcome of interest on these variables and the
usual controls, with the sample always restricted to second generation immigrants on the
mother side. In both cases, the correlation between school performance and test scores in
the mother’s country of origin is mainly driven by the intercept, and not by different returns
to education. This pattern is different from the one documented by Schoellman (2012)
for wages of immigrants. Schoellman (2012) shows that returns to education (and not the
intercept) of US immigrants are positively related to GDP per capita and PISA scores in
the country of origin and interprets this as evidence in favour of the fact that school quality
varies greatly across countries. Our results show that, while differences in school quality
might be important for labor market outcomes of immigrants, they do not seem to account
for the differential school performance of their children. What matters in this case are fixed
cultural traits incorporated in the country specific intercepts.
3.6.2 Time Use
In this section we investigate whether the way in which immigrant parents from high PISA
countries and their children spend their time might help us explaining our main results.
Table 16 starts by looking at parents. Columns 1 to 3 refer to total child care, while
columns 4 to 6 break down the time spent with children in the educational, recreative and
basic categories described in Section 3.2. Across all specifications and time use categories,
interviewed parents from high PISA countries stand out for spending more time with their
children. The result is robust to the inclusion of state fixed effects and several controls
on demographic characteritstics of both parents and children. Since time use variables are
30We verified that this pattern holds also for the PISA data. These results are not shown and are available
upon request.
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measured in minutes and refer to a single day, from column 3 it emerges that an increase of
one standard deviation in the PISA score in a parent’s country of origin corresponds to a
higher investment of approximately one hour per week in total child care. This extra hour
is quite evenly spread across the three time use subcategories.
Table 18 examines instead time use habits of children. Here we restrict the sample to
students between 15 and 18 years old, which are enrolled in full time education; moreover, as
usual we restrict attention to second generation immigrants on the mother side in the main
text.Our dependent variable is time spent studying, as a proxy for one the main inputs in the
educational process. While the sample size is quite small, we find a strong and significant
correlation with the average test score of the mother country of birth. According to column
3, the most complete specification, an increase of a standard deviation in Tm is associated
with more than 4 extra hours of studying per week.
The results in this section seem to indicate that second generation immigrants do differ in
terms of observable practices as a function of the country of origin of their parents. In
absence of a credible estimate of the effectiveness of parental child care and children’s study
time, it is of course difficult to establish where these differences might be driving the results
found in the previous sections.
3.6.3 Country Level Characteristics
We now present results from specification (1), augmented by a series of controls at the
mother’s country of origin level. The main objective of this analysis is to verify that the
estimate of our coefficient of interest does not pick up variation across different country-
level characteristics, that might also plausibly affect second generation immigrants’ school
performance.
Table 19 includes controls related to the level of economic development and to the quality
of the education system in country m. In particular, we include log GDP per capita, the
percentage of native mothers with at least some tertiary education, average years of education
of natives between 20 and 30 years old in 1990 and the primary school pupil to teacher ratio in
country m. None of these controls significantly affects the coefficient on Tm31, and, with the
exception of the share of skilled of native mothers, they do not seem to affect the performance
31Regressions with other controls of school quality are available under request. The main result is unaf-
fected across all specifications we have experimented with.
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of second generation immigrants either.
Table 20 includes controls related to religion and cultural values. Columns 2 controls for the
religious composition on the population in 1970, while column 3 controls for some answers to
various World Value Survey questions that should capture attitudes towards education and
hard work. In both cases the coefficient of interest is not greatly affected, even though some
of the controls introduced seem to have explanatory power on the performance of second
generation immigrants.
3.7 Conclusions
While PISA scores are often taken as a metric to compare the quality of different educational
systems, this is not the whole story. In this paper we argue that an important share of the
cross-country variation in test scores is driven by differences in broadly defined parental in-
puts. We arrive to this conclusion by comparing the PISA performance of second generation
immigrants, which are born and educated in the same country and school, but have parents
of different nationalities. While we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that some unob-
servable characteristic plays a role in driving our results, we show through various checks
that this is unlikely to be the case, and that any residual pattern of differential selection
would probably go against finding our result.
We also provide evidence against the possibility that the superior performance of second
generation immigrants from high PISA countries is due to an intergenerational spillover of
the high quality education received by their parents. There seems to be some deep cultural
factor that makes parents born in some specific countries invest more in their children’s
education.
Our paper leaves open important avenues for future research. While our main contribution
is to identify and quantify an important parental quality component in average PISA scores,
our evidence on the specific mechanisms behind this component is only suggestive. We
believe it would be important to deepen our understanding of what East Asian parents do
differently from Southern European ones (to pick a stark comparison) when raising their
children, and whether these differences are optimal responses to the economic environments
they are placed in, or maybe the by-product of differences in preferences shaped by the
historical experiences of the two regions.
125
Moreover, our results could be viewed as a sign of caution for policy-makers aiming to
raise their students’ performance in standardized tests. Since cross-country gaps seem to
go beyond differences in school quality, it is unclear to what extent various policies can be
effective to this end, given that the cultural factors that lead parents to invest more or less
in children’s education might be deeply entrenched and persistent over time.
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Figures
Figure 1: Performance of Second Generation Immigrants and Natives from Country m
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Source: PISA (2003-2012). Panel a plots the average PISA score of second generation im-
migrants whose mother is from country m (y-axis) with respect to the average PISA score of
natives in country m (x-axis). Panel b corrects the average PISA scores of second generation
immigrants by differences in observable characteristics (as explained in Footnote 17). The size
of the circles in panel b represents the sample size.
Figure 2: Different Types of Selection
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Figure 3: Country Specific Intercept and Returns to Parental Education - PISA Data
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Source: PISA (2003-2012). Panel a plots the country specific intercepts θm in equation T
m
ist =
θm + βmTm ∗ EduMothmist + βXmist + mist (y-axis) with respect to the average PISA score of
natives in country m (x-axis). Panel b plots the country specific returns to education βm with
respect to the average PISA score of natives in country m. The size of the circles represents
the sample size.
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Figure 4: Country Specific Interecept and Returns to Parental Education - US Census
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Source: US Census. Panel a plots the country specific intercepts θm (y-axis) with respect to
the average PISA score of natives in country m (x-axis). Panel b plots the country specific
returns to education βm with respect to the average PISA score of natives in country m. The
size of the circles represents the sample size.
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Figure 5: Selection on Parental Education
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Source: PISA (2003-2012). The Figure plots a measure of the degree of selection into migration
in country m (the average years of schooling of emigrant parents over the average years of
schooling of remaining parents) (y-axis) with respect to the average PISA score of natives in
country m (x-axis).
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Figure 6: Parental Component
ALB
ARG
AUS
AUT
BEL
BRA
BGR
CHL
CHN
TWN
COL
HRV
CZE
DNK
EST
FRA
DEU
GRC
HKG
HUN
IND
ITA
JOR
KOR
LIE
MAC
MYS
NLD
NZL
PAN
POL
PRT
ROU
RUS
SGP
SVK
VNM
SVN
ESP
SWE
CHETHA
TUR
GBR
USA
URY
SCG
ALB
ARG
AUST
BEL
BRA
BGR
CHL
TWN
COL
HRV
CZE
DNKEST
FRA
DEU
GRC
HKG
HUN
IND
ITA
JOR
KOR
LIE
MAC
MYS
NLD
NZL
PAN
POL
PRT
ROU
RUS
SGP
SVK
VNM
SVN
ESP
SWE
CHE
THA
TUR
GBR
USA
URY
SCG
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
Pa
re
nt
al
 C
om
po
ne
nt
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Average Score Natives
School FE Country FE
Source: PISA (2003-2012). The Figure plots an estimate of the size of the parental component
(Parentsc in the decomposition described in Section 3.5, normalized such that it takes value 1
for China) (y-axis) with respect to the average PISA score of natives in country m (x-axis).
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Tables
Table 1: Average PISA Scores across Regions
Math Reading Science # Countries
East Asia 0.85 0.58 0.69 7
EU North 0.49 0.43 0.44 15
Oceania 0.43 0.49 0.50 2
US 0.17 0.34 0.30 1
EU South 0.06 0.08 0.10 5
EU East -0.16 -0.27 -0.15 19
Other Asia -0.52 -0.51 -0.47 5
Latin America -0.69 -0.52 -0.59 11
Middle East/NA -0.71 -0.59 -0.60 7
The Table shows the simple average of the scores obtained
in countries belonging to each region, across all available
waves. Scores are standardized to have mean 0 and
standard deviation 1.
132
Table 2: Summary statistics - PISA (Mothers)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Score .1944 .9961 -3.179 3.362
Tm .2225 .6063 -1.068 1.407
Mother Sec Edu .5154 .4998 0 1
Mother Ter Edu .3001 .4583 0 1
Father Sec Edu .5142 .4998 0 1
Father Ter Edu .3351 .472 0 1
Immigrant Mother 1 0 1 1
Immigrant Father .6486 .4774 0 1
# Obs in Host Country c 1115.0256 2004.6515 10 9759
# Obs from Country m 887.4694 2301.3304 2 14905
# Host Countries for Mothers from Country m 3.3469 3.0452 1 13
Observations 43486
The Table shows descriptive statistics for second generation immigrants on the mother’s
side. Sample includes only cases where both parents report a country of origin and the
country of origin of the mother runs a PISA test on natives. Scores are from the math
test and are standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 (in the whole
sample). Observations weighted accordind to the provided sample weights.
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Table 3: Second Generation Immigrants by Country of Origin - PISA Data
Mothers Fathers
Country # Host Top # Host Top
of Origin Number Countries Host Country Number Countries Host Country
Albania 360 5 Greece (200) 332 5 Greece (173)
Argentina 83 2 Uruguay (82) 80 1 Uruguay (80)
Australia 169 2 New Zealand (168) 133 2 New Zealand (132)
Austria 260 2 Switzerland (192) 188 2 Switzerland (144)
Belgium 276 3 Luxembourg (261) 258 2 Luxembourg (238)
Brazil 214 4 Uruguay (92) 192 4 Uruguay (86)
Bulgaria 34 1 Turkey (34) 17 1 Turkey (17)
Canada 2 1 Ireland (2) 2 1 Ireland (2)
Chile 71 1 Argentina (71) 57 1 Argentina (57)
China 14905 13 Macao (9570) 14224 11 Macao (8788)
Colombia 5 1 Costa Rica (5) 6 1 Costa Rica (6)
Croatia 229 3 Serbia-Mont. (121) 195 3 Serbia-Mont. (93)
Czech Republic 216 2 Slovakia (206) 187 2 Slovakia (177)
Denmark 82 2 Norway (81) 103 1 Norway (103)
Estonia 84 1 Finland (84) 56 1 Finland (56)
France 1398 7 Switzerland (650) 1181 7 Switzerland (469)
Germany 1470 9 Switzerland (658) 1175 9 Switzerland (478)
Greece 94 2 Australia (70) 144 2 Australia (118)
Hong Kong 248 2 Macao (174) 451 3 Macao (363)
Hungary 19 2 Austria (17) 17 2 Austria (13)
India 234 4 Australia (201) 235 4 Australia (197)
Italy 1630 9 Switzerland (1061) 2805 9 Switzerland (1844)
Jordan 184 1 Qatar (184) 145 1 Qatar (145)
Liechtenstein 40 1 Switzerland (40) 28 1 Switzerland (28)
Macao 149 1 Hong Kong (149) 132 1 Hong Kong (132)
Malaysia 67 4 Australia (54) 57 4 Australia (46)
Netherlands 242 5 Belgium (208) 290 5 Belgium (211)
New Zealand 859 1 Australia (859) 859 1 Australia (859)
Panama 11 1 Costa Rica (11) 16 1 Costa Rica (16)
Poland 313 3 Germany (237) 246 3 Germany (196)
Portugal 2824 4 Luxembourg (1906) 2687 5 Luxembourg (1865)
Romania 62 2 Austria (60) 67 3 Austria (53)
Russia 4770 13 Estonia (1391) 4643 13 Estonia (1390)
Serbia-Mont. 2814 9 Switzerland (1637) 2860 9 Switzerland (1649)
Singapore 9 1 Indonesia (9) 10 2 Indonesia (9)
Slovakia 554 2 Czech Republic (549) 657 2 Czech Republic (652)
Slovenia 15 2 Austria (11) 18 2 Austria (11)
South Korea 48 2 Australia (33) 49 2 Australia (36)
Spain 354 5 Switzerland (336) 432 4 Switzerland (412)
Sweden 383 2 Finland (239) 296 2 Finland (182)
Switzerland 114 1 Liechtenstein (114) 97 1 Liechtenstein (97)
Taiwan 27 1 Hong Kong (27) 10 2 Hong Kong (6)
Thailand 14 1 Finland (14) 2 1 Finland (2)
Turkey 2864 8 Denmark (621) 3134 8 Switzerland (632)
UK 3820 5 Australia (2316) 3975 5 Australia (2500)
United States 457 5 Mexico (228) 586 5 Mexico (360)
Uruguay 88 1 Argentina (88) 82 1 Argentina (82)
Vietnam 327 4 Australia (260) 324 3 Australia (251)
Average 906.1 3.4 911.3 3.4
The Table shows summary statistics on second generation immigrants on the mother and father side from each
country of origin in the PISA sample included in our decomposition exercise, across all available waves. # Host
Countries is the number of different host countries in which second generation immigrants of a given nationality
are observed. Top Host Country is the host country where the highest number (reported in brackets) of second
generation immigrants of a given nationality are observed.
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Table 4: Second Generation Immigrants by Host Country - PISA Data
Mothers Fathers
Top Country Top Country
Host # Countries of Origin # Countries of Origin
Country Number of Origin (in PISA) Number of Origin (in PISA)
Argentina 631 6 Uruguay (88) 585 6 Uruguay (82)
Australia 9022 17 UK (2316) 9394 17 UK (2500)
Austria 1979 15 Turkey (487) 1965 15 Turkey (519)
Belgium 3126 7 Turkey (434) 3524 7 Turkey (492)
Costa Rica 460 3 Panama (11) 537 3 Panama (16)
Croatia 2160 4 Serbia-Mont. (363) 1948 4 Serbia-Mont. (348)
Czech Republic 780 6 Slovakia (549) 1014 6 Slovakia (652)
Denmark 2712 6 Turkey (621) 2814 6 Turkey (625)
Estonia 1708 2 Russia (1391) 1839 2 Russia (1390)
Finland 1103 10 Sweden (239) 1266 10 Sweden (182)
Georgia 97 2 Russia (69) 76 2 Russia (51)
Germany 1429 10 Turkey (512) 1515 10 Turkey (559)
Greece 1270 3 Russia (214) 760 3 Albania (173)
Hong Kong 5447 4 China (4758) 5296 4 China (4938)
Indonesia 44 5 Singapore (9) 55 5 Singapore (9)
Ireland 1173 17 UK (946) 1043 15 UK (814)
Israel 2321 5 Russia (606) 2474 5 Russia (596)
Kazakhstan 1174 2 Russia (982) 1117 2 Russia (918)
Kyrgyzstan 480 2 Russia (106) 297 2 Russia (106)
Latvia 2295 4 Russia (967) 2593 4 Russia (1107)
Liechtenstein 330 11 Switzerland (114) 281 11 Switzerland (97)
Luxembourg 4448 10 Portugal (1906) 4540 10 Portugal (1865)
Macao 10202 5 China (9570) 9654 7 China (8788)
Mauritius 84 4 China (11) 57 4 China (8)
Mexico 1085 4 United States (228) 1398 4 United States (360)
Moldova 203 3 Russia (68) 192 4 Russia (59)
Netherlands 1741 16 Turkey (203) 1832 16 Turkey (228)
New Zealand 1989 8 UK (528) 2144 8 UK (620)
Norway 1145 3 Sweden (144) 1149 3 Sweden (114)
Portugal 1576 5 Brazil (61) 1353 5 Brazil (64)
Qatar 5908 4 Jordan (184) 5159 4 Jordan (145)
Serbia-Mont. 2333 4 Croatia (121) 1782 4 Croatia (93)
Slovakia 593 3 Czech Republic (206) 583 3 Czech Republic (177)
Slovenia 1841 3 Italy (8) 1880 3 Italy (10)
South Korea 29 5 China (11) - - -
Switzerland 8453 11 Serbia-Mont. (1637) 8320 11 Italy (1844)
Turkey 229 5 Germany (67) 190 5 Germany (33)
UK 2199 7 China (25) 2380 7 China (26)
Uruguay 313 4 Brazil (92) 338 4 Brazil (86)
Average 2156.7 6.3 2137.1 6.2
The Table shows summary statistics on second generation immigrants on the mother and father side observed in each
country in the PISA sample, across all available waves. # Countries of Origin is the number of different countries of
origin of second generation immigrants in a given host country. Top Country of Origin (in PISA) is the country of
origin from which the highest number of second generation immigrants in a given host country are observed (number
reported in brackets).
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Table 5: Main results-PISA
Dependent Variable: Math Test Score
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All No Asia
Tm 0.676*** 0.547*** 0.261*** 0.255*** 0.241*** 0.317***
(0.022) (0.044) (0.033) (0.034) (0.03) (0.078)
Female -0.129*** -0.136*** -0.212*** -0.209*** -0.208*** -0.181***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027)
Moth Sec Edu 0.008 0.003 0.084
(0.029) (0.029) (0.061)
Moth Ter Edu 0.035 0.027 0.136**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.059)
Fath Sec Edu 0.032 0.033 0.083
(0.034) (0.034) (0.069)
Fath Ter Edu 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.144**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.069)
N 43486 43486 43486 43486 43486 24408
# Country m 49 49 49 49 49 36
R Squared 0.165 0.248 0.665 0.666 0.666 0.636
Host Country f E No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent m FE No No No No Yes Yes
The Table shows results for second generation immigrants on the mother’s side. The
sample includes only cases where both parents report a country of origin and the country
of origin of the mother runs a PISA test on natives. Tm refers to the average math PISA
score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1) in the country of
birth of the mother, across all available waves. All specifications control for intercept,
wave fixed effect and a dummy for father immigrant status. Observations weighted
according to the provided sample weights. Robust standard errors clustered by mother
country of origin. All coefficients and standard errors are estimated according to the
”Unbiased Shortcut” procedure (PISA Technical Report, 2009), using the replicate
weights provided by PISA. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%,
*** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 6: Summary statistics - US Census (Mothers)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
No Grade Repeated .8083 .3937 0 1
Tm .1269 .5382 -1.474 1.407
Mother Sec Edu .4831 .4997 0 1
Mother Ter Edu .2062 .4046 0 1
Father Sec Edu .3915 .4881 0 1
Father Ter Edu .3347 .4719 0 1
Mother Immigrant 1 0 1 1
Father Immigrant .4594 .4984 0 1
Yrs Since Migr Mother 20.06 8.749 2 57
Female .4854 .4998 0 1
Student Age 11.35 2.287 8 15
# Obs from Country m 874.7705 2132.5378 1 13813
Observations 53361
The Table shows descriptive statistics for second generation
immigrants on the mother’s side. The sample includes only
cases where both parents report a country of origin and the
country of origin of the mother runs a PISA test on natives. No
Grade Repeated is a dummy taking value 1 for students
attending a grade larger or equal to the mode of the
corresponding year of birth, quarter of birth, state and year cell.
Score Country m is the average math PISA score of natives
(standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1) in the
country of birth of the mother. Observations weighted
accordind to the provided sample weights.
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Table 7: Main results-US CENSUS
Variables Dependent variable: 1=never repeated a grade
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All No Asia
Tm 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.016*** 0.030**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.012)
Female 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.071***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Mother Sec Edu 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.049***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Mother Ter Edu 0.068*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.058***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Father Sec Edu 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.045***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Father Ter Edu 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.068*** 0.075***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
N 53361 53361 53361 53361 53361 47984
# Country m 61 61 61 61 61 45
R Squared 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
County FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years Since Migr Mother No No No Yes Yes Yes
Continent m FE No No No No Yes No
Tm refers to the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and
standard deviation 1) in the country of birth of the mother, across all available waves. All
specifications control for intercept, child age dummies, parents’ age, family size, year fixed
effect,state fixed effect, (year specific) quarter of birth fixed effect and father immigrant
status. Observations weighted accordind to the provided sample weights. Robust standard
errors clustered by mother country of origin. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes
significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 8: Selection
Mothers Fathers
Years Edui/Years Edum Years Edui/Years Eduf
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Tm -0.126* -0.222**
(0.070) (0.084)
T f -0.108* -0.178***
(0.057) (0.060)
N 45023 45023 44373 44373
R Squared 0.08 0.47 0.09 0.50
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE No Yes No Yes
The sample includes only second generation immigrants on the mother
side for specifications (1) and (2) and on the father side for
specifications (3) and (4). Years Edum and Years Eduf are the
average years of education of mothers and fathers in the country of
birth of the mother and father respectively. Score Country m and
Score Country f refer to the average math PISA score of natives
(standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1) in the
country of birth of the mother and the father, across all available
waves. All specifications control for intercept and wave fixed effect.
Robust standard errors clustered by mother country of origin in
specifications (1) and (2) and by father country of origin in
specifications (3) and (4) . * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes
significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 9: Selection into Schools
Avg Score School School FE Academic Admission % Qual Teachers Dropout Rate
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Tm 0.208** 0.201** 0.052** 0.028** -0.009**
(0.084) (0.079) (0.022) (0.011) (0.004)
Female 0.062*** 0.074*** 0.014 0.007 -0.002
(0.020) (0.019) (0.010) (0.007) (0.002)
Father Sec Edu 0.102*** 0.099*** 0.061** -0.021 -0.007
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.014) (0.009)
Father Ter Edu 0.252*** 0.238*** 0.084*** 0.004 -0.008
(0.040) (0.037) (0.028) (0.016) (0.010)
Mother Sec Edu 0.157*** 0.152*** 0.018 0.010 -0.036
(0.025) (0.024) (0.015) (0.007) (0.028)
Mother Ter Edu 0.248*** 0.234*** 0.024 0.009 -0.037
(0.049) (0.047) (0.024) (0.015) (0.025)
N 42944 42895 43486 32356 10184
# Country m 49 49 49 48 41
R Squared 0.34 0.35 0.17 0.41 0.06
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The sample includes only second generation immigrants on the mother side. Score Country m refers to the
average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1) in the country of
birth of the mother, across all available waves. All specifications control for intercept and father immigrant
status. Robust standard errors clustered by mother country of origin. * denotes significance at 10%, **
denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 10: Language
Dependent Variable: Math Test Score
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Tm 0.236*** 0.232*** 0.236*** 0.181***
(0.029) (0.035) (0.035) (0.029)
Female -0.206*** -0.207*** -0.206*** -0.171***
(0.025) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Father Sec Edu 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.131***
(0.046) (0.033) (0.033) (0.049)
Father Ter Edu 0.084* 0.080** 0.084** 0.202***
(0.049) (0.039) (0.040) (0.054)
Mother Sec Edu 0.008 -0.001 0.008 0.006
(0.035) (0.028) (0.028) (0.044)
Mother Ter Edu 0.061 0.052 0.061* 0.070
(0.050) (0.037) (0.037) (0.046)
Foreign Language at Home -0.094***
(0.031)
Mother Same Native Lang 0.004
(0.034)
Father Same Native Lang -0.036
(0.043)
Mother Linguistic Distance 0.120**
(0.049)
Father Linguistic Distance 0.010
(0.053)
N 40915 40915 40915 21346
# Country m 49 49 49 42
R Squared 0.664 0.664 0.664 0.582
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
The Table shows results for second generation immigrants on the mother’s
side. Sample includes only cases where both parents report a country of
origin and the country of origin of the mother runs a PISA test on natives.
Tm refers to the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have
mean 0 and standard deviation 1) in the country of birth of the mother,
across all available waves. All specifications control for intercept, wave
fixed effect and a dummy for father immigrant stautus. Observations
weighted according to the provided sample weights. Robust standard
errors clustered by mother country of origin. All coefficients and standard
errors are estimated according to the ”Unbiased Shortcut” procedure
(PISA Technical Report, 2009), using the replicate weights provided by
PISA. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, ***
denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 11: Decomposition Results
VParents (%) VFE (%)
School FE Host Country FE School FE Host Country FE
11.9 26.0 11.6 23.6
SParents(c, EA) (%) SFE(c, EA) (%)
School FE Host Country FE School FE Host Country FE
East Asia vs
EU North 17.9 55.6 19.1 60.2
Oceania 37.5 83.3 37.7 84.6
US 2.7 16.4 4.7 22.5
EU South 32.7 79.1 30.4 70.1
EU East 18.9 46.9 19.9 50.8
Other Asia 11.0 35.7 8.1 25.8
Latin America 10.1 30.5 9.0 26.1
Middle East/NA 33.8 81.6 31.0 68.8
The Table shows results from the decomposition of the cross-country variation in the
PISA Math Score. The first panel shows the share of the cross-country variance
accounted by the whole parental component (VParents) and by the country specific
intercept (VFE), while the second panel shows the share of the score gap between
East Asia and each group accounted by the whole parental component
(SParents(c, EA)) and by the country specific intercept (SFE(c, EA)). For each
group, SParents(c, EA) and SFE(c, EA) are computed using weighted averages of the
corresponding parental components and test scores for each belonging country, where
the weights are given by the (weighted) number of immigrant parents from each
country available in the sample.
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Table 12: Parental Component by Country
Parentsc SParents(c,CHINA) (%) SFE(c,CHINA) (%)
Country PISA Score School FE Country FE School FE Country FE School FE Country FE
China 1.41 1 1 - - - -
Hong Kong .89 .94 .84 11.9 30.83 6.48 9.93
Switzerland .78 .95 .53 8.12 74.37 10.29 81.31
Belgium .7 1 .55 .66 63.41 4.67 75.3
Netherlands .68 .93 .72 10.08 38.72 12.24 45.36
Germany .55 .92 .6 8.82 47.17 9.69 50.56
Estonia .54 .97 .67 3.75 38.41 5.29 43.72
Macao .51 .94 .65 6.61 39.28 2.35 22.28
New Zealand .48 .66 .21 36.13 84.79 36.07 85.18
Denmark .44 1.09 .68 -9.66 33.08 -7.05 41.56
Vietnam .43 .93 .53 6.94 47.97 1.23 28.16
Australia .43 .6 .33 40.72 68.27 41.81 71.88
Austria .42 .87 .27 12.76 73.98 13.35 76.75
France .41 .81 .36 18.74 64.64 19.32 67.75
Czechia .38 .75 .37 24.46 61.66 23.86 59.5
Sweden .36 .93 .52 7.18 46.07 10.26 55.57
United Kingdom .3 .75 .4 22.51 54.53 23.32 58.05
Poland .27 .72 .38 24.67 54.74 22.91 50.26
Slovakia .23 .85 .23 12.64 65.08 11.69 62.47
Spain .18 .63 .08 30.22 75.03 29.05 69.43
United States .17 .96 .8 2.87 16.36 4.8 22.52
Portugal .08 .62 .05 28.81 71.62 25.09 56.48
Italy .07 .51 -.18 36.66 87.72 35.7 84.85
Russia .02 .84 .53 11.48 33.64 13.27 39.96
Croatia .01 .58 .18 30.09 58.64 30.65 60.47
Greece -.11 .44 -.08 37.07 71.31 36.87 70.25
Turkey -.31 .4 -.45 35.07 84.41 32.05 70.66
Serbia & Montenegro -.34 .53 -.03 26.89 59.23 27.66 61.89
Romania -.41 .66 .45 18.61 30.26 19.01 31.8
Uruguay -.46 .87 .42 6.8 31.1 5.69 26.4
Chile -.46 .63 .15 19.61 45.38 18.9 42.51
Malaysia -.49 .63 .01 19.24 52.12 18.24 49.17
Argentina -.76 .83 .43 7.7 26.1 7.08 23.12
Albania -.77 .44 -.18 25.71 54.41 25.15 52.44
Jordan -.83 .72 .23 12.34 34.36 12.26 33.75
Brazil -.9 .77 .35 9.77 28.25 8.27 22.48
India -1.07 .71 .37 11.63 25.67 9.99 19.71
Average 0.10 0.76 0.33 17.16 52.02 16.88 50.65
The Table includes only countries with at least 100 second generation immigrants in the sample. Parentsc is the
estimated parental component, normalized such that ParentsCHINA = 1.
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Table 13: Interactions - US CENSUS
Variables Dependent variable: 1=never repeated a grade
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Tm 0.032*** 0.112*** 0.032*** 0.111*** 0.155*** 0.175***
(0.008) (0.024) (0.008) (0.026) (0.034) (0.040)
Female 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.067***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Yrs Schooling Father 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Yrs Schooling Mother 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
Tm ∗Yrs Schooling Mother -0.005***
(0.001)
Yrs Schooling Moth in US 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.002* 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Yrs Schooling Moth in m 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tm ∗Yrs Schooling Mother in US -0.006*** -0.002** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tm ∗Yrs Schooling Mother in m -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Yrs Since Migr Mother 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Tm ∗Yrs Since Migr Mother -0.002** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Age Migration Moth 0.006***
(0.002)
(Age Migration Moth)2 -0.000***
(0.000)
Tm ∗Age Migration Mother -0.001
(0.001)
N 52853 52853 52853 52853 52853 52853
# Country m 61 61 61 61 61 61
R Squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tm refers to the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard
deviation 1) in the country of birth of the mother, across all available waves. All specifications control
for intercept, child age dummies, parents’ age, family size, year fixed effect,state fixed effect, (year
specific) quarter of birth fixed effect and father immigrant status. Observations weighted accordind to
the provided sample weights. Robust standard errors clustered by mother country of origin. * denotes
significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 14: Interactions - US CENSUS (Mothers Entirely Educated in
Home Country)
Variables Dependent variable: 1=never repeated a grade
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Tm 0.042*** 0.115*** 0.169*** 0.185***
(0.010) (0.022) (0.037) (0.039)
Female 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Yrs Schooling Father 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Yrs Schooling Mother 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tm ∗ Yrs Schooling Mother -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Yrs Since Migr Mother 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Tm ∗ Yrs Since Migr Mother -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Age Migration Moth 0.007**
(0.003)
(Age Migration Moth)2 -0.000**
(0.000)
Tm ∗ Age Migration Moth -0.001
(0.001)
N 30118 30118 30118 30118
# Country m 61 61 61 61
R Squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
The sample includes only cases where the mother was entirely educated in her
home country. Tm refers to the average math PISA score of natives
(standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1) in the country of
birth of the mother, across all available waves. All specifications control for
intercept, child age dummies, parents’ age, family size, year fixed effect,state
fixed effect, (year specific) quarter of birth fixed effect and father immigrant
status. Observations weighted according to the provided sample weights.
Robust standard errors clustered by mother country of origin. * denotes
significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at
1%.
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Table 15: Summary statistics - Time Use Survey (Parents)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total Child Care 86.76 122.3 0 1055
Educational Child Care 9.809 30.29 0 420
Recreational Child Care 21.11 59.76 0 639
Basic Child Care 55.85 90.96 0 1055
T p -.3779 .5812 -1.068 1.407
Yrs Since Migration 15.7 10.63 1 58
Mother .4878 .4999 0 1
Age Parent 37.72 8.456 18 80
Age Spouse 37.95 8.862 16 80
Parent Sec Edu .2397 .4269 0 1
Parent Ter Edu .3762 .4845 0 1
Spouse Sec Edu .2277 .4194 0 1
Spouse Ter Edu .3932 .4885 0 1
Number of Children 2.038 .9657 1 7
Avg Age Children 8.133 5 0 18
Number of Male Children 1.038 .8499 0 5
# Obs from Country p 91.2105 351.2035 2 2624
Observations 5199
The Table shows descriptive statistics for interviewed immigrant
parents in the Time Use Survey. Total refers to the total time
spent in child care activities, while Educational, Recreational
and Basic refer to the time use categories as defined in the text.
Score Country p is the average math PISA score of natives
(standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1) in the
country of birth of the interviewed parent. Observations
weighted according to the provided sample weights.
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Table 16: Time Use of Parents
Total Total Total Educational Recreational Basic
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
T p 15.673** 12.863*** 8.432** 1.446** 3.345** 3.641
(7.209) (4.661) (3.445) (0.720) (1.445) (2.366)
Mother 67.800*** 7.396*** 3.477 56.927***
(4.029) (0.667) (3.524) (2.490)
Parent Sec Edu -5.409 3.113*** -4.550 -3.972
(5.403) (0.619) (2.863) (2.433)
Parent Ter Edu 10.286** 4.335*** -2.597 8.548***
(5.086) (1.077) (3.227) (2.482)
Spouse Sec Edu 3.116 -2.795*** 7.935*** -2.024
(3.507) (0.517) (2.770) (1.274)
Spouse Ter Edu 12.009*** 0.709 6.812* 4.488**
(2.927) (1.727) (3.558) (2.220)
Age Parent 0.494 0.134** 0.142 0.219
(0.480) (0.063) (0.450) (0.145)
Age Spouse 0.347* 0.194** -0.062 0.215
(0.206) (0.084) (0.262) (0.197)
Number of Children 16.905*** 2.817*** 1.074 13.014***
(2.048) (0.957) (0.865) (1.626)
Avg Age Children -9.135*** -0.353*** -3.386*** -5.397***
(1.317) (0.119) (0.540) (0.774)
Number of Male Children -0.652 1.157*** -2.035** 0.226
(1.744) (0.417) (0.794) (1.204)
Yrs Since Migration -0.018 -0.153*** -0.070 0.206*
(0.161) (0.032) (0.098) (0.122)
N 5199 5199 5199 5199 5199 5199
# Country p 57 57 57 57 57 57
R Squared 0.01 0.03 0.23 0.06 0.10 0.21
State FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The sample includes only immigrant parents of children with at most 18 years. Total refers to the total
time spent in child care activities, while Educational, Recreational and Basic refer to the time use
categories as defined in the text. Score Country p is the average math PISA score of natives
(standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1) in the country of birth of the interviewed
parent, across all available waves. Additional controls in specifications (3) to (6) are dummies for
retired, full time students and disabled parents. Robust standard errors clustered by parent country of
origin. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 17: Summary statistics - Time Use Survey (Stu-
dents)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Study Time 57.86 88 0 525
Tm -.3441 .5669 -1.068 1.407
Native Father .1949 .3966 0 1
Female .422 .4944 0 1
Mother Sec Edu .2153 .4115 0 1
Mother Ter Edu .3841 .487 0 1
Father Sec Edu .1928 .3949 0 1
Father Ter Edu .3801 .486 0 1
Age 16.39 1.039 15 18
# Obs from Country m 10.5610 38.2590 1 248
Observations 433
The Table shows descriptive statistics for second generation
immigrants on the mother side. Score Country m is the
average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have
mean 0 and standard deviation 1) in the country of birth of
the mother. Observations weighted according to the provided
sample weights.
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Table 18: Time Use of Students
Variables Dependent Variable: Study Time
[1] [2] [3]
Tm 42.154*** 41.223*** 32.539**
(13.964) (12.971) (12.348)
Native Father -24.708 -18.913 -30.387
(20.407) (23.861) (24.880)
Female -4.227
(8.876)
Mother Sec Edu -7.142
(11.836)
Mother Ter Edu 26.791**
(12.959)
Father Sec Edu 21.461
(15.656)
Father Ter Edu 16.860
(16.197)
Age 1.429
(4.576)
N 433 433 433
# Country m 41 41 41
R Squared 0.07 0.17 0.21
State FE No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes
The sample includes only second generation
immigrants on the mother side that are full time
students and at most 18 years old. Score Country
m is the average math PISA score of natives
(standardized to have mean 0 and standard
deviation 1) in the country of birth of the mother,
across all available waves. Robust standard errors
clustered by mother country of origin. * denotes
significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%,
*** denotes significance at 1%.
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Table 19: Country of Origin Characteristics - Economic and Educational Development
Variables Dependent variable: test score math
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Tm 0.265*** 0.289*** 0.204*** 0.236*** 0.254*** 0.244***
(0.032) (0.041) (0.035) (0.039) (0.036) (0.039)
Female -0.208*** -0.207*** -0.205*** -0.207*** -0.208*** -0.203***
(0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Father Sec Edu 0.031 0.029 0.03 0.031 0.031 0.025
(0.047) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Father Ter Edu 0.108** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.098**
(0.052) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039)
Mother Sec Edu -0.004 -0.004 -0.018 -0.009 -0.006 -0.02
(0.036) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Mather Ter Edu 0.026 0.027 0.006 0.019 0.023 0.003
(0.050) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Log GDP -0.055** -0.064**
(0.027) (0.030)
% Skilled moth in m 0.207*** 0.487***
(0.078) (0.119)
Avg Years Edu in m 0.011 -0.006
(0.009) (0.011)
Pri Pupil/Teacher in m -0.001 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002)
N 42730 42730 42730 42730 42730 42730
# Country m 44 44 44 44 44 44
R Squared 0.672 0.672 0.673 0.672 0.672 0.674
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The sample includes only second generation immigrants on the mother side. Score Country m
is the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation
1) in the country of birth of the mother, across all available waves. Observations weighted
according to the provided sample weights. Robust standard errors clustered by mother country
of origin. All coefficients and standard errors are estimated according to the ”Unbiased
Shortcut” procedure (PISA Technical Report, 2009), using the replicate weights provided by
PISA. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at
1%.
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Table 20: Country of Origin Characteristics - Religion and Culture
Variables Dependent variable: test score math
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Tm 0.265*** 0.261*** 0.265*** 0.238***
(0.032) (0.068) (0.039) (0.052)
Female -0.208*** -0.205*** -0.208*** -0.206***
(0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Father Sec Edu 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.032
(0.047) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Father Ter Edu 0.108** 0.104*** 0.108*** 0.108***
(0.052) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Mother Sec Edu -0.004 -0.014 -0.004 -0.008
(0.036) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Mother Ter Edu 0.026 0.008 0.026 0.020
(0.050) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
% Catholic in m -0.116
(0.112)
% Protestant in m 0.062
(0.133)
% Other Christian Rel in m 0.055
(0.299)
% Orthodox in m -0.081
(0.190)
% Jews in m 4.225
(4.033)
% Muslim in m -0.168
(0.126)
% Jews in m 0.547***
(0.183)
% Buddhist in m 0.04
(0.457)
% Eastern Religions in m 0.591*
(0.329)
% Other Religion in m -0.008
(0.383)
Leisure Not Important in Life -0.378***
(0.110)
Child Quality: Hard Work -0.055
(0.118)
Child Quality: Obedience 0.152
(0.243)
Locus of Control 0.08**
(0.038)
N 42730 42730 42730 42730
# Country m 49 49 46 46
R Squared 0.672 0.674 0.672 0.673
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
The sample includes only second generation immigrants on the mother side.
Tm is the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0
and standard deviation 1) in the country of birth of the mother, across all
available waves. Observations weighted according to the provided sample
weights. Robust standard errors clustered by mother country of origin. All
coefficients and standard errors are estimated according to the ”Unbiased
Shortcut” procedure (PISA Technical Report, 2009), using the replicate
weights provided by PISA. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes
significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
151
3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 PISA
Given that the individual host countries have great flexibility in choosing how to report
parents’ countries of birth, some aggregation is necessary to get a set of countries/regions
consistently defined over time. In particular, we make the following adjustments: we code
Yugoslavia and similar labels as Serbia and Montenegro, USSR and similar labels as Russia,
Albania or Kosovo as Albania, France or Belgium as France, Germany or Austria as Ger-
many, China (including Hong Kong) as China. We drop all observations with inconsistent
or missing information on students’ or parents’ countries of birth.
Parents’ educational attainment is reported according to the ISCED 1997 classification sys-
tem. We group levels 0 and 1 into primary education, levels 2, 3 and 4 into secondary
education and levels 5 and 6 into tertiary education.
We construct some measures of school quality from the available information in the Student
and School Questionnaires. In particular, Avg Score School is the average PISA score of
the native students in the same school, Score FE is the estimated school fixed effect in a
regression of the PISA score on gender and parental education dummies (once again limiting
the sample to native students), Academic Admission is a dummy that takes value 1 whenever
schools report that student’s record of academic performance is either always or sometimes
considered for admissions, % Qual Teachers is the share of current teachers with at least the
ISCED 5A level of education and Dropout Rate is the share of students who leave the school
without having obtained the corresponding diploma.
3.8.2 Time Use
The time use categories are constructed as follows. Basic Child Care includes Physical
care for household children, Organization & planning for household children, Looking af-
ter household children (as a primary activity) , Attending household children’s events,
Waiting for/with household children, Picking up/dropping off household children, Talk-
ing with/listening to household children, Caring for & helping household children (n.e.c.),
Providing medical care to household children, Obtaining medical care for household chil-
dren, Waiting associated with household children’s health, Activities related to household
child’s health (n.e.c.), Travel related to caring for and helping household children. Educa-
tional Child Care includes Reading to/with hh children, Homework (household children),
Meetings and school conferences (household children), Home schooling of household chil-
dren, Waiting associated with household children’s education, Activities related to house-
hold child’s education (n.e.c.). Recreational Child Care includes Playing with household
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children (not sports), Arts and crafts with household children, Playing sports with house-
hold children. Study Time includes Research/homework for class for degree, certification,
or licensure,Research/homework for class for personal interest, Waiting associated with re-
search/homework, Research/homework (n.e.c.).
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